Q&A: Kiddushin 82, Lesson 6
Kiddushin 82, Lesson 6
Question
In the lesson you explained that the question whether agency is authorization or an extended hand does not touch on the question whether the result of the agency isthat the act is that of the principal or only that the results are attributed to the principal.
But I didn’t understand why. Seemingly, if the agent is an extended hand then it is considered that the principal performed the act because it was his hand that carried it out. And if agency is authorization then the agent performed the act and not the principal, but rather the results of the act are for the principal. And it seems to me that this itselfis the main practical difference in the conceptual inquiry regarding the mechanism of agency.
Answer
As I explained there, the question whether this is authorization or an extended hand deals with the mechanism of agency, whereas the question whether agency applies to legal capacity or to the act concerns the result—whether the act is considered the principal’s act or not. The indication of this is that regarding authorization versus an extended hand there is a dispute among the medieval authorities (Rishonim), but agency for legal capacity and agency for the act both exist according to both approaches.
Let’s say you understand the mechanism as authorization; even so, one can still say both that the act is considered my act and that the result takes effect for me. A practical difference would be that the transgression would be charged to me (were it not for the rule that there is no agent for a transgression). Or in the case of an agent sent to cause damage by fire, which is only agency for the act (because no legal effect takes place there), it is still possible that that agent acts as an authorized representative, and the result is that the act is attributed to the principal and he is liable to pay.
Discussion on Answer
When you say that the act is considered the principal’s act, that can be said in two senses: 1. In the context of how the agency is carried out, the agency was performed by the principal. 2. In the sense of the result of the agency (that he is considered to have acted and the transgression is on him). You can identify those two, and you can distinguish between them.
In the other direction, the distinction may be even easier to see: even if it is an extended hand, that is only regarding how the agency is carried out, but not regarding the result (where, from that standpoint, the one who acted is the agent, and only the result passes over to the principal).
So why did the later authorities say that according to Maimonides, in the case where the principal became insane, it must be that the law of agency is authorization? After all, even if it is authorization, it could still be that the act is considered the principal’s act. And one could also say that it is a case of an extended hand, except that the act is the agent’s, and therefore he can continue his agency.
In other words, the later authorities tied the Maimonides-Tur dispute to the question of the mechanism of agency, but according to what you’re saying, we should have tied it to the question of the result of the agency.