On pages 239–241 of The First Existent you present the challenge from evolution (unrelated to the anthropic principle). There you make distinctions, and say that someone who accepts the “challenge from evolution” (you also call it “the life-sciences camp”) needs to look for another way to arrive at God. Because “the argument from complexity” does not work for him in the realm of the life sciences. In my opinion there are quite a few religious people like that; when you present them with the challenge from evolution they get very alarmed. So apparently the distinction you made is correct—I’m just saying it should also be made in the context of the anthropic principle.

Back to the anthropic principle: someone who takes the laws of nature out of the game (and there are quite a few atheists like that) can indeed use the anthropic principle against the “life-sciences camp.” And there the refutation you presented (which, as noted, was only against the physico-theological-physical argument) cannot be a good refutation against the “life-sciences camp” (again, according to the distinction that you yourself made).

*It is important to note that you refute the “challenge from evolution” (according to your view, of course), but again, that is only for someone who agrees that the world has “reached its goal” and that “man is the crown of creation.”
For atheists that is really, really not the case, and so maybe this is just a dialogue of the deaf.

Someone who ignores the proof can indeed ignore it. Someone who redirects it toward something else can indeed refute that other thing. What does that have to do with the issue? I presented a specific argument. You need to discuss it, not other arguments with other assumptions. Unless you think my assumptions are incorrect—but then discuss that. I claim that a system of laws that leads to our world is improbable without a guiding hand that created it. That’s it. That’s my claim. If someone wants to discuss “within the laws,” I already wrote at length that I have no need to deal with that (though even there it seems improbable to me).
The argument assumes nothing about man as the crown of creation, nor that the world has reached its goal. The world as it is today is sufficiently complex to establish this argument. If afterward it develops further, that only strengthens the argument. A system of laws that leads to such a world requires explanation. That’s all.

You argue that entropy is steadily decreasing and that creatures today are more complex than in the past. That is technically true, and even atheists would not dispute that (in the technical sense). In addition, it would also be very hard for an atheist to argue that the decrease in entropy is a product of evolution, because evolution includes a very dominant component of “extinction,” so there is no reason to assume (if one relies only on evolution) that after four and a half billion years the slope of increasing complexity is more or less only in one direction—toward increasing complexity. And one can probably assume (at least rationally) that there is a programmer behind the laws of nature and complexity.

The point is that there is no shortage of atheists who hold that despite the high complexity of creatures today on planet Earth, in an essential sense our condition is no better than that of the creatures that lived on Earth a million years ago (when entropy was presumably higher relative to today).

In that sense, atheists are talking about essence, while you are talking about technical modes.
Imagine, for example, that someone thinks the world record is collecting sewing needles. Technically he is a world champion, and maybe it gives him a good feeling inside, but from the standpoint of the world there is nothing essential there.

I’m saying your argument may well be convincing and intellectually correct, but as you wrote in the introduction to The First Existent,
in the end, if an atheist is an atheist—then he’s an atheist, and correct things won’t convince him. Meaning, if an atheist sees no essential difference between a human being and an ant, then even if the physico-theological argument seems intellectually correct to him, it won’t move anything for him. And what can you do—ultimately none of us makes decisions purely on the basis of rational thought alone (sometimes that’s for the better).

I can’t understand you. If you agree that entropy decreases, then how can you say it’s the same thing? These are just word games. Someone who doesn’t accept a correct argument because he doesn’t feel like it—I have nothing to discuss with him. Psychology is a different branch from philosophy. You can’t reject a correct argument by claiming there are people who won’t accept it because they are captive to a mistaken conception. Let them take a pill.

One can argue that the laws of nature are primordial (that they are the basis of everything—the atheist cosmological argument). You also addressed this in your book.
The answer you gave was that it is not plausible that they are primordial, mainly because of fine-tuning (the constants).
But atheists have an answer to that too—
You are invited to look at the channel of Professor of Physics Sabine Hossenfelder.
There is a short video there (8 minutes) that answers your argument.

I’ll conclude by stressing that there are atheists who would not necessarily agree that entropy is decreasing, despite a certain complexity that exists. For example, in the past there were more complex creatures—giant insects, the megalodon, giant land mammals.
Likewise, there are those who infer that the fact that animals have various problems is evidence against the physico-theological argument. For example, in humans, the fact that our eye is poorly designed and causes us vision problems compared to other animals.
At best they will infer that entropy is decreasing despite these flaws; at worst they will infer that there is no way a “super-engineer” prepared such laws of nature, and then they have direct evidence against the physico-theological argument.

*I’ll just note regarding entropy that, if I remember correctly, you also wrote that it is impossible really to estimate it relative to earlier periods.

I see no point in hairsplitting over what atheists might say. If you have a specific argument against what I said that seems to you (not to this or that person) correct, and that I have not answered, raise it here. So far I have found nothing of the sort in your words.

And don’t invent terms unless you define them. That only clouds the discussion.

The atheist argument is that we do not really know anything about any sample space of those constants, or about other relations among them. If, say, we could observe various universes collapsing (or universes without life) with various other constants, that would be one thing. But that is not the situation.

It’s like throwing 1,000,000 times some geometric shape with X faces (without knowing what numbers are on the faces).
You get the number 5 a million times.
That tells you nothing, because maybe that geometric shape has only the digit 5 on it (or maybe not). You do not actually know, and therefore nothing can be inferred.

You can of course argue that if the geometric shape contains only the number 5 on all its faces then that indicates design. But atheists won’t accept that (again, because of the atheist-cosmological argument).

Besides, atheists spice up their case for their argument by saying that it seems very strange that God would create such a sophisticated universe with such delicately fixed relations, when most of it (almost all of it) is actually unusable for the living creatures in it . . .

And again, apart from that—I am setting aside the fact that an atheist can easily claim not only that there is no evidence that entropy is decreasing, but in his opinion entropy is actually increasing.

You keep telling me what atheists might say instead of presenting your own argument. These are absurd arguments that I have already answered in detail. So let’s stop here.

Argument: Fine-tuning cannot be used to strengthen the physico-theological argument, and that is because there is no sample space of constants across various different universes. Examples from cellular automata are not sufficiently relevant.

Counterargument: it certainly can, because in the absence of information one assumes a uniform distribution. And if there is some other information, that itself testifies to a guiding hand (as in the die example with the fives that you brought).
Second counterargument: if you assume many other universes, each with different constants, then you need to tell me who the manufacturer of those universes is, and why we do not see any of them (ah, because they are tiny and transparent. Teapots).
And third, if such different and bizarre universes do in fact exist, then there is no reason to assume that in one of them there are no gods, demons, and all the other beings whose existence you are trying to avoid claiming.
Oh, and a fourth: isn’t all this a more complex proposal, and therefore a less plausible one (Occam’s razor), than the proposal that there is someone or something that created our universe?! Please pass along a suggestion of mine regarding the theory of gravitation: there is no gravitational force. There are lots of demons, and whenever someone looks they pull bodies toward one another. Or maybe there are also lots of worlds where everything is random in all of them (with no forces and fields etc.), and one of them behaves according to the inverse-square law. But clearly there is no gravitational force.
Let the atheists solve it.
By the way, I already explained all this very clearly. There is no new question here that I haven’t addressed.

Response to counterargument 1:
Who said that when there is no information we assume a uniform distribution?
I’ll quote the professor of physics I mentioned earlier (response below).
And assuming I understood her correctly, that raises the (very technical) statistical question: who is right, you or her?

As for arguments 2–4, I did not assume many universes, so that is irrelevant.

What’s wrong with the argument is the claim that the value of the constants of the nature that we observe are unlikely.
There is no way to ever quantify this probability because we will never measure a constant of nature that has a value other that the one it does have.

If you want to quantify a probability you have to collect a sample of data.
You could do that, for example if you were throwing a dice –
Throw them often enough, and you get an empirically supported probability distribution.
But we do not have an empirically supported probability distribution for the constants of nature.

And why is that?
It’s because… they are constant.
saying that the only value we have ever observed is “unlikely” is a scientifically meaningless statement.
We have no data and we will never have data, which allows us to quantify the probability of something we cannot observe.
There’s nothing quantifiably unlikely, therefore, there’s nothing in need of explanation.

So what is the answer to the question I asked—
what do you do in a case where there is no information: do you assume a uniform distribution or can you not assume one?
I’d be happy if someone can answer that, if he has knowledge.
And is this even a technical (mathematical) question, or actually a philosophical one?

[Ehud, see Rabbi Michi’s answer here https://mikyab.net/posts/76025#comment-61694 ]

I already answered that above. This is a philosophical question, not a mathematical one. I’ll repeat briefly.
In the absence of information, I assume a uniform distribution. And if there is some other distribution, that means someone built some structure that dictates a statistical preference for these laws, and that itself requires someone or something to do so. So either way you arrive at God.

Since this is a philosophical question, and everyone can think however he wants—
if someone decides that in a case where there is no information, he assumes no distribution at all—
is this a “philosophical inferiority,” like in the case of an infinite loop in the context of the cosmological argument?

If this is not something philosophically invalid, and it’s 50-50, then this is a kind of lifeline for the atheist (not a very strong one), because the physico-theological argument does not collapse even if someone chooses not to go with a uniform distribution when there is no information. That is, even if someone has a problem with the fine-tuning argument

I did not assume a uniform distribution. My throat is already hoarse. I built an either-way argument for whether the distribution is uniform or not. That’s it, we’ve exhausted this.

Okay, you claim you didn’t assume a uniform distribution, so I’ll simply quote from the current thread what you wrote:

“Counterargument: it certainly can, because in the absence of information one assumes a uniform distribution.”.

At one point you claim one assumes it; afterward you claim you didn’t assume it, but really you do assume it for the sake of an “either-way” argument.

In any case, the either-way argument is of course fundamentally mistaken and contains a logical fallacy of the “false choice” type.
It assumed:
1. A uniform distribution.
2. Many universes.

As I showed, at least one more option is missing, and this is actually the official atheist position: that one does not assume a uniform distribution, and does not assume many universes. One simply says that this is the current state of affairs.
It’s a shame Hillel didn’t think of this very basic question before the book was written . . .

Everyone is invited to read and judge as they wish. I think it’s pretty clear who is right here.

Given your problematic reading comprehension, I’m starting to suspect that you are the famous Ehud here on the site. A quote taken out of context isn’t supposed to prove anything.
I claim one should use a uniform distribution, not because the uniform distribution represents reality, but because of the either-way argument. It doesn’t take a long school day to understand that, especially when I already explained it here.
Even in your description of my words you display reading comprehension at an embarrassing level. I did not write that the choice is between a uniform distribution and multiple universes. Multiple universes is an option even if the distribution is uniform (though then you need more universes).

And the option you add—that the world is as it is—is not a third option but an agreed fact. The question is what brought it to be as it is, not what its condition is now. Regarding that, there are two options: either a uniform distribution or a distribution biased toward the current one. And that is what I was talking about.
It is indeed clear (not just “pretty clear”) who is right here. Best of luck to all of us.

I try not to deal in barbs; if you or one of the readers wants to write something substantive, you are more than welcome.

I’ll demonstrate the difference between my method and Michi’s method.

Ehud’s method:
1. Absence of information (our situation) — all of us have free choice whether God created this or the laws are primordial.
2. Information about different constants (for example, many universes with a different number of constants in each universe) — it will be easier to decide whether our universe is special.
3. Clear knowledge that the current state of the constants (as in our universe) is the only possible state — everyone is free to decide in that case whether God created it or the laws are primordial.

Michi’s method:
1. Absence of information — one can assume there is a God, because in this case we assume a uniform distribution.
2. “If there is another distribution” (a distribution biased toward the current one) — one must assume there is a God.

Beyond the false choice in Michi’s argument, as I demonstrated, there is a problem with the second clause in Michi’s either-way argument.
The problem is this: assuming there is information (say, more universes were discovered), that does not mean there is “another distribution” or a “distribution biased toward the current one” (by the way, to the best of my understanding there is no such concept).
And therefore there is no possibility at all of inferring that someone gave a “statistical preference” (in Michi’s words); rather, one simply knows that the state of the constants is completely static.

I think I demonstrated quite clearly why Michi is mistaken:
A. There is a false choice in Michi’s argument (by the way, not only on this issue but on many issues).
B. The second clause in the “either way” is simply incorrect.
Behind the scenes he always assumes some distribution.
We also know that there are situations in reality that are not statistical but fixed, and therefore one can assume the same about the constants of physics.

I ask—if someone responds, please respond substantively and without barbs.

Ehud, I’ll try. Especially if you read Rabbi Michi’s remarks referred to in the link I sent above.
When a universe emerges out of absolute nothingness, that is a case where no information exists, there is no mechanism controlling the emergence of universes, and therefore Rabbi Michi treats it as a uniform distribution—meaning there is no reason to attribute any probabilistic advantage to any particular universe. Because any such advantage is the product of some hidden mechanism, which does not exist here because we are dealing with absolute nothingness. Therefore our universe, or a reasonable and successful universe, has a tiny probability, and from this comes a proof of God.
But when a universe emerges from some mysterious universe-generating mechanism, that is a case where we do not know the information, but there is a mechanism controlling the emergence of universes, and one can say that each universe has a different probability, though we do not know what that probability is. In such a case one should indeed not assume a uniform distribution over universes, but the argument shifts to dealing with the very existence of that mechanism, and with the fact that this mechanism grants a high probability to a reasonable and successful universe. The existence of such a mechanism is what proves the existence of God (because without God, such a successful mechanism itself emerges from nothing with uniform probability across all mechanisms).
(Rabbi Michi, if I did not describe this correctly, or if what I wrote is not relevant, I’d appreciate it if you would please correct me.)

Hello Tirgitz,

Response to your words. Quote 1:
“When a universe emerges out of absolute nothingness, that is a case where no information exists, there is no mechanism controlling the emergence of universes”.

Response 1:
There is a certain inaccuracy here. I am not saying there is or is not a mechanism that controls it. That is not relevant at the moment. All I know is that there are the constants in our universe.
There may be a mechanism or there may not be. There is no information.

Quote 2
“Rabbi Michi treats it as a uniform distribution”

Response 2:
Statistics is a science that deals with quantitative data.

Therefore, to say that one assumes a uniform distribution over a single state is nonsense.
It may somehow even be true, because in practice I believe God did indeed create the universe out of every possible state.
But that doesn’t say anything.
If I tell you “6,” can you assume some “uniform distribution” about that?
A distribution of what?

Please look at the words of the professor of physics (you are also invited to watch the video) whom I quoted here. Maybe she explains it better than I do.

Quote 3
“…therefore our universe, or a reasonable and successful universe, has a tiny probability”

Response 3:
Again, as I explained earlier: if I just tell you “9,” you cannot infer any tiny probability because you have no knowledge of any sample space.

Quote 4:
“…there is a mechanism controlling the emergence of universes, and one can say that each universe has a different probability though we do not know what that probability is.”

Response 4:
For our purposes, the discussion revolves around the constants. I started from the assumption that if we know there are many universes, then we can know their constants.
Then indeed there is a bit more information, and we can get a distribution (if there are two universes we can get a sample space of 2, and if there are 100, we get a sample space of 100, etc.).
After we have a distribution we can draw various inferences. For example, if in all universes the constants are the same, then according to atheists that may mean there is no God assembling universes; rather, the universes are simply an existing state with those same constants (there is nothing special about the constants).
And if each universe has different constants from other universes, then if indeed there is no life on the other universes, it is reasonable to assume that the constants in our universe are indeed a very special case that came to allow life here.
(this still does not answer the question why God would create empty universes, but that is another matter).

We are dealing here with constants. I did not understand the relation between the constants and your statement that “one can say that each universe has a different probability.”
If you mean that God is necessary because there are a number of universes (regardless of the state of their constants), then I do agree with that, but for that we have no need at all for the fine-tuning argument 🙂

I suggest you look at the blog of “Ethologica” under “Abraham Plays with Errors” in the chapter on fine-tuning. He holds something similar to what I hold—
in the end Michi draws conclusions that are irrelevant to information we simply do not have.
By the way, as far as I know, he has a doctorate in mathematics.

If you have anything more to write—I’d be happy.
And good for you for writing without barbs!

Have a peaceful Sabbath!

Ehud, sorry for entering the discussion. I really don’t understand these topics at all, because even when I read about them I didn’t really understand.
But I didn’t quite manage to understand this issue of lack of information about the probability space.
I think everyone agrees that we have no information about what happens outside the three-dimensional domain… but that doesn’t mean we don’t assume some distribution in order to explain.
According to your approach, it’s impossible to explain anything. For example, regarding lots of things we don’t really have a probability space except for exercises in a math textbook. Unless we assume additional assumptions like “uniformity” =? the “simplicity” of the universe, and so on.

I think that science too, when it proves things, explains according to the most reasonable/best explanation. It assumes uniform distributions all the time, and again this comes from lack of information and a desire to learn about the world.
It seems to me all analogies and all science are built on that. But I’m no expert.
It also seems to me that atheists raise these doubts specifically regarding first questions, but sleep very well at night with everything else…
I’m writing apologetically because maybe you can enlighten me that indeed the foundations of epistemology are stable even within a secular worldview.

[Ehud, I obviously know this discussion and its twists and links from before it went into mothballs, and I’m not trying to get into it here. I presented to you what I understood from Rabbi Michi’s words, because I thought you had understood him incorrectly (regardless of whether you actually have good arguments against what he said). Yes yes, no no.].

Hello to commenter . (DOT)

“Regarding lots of things, we don’t really have a probability space except for exercises in a math textbook.”

True, and when we do not have a known sample space, we cannot infer anything in that context.
For example, in a basketball game there are 3 ways to score points—
a three-pointer (three points)
a regular basket (2 points)
a free throw (one point).

If for the first time in your life you saw a basketball game, and you heard the announcer say, “Michael Jordan scores one point from the line,”
could you at that moment necessarily infer that there is also a possibility of scoring two points or three points, or maybe even a 20-point basket?

You wrote a general sentence saying that you think people do assume sample spaces.

I’d be happy if you could give a practical example—something where we necessarily had absolutely no knowledge of the sample space, and yet we still managed to estimate intelligently (not just guess) what the correct sample space was.

I repeat what I said: I am a believer, and I agree with Michi that one can assume that the sample space of potential constants is infinite. But that is a kind of guess.
At the same time, any atheist who thinks there is no possibility of inferring anything about a sample space is just as right as I am.

By the way, Michi’s argument that “I didn’t claim a uniform distribution in advance; I did that for the either-way argument, and only afterward concluded that one should indeed use a uniform distribution” is not serious at all, as I showed in this discussion.

Wishing you a peaceful Sabbath.

Ehud, as I understand it, you are basically reducing everything to foundational problems like the problem of induction.
That’s where the questions about the argument come from. If you accept the use of these tools, then the questions you raise are not good—or more precisely, not unique to this case.
And if not, then not—but don’t say that it’s only this conclusion that you don’t accept while accepting everything else.

The same thing can be said about black ravens: once you’ve encountered one raven, you assume there are only black ravens. Once you encounter a law of nature, you assume it prevails throughout the universe. Of course that is an assumption that you will call arbitrary, just like your assumption about Michael Gordon.
(Specifically, I think your analogy there is reversed: a person infers that you can score only one point with a basket, whereas in fact you can also score two and three points—and that is reality as opposed to the simple assumption.)

Have a good week, DOT,

What I’m saying is that if you hear of a certain number, and assuming you have no hint or information about anything connected to it, you have no way of seriously knowing to which sample space it belongs, and any decision from that point on will be nothing but a guess.

Can you give me an example of something I would reject because I reduce everything to the problem of induction?

I’ll note again that I have no problem with Michi’s guess.
What I do have a problem with is that he thinks it is a “serious argument.”

Let’s move on—just answer the question I asked.