Q&A: Knowledge of Error?
Knowledge of Error?
Question
Hello,
It is commonly said that the sentence, “Yesterday I knew that the sun would not rise, but I was mistaken,” is incorrect, since the sun did rise. Therefore it should be corrected to: “I thought I knew that the sun would not rise, but I was proven wrong.” Likewise one could say, “Yesterday I believed …” => If so, it seems that knowledge is defined as true belief.
But on the other hand, if knowledge is only true belief, and we hardly know anything with certainty (except for internal claims like cogito), then we cannot really speak of knowledge at all, only of belief!
How do you understand whether there can be correct knowledge despite the possibility of error?
I thought of answering that we have a presumption, but one cannot know that the presumption itself is correct. What do you think?
Answer
First, you are identifying correctness with certainty, but the two are not identical. When I say that I know that the acceleration of a body is proportional to the force acting on it, it is justified to call that knowledge. If at some stage it turns out that I was mistaken, then it turns out that this was not knowledge after all (I was mistaken when I thought that I knew). But the justification for saying “I know” does not require certainty; it only requires that I myself think it is true. That is, that in my view this is knowledge and not merely belief (according to your view. In my view, belief is like knowledge).
And from this you can understand that when I say “I know X,” it depends on my own knowledge that it is true, and not on the truth as such. And indeed, it may turn out that I was mistaken.
Discussion on Answer
If a person tells me that he knows something, then I understand that in his view it is knowledge, and I myself take into account that he may be mistaken. But it still has meaning when he tells me that he knows, because I understand that at least from his point of view this is knowledge and not belief or a conjecture. Now it remains for me to decide what I think based on the trust I place in him.
In general, in my opinion these are merely word games. What difference does it make whether you use one term or another? The claim is that there is such a mental state—whether you call it knowledge or not—in which I know something at a given moment and it later turns out to be a mistake. Your questions are basically questions about language, and therefore in my opinion they are not important.
It follows from what you say that if knowledge requires only that I myself think it is true—and that it depends on my knowing that it is true and not on the truth as such—then you have emptied the concept of knowledge of content and turned it into something subjective.
By contrast, if you were mistaken, then you would not use the words “I knew,” but only “I thought it was true (and I was mistaken).” And similarly, if you believed something and it turned out that you were right, then you would say “I knew.” Therefore knowledge belongs to the objective plane.
But if so, the question returns: knowledge requires certainty and truth. And that hardly exists, except for internal claims, or logical truths.