Q&A: Retroactive Halakhic Intervention in Contracts
Retroactive Halakhic Intervention in Contracts
Question
Hello,
Recently Gafni proposed a bill regarding mortgages, in which he suggests limiting the percentage by which interest rates may rise on existing mortgages. In other words, a bill that in practice retroactively changes existing contracts.
My question is whether there is any parallel to this in the halakhic world. Does the Rabbi know of a case in which, regarding a contract that was valid from a halakhic standpoint at the time it was written, a new halakhic ruling intervened retroactively—that is, changed the existing contract? Alternatively, is such a thing even possible from a halakhic perspective? And would it be possible when there is a Sanhedrin?
Answer
Certainly yes. After all, a religious court can confiscate property, and it is obvious that it can also cut interest rates, etc. A religious court also retroactively confiscates the money of betrothal. Of course, this is only a principled answer, without addressing my opinion of the proposal itself.
Discussion on Answer
A. Why does that matter? If they can do this, they can do that too.
B. I gave the example of confiscating the betrothal money. That is a general confiscation applying to anyone who sent an agent for divorce and then canceled it not in his presence, and not a specific case. Rabbeinu Gershom’s ban did not void any contract; it only forbids doing it.
Thanks, that answered my question.
A. It matters because sometimes there is a response to a micro-problem, and I was more interested in macro-level changes that led to broad changes.
B. For that matter, Rabbeinu Gershom’s ban began from a certain point in time, and in practice it forbade marrying a second wife. I’m sure that at that time there were people who had become engaged to a second wife before the ban but had not managed to marry her before the prohibition took effect. Didn’t the ban in practice void their betrothal?
In any case, it did not void their betrothal, and not even the marriage or kiddushin, if they did it. It only forbade doing so. It has no connection to our discussion.
In addition, I’d be interested to know what the Rabbi thinks about Gafni’s mortgage proposal from a moral perspective. (To me it seems blatantly immoral, since mortgage holders knew the possible risks from the outset, and the banks priced them accordingly, which is why they received a certain discount.) And what does the Rabbi think about the matter from a halakhic perspective?
If we are talking about retroactive cancellation, then it really does seem problematic to me.
Rabbi, I’m asking about a halakhic ruling that retroactively changed contracts in general, not דווקא a religious court dealing with a specific contract. An example that popped into my head and might be relevant: could it be that the ban of Rabbeinu Gershom retroactively voided the entire betrothal agreement of people who had become engaged to a second wife but had not yet married her? (By the way, an interesting question.)