See also column 481.

“Wheat that came down in the clouds” has come back to life in light of cultured meat. And maybe in the future there will also be wheat like that.

Sh.,
Thank you for the reply.
However, I didn’t really understand how these examples answer my question. On the face of it, quite the opposite!
After all, regarding the flying camel and the wheat, Rashi explains there on the spot that this is something realistic (even if a bit far-fetched — a camel moving quickly, and a stalk that carried wheat with it). And similarly in the other examples, the commentators work hard to explain why these are realistic cases. For example, according to Tosafot, the wheat was miraculous. Now, from the fact that the commentators trouble themselves to establish these situations as realistic (even if remote and uncommon), it necessarily follows that they understood the Talmudic discussions to have to deal with realistic applicability. For if we are talking about a theoretical discussion, in the sense of “expound and receive reward,” why insist on explaining it like Rashi or Tosafot? So precisely from these examples there seems to be proof that the Talmudic discussions operate on the plane of reality (even if remote and improbable).
As for the idolatrous city and the wayward and rebellious son, it says explicitly in the Talmud that they never were and never will be. But I’m asking about the other discussions. In fact, quite the contrary: from the fact that specifically about these cases it was said, it seems that this is the exception, while the rule is that everything belongs on the plane of reality, and we don’t have discussions for the sake of discussion alone.
So I’ll ask again: do we find an explicit discussion of something that will never exist (and not merely something improbable)?
P.S.
Of course, you don’t have to agree with Rashi’s or Tosafot’s plain reading in explaining those cases. But in any event, these passages are not decisive proof. And certainly according to Rashi and Tosafot and the other commentators, it seems they took a different approach, as stated.

I didn’t understand you. Are you asking about the other discussions? I gave you two examples. How many more do you want? If I bring two more, will you ask whether all the rest are like that? I really don’t understand what you mean.
The fact that medieval authorities explain it as a rare reality doesn’t say anything about the Talmud, only about their own opinion. In my opinion, this is a reality that never was and could not be. And if you want proof, there is proof from the wayward and rebellious son and the idolatrous city. That’s all.
In addition, I referred you to my column, and in it there is a reference to a book about the Platonism of the Talmud.

It seems I really didn’t explain myself properly.

I’ll try to explain myself through the following division: (a) the Talmud deals with the ideas themselves, with concepts, and the question of whether the thing is possible in our world is not important at all. According to this, the case of a camel flying in the air is to be taken literally. (b) the Talmud deals only with practical questions; anything that will not be realized in our world is unimportant and is not discussed. (c) the Talmud deals with all topics that are capable of realization. True, theoretically they may never actually be realized in our world, but in principle the discussion could be realized.

Now, I wanted to argue that from the fact that the medieval authorities explain the flying camel as a remote reality, it follows that they do not agree with the first option. On the other hand, the case of the wayward and rebellious son indicates that practical realization is not important. However, one could argue — say, according to Rashi — that in the end, the wayward and rebellious son and the idolatrous city are realities that in principle could exist, except that there is a disclosure showing that they in fact never were and never will be.

From here, I do not see these Talmudic discussions as proofs of the first option (only as a rejection of the second option). And I wonder whether I’ve missed examples that point to the first approach.

Indeed, all this is if I accept the medieval authorities’ view. You can certainly argue for the first option. That is, I have no refutation of that.

—
Thanks for the references; I’ll read and study them.

Are you asking why the Talmud does not deal with the law of a round triangle or a married bachelor? What kind of question is that? If the thing is defined, then in principle it can be realized, at least hypothetically. And if it is not defined, then there is no such thing. So what exactly are you asking? I’m referring you again to the column in which I dealt with the practical ramifications, and see there my detailed discussion of the matter.

No. I’m asking: is there an example of a discussion dealing with a reality that cannot be implemented in our world? For example, a camel flying in the air (that is not logically impossible), while at the same time the medieval authorities do not give an interpretation of the case that would fit it into reality (a camel moving quickly).

All right, thanks for the answers. I’ll read what you wrote in the references.

And with your permission, just one last question: why, in your opinion, do Rashi, Tosafot, and the other medieval authorities give a strained interpretation to the flying camel and to the wheat that came down in the clouds, so that it fits our reality, instead of simply saying, “This is an abstract principled discussion, and the case does not fit the reality before us”?

Again, thank you very much!

First, it is not certain that this is really their interpretation. For example, Rashi regarding “wheat that came down in the clouds,” where he writes that the ship rose into the air, may mean only to explain that the wheat being discussed grew in the ground and did not come down from the air, in order to define what kind of wheat is being discussed — but not that such a case could actually happen.
It may be that they inferred from the wording of the Talmud that it appears in practice to be speaking about a case rooted in reality, but not necessarily that the discussion itself must revolve around a realistic case.
On this matter, also see my article about forced interpretations, which touches on this.

Thank you very much!

It’s not something to be taken for granted that you devoted the time and attention to these questions — thank you!