Q&A: Regarding the law of “yours” — in a sukkah and a lulav
Regarding the law of “yours” — in a sukkah and a lulav
Question
In the Talmud, Sukkah 27b, it is explained that Rabbi Eliezer derives from the verse, “You shall make for yourself the festival of Sukkot,” that a person does not fulfill his obligation in another person’s sukkah, similar to what is derived regarding the lulav, where it must be his own from the verse “and you shall take for yourselves,” which is expounded to mean: from your own property.
And it is explained in the Talmud that the Sages agree that “you shall make for yourself” is interpreted to exclude the case that a person does not fulfill his obligation in a stolen sukkah, but they hold that he does fulfill his obligation in a borrowed sukkah, deriving this from the verse “All the native-born in Israel shall dwell in sukkot,” meaning that all Israel can fulfill the obligation in one sukkah.
And I was troubled by two points. 1. According to Rabbi Eliezer — does he really hold that a son does not fulfill his obligation in his father’s sukkah? It seems strained to say that he requires a transfer of ownership to each person, because if so, they would not be able to make kiddush and eat an olive-sized amount together at the same time.
2. According to the Sages it is difficult, because once the Merciful One revealed in the verse “All the native-born in Israel shall dwell in sukkot” that one fulfills his obligation in a borrowed sukkah, and that this is not considered a deficiency in the requirement of “you shall make for yourself,” then why should we not say that one likewise fulfills his obligation with another person’s lulav, and there is no deficiency because of “for yourselves”? For we see regarding sukkah that when one uses it with the owner’s permission, it is indeed considered “yours” / “for yourselves.”
I will add another difficulty that bothered me regarding the law of a borrowed sukkah, which perhaps will be clarified together with this issue. Later in the tractate, on 31a, it is explained that according to the Sages, who hold that a person fulfills his obligation in a borrowed sukkah, one who steals a sukkah also fulfills his obligation, because land cannot be stolen (since the sukkah is treated as land, as Rashi writes: “for example, where he forcefully overpowered his fellow and removed him from his sukkah, which was built on the land of the robbery victim, and anything attached to the ground is like the ground itself”) — “and it is a borrowed sukkah.” I did not understand this at all, because it is certainly true that because of the prohibition of theft, a person may not take control of another person’s land, even if we say that land cannot be stolen, since his use contradicts the other person’s ownership of the land. So even if they hold that land cannot be stolen, that is only with regard to the land itself — that we say the thief does not acquire the land through the laws of theft (and the practical difference is that he does not acquire it through despair and change). But surely the uses he makes of the land against the owner’s will are uses without right, and are therefore “stolen uses.” So why, according to the Sages, does he fulfill his obligation in such a case?
Answer
- A son who is supported at his father’s table fulfills his obligation in his father’s sukkah. But an adult son indeed appears not to fulfill his obligation according to Rabbi Eliezer. The sukkah belongs to the head of the household, and in that “for yourselves” is fulfilled.
- But that is only for sukkah, not for lulav, because the sukkah is a substitute for a house, and therefore the law of “for yourselves” is fulfilled when it belongs to the head of the household. But in the case of lulav, this is private ownership and not a residence, and there the law of “for yourselves” is fulfilled only if it is actually his (the son’s). Therefore we find that one must transfer ownership of the lulav to his young son, etc.
- I did not understand the question. Even if the use falls under theft, as long as the sukkah itself is not stolen, why should it be disqualified? We are not dealing here with the law of a commandment that comes through a transgression, but with the law of “for yourselves.” The fact that the person, as an individual, is violating the prohibition of theft changes nothing regarding the question whether the sukkah is stolen in his possession.
Discussion on Answer
I didn’t understand the question. Rabbi Eliezer disqualifies a borrowed sukkah, but not a son in his father’s sukkah. That itself is the distinction I suggested. The fact that the son has no monetary ownership does not matter if his father does.
I explained that the sukkah has to be his, and if land cannot be stolen then the sukkah is his. Even if the dwelling is through a transgression, the place is his place.
According to Rabbi Eliezer:
“Rabbi Eliezer disqualifies a borrowed sukkah, but not a son in his father’s sukkah. That itself is the distinction I suggested. The fact that the son has no monetary ownership does not matter if his father does” — why? Why is that considered that he has ownership? Does the Rabbi mean because his father’s ownership is significant for him as well (“one purse for both of them”)? If so, then also regarding lulav we should not require transferring ownership to a minor.
According to the Sages:
“I explained that the sukkah has to be his, and if land cannot be stolen then the sukkah is his. Even if the dwelling is through a transgression, the place is his place.” When I enter my friend’s courtyard, does the place become mine? On the contrary, land always remains in the owner’s legal possession, and he does not even have theft-based acquisition rights in it. To what “place” is the Rabbi referring? The airspace of the sukkah? The status of “dwelling” that the sukkah has? I do not understand what about the stolen sukkah is “borrowed” in his hands rather than “stolen” in his hands. And mainly, why is that same “place” not also his in the case of one who steals wood and makes it into a sukkah?
Thank you very much!
According to Rabbi Eliezer:
A father’s place of residence is considered his son’s place as well. In the case of lulav, we are not dealing with residence.
According to the Sages:
The Sages hold that one fulfills his obligation in a borrowed sukkah, and if land cannot be stolen then this is a borrowed sukkah and it is considered his according to the Sages. The fact that the use is through a transgression does not change the fact that, as an object, this is a borrowed sukkah.
I did not understand, according to Rabbi Eliezer, what the Rabbi’s reasoning is for saying that in the case of one supported at his father’s table there is no deficiency in that it is not his. And if the Rabbi means that it is considered his because he is under his father’s care and they are “one purse,” then in the case of lulav too, one who is supported at his father’s table should not need to acquire it, because even before he acquires the lulav it is under his father’s ownership and should be considered his?
And according to the Sages — what is meant by “if land cannot be stolen then the sukkah is his”? What is the “sukkah” that the Rabbi claims is indeed his? The space itself? The actual wood of the sukkah? The act of dwelling in the sukkah? For the land itself is certainly not his (and on the contrary, this is worse than stealing movable property, where he at least has theft-based acquisition rights). And regarding the dwelling in the sukkah, that too is stolen, because he has no right to use it there. And this is worse than a borrowed sukkah, where he has the right to live there, whereas here he is neither using his own property nor using it lawfully.
We’re repeating ourselves. I explained everything. You may disagree, and that is perfectly fine.
Sorry about the last question. There was a glitch (on my end or on the site, I don’t know), and my previous comment didn’t appear, nor did the Rabbi’s last answer.
Thank you very much for sharpening the points down to the finest detail!!!
First of all, thank you very much!
But I’m still having difficulty, because in my humble opinion the definition the Rabbi wrote regarding question 2 seemingly undermines the reasoning the Rabbi wrote in answer to question 1.
That is, if according to the Sages the definition of “yours” in sukkah is “my place of residence,” and that can exist even in a borrowed sukkah (because even though the sukkah itself is not mine, it is still my place of residence), then Rabbi Eliezer, who disqualifies even a borrowed sukkah, must hold that one needs monetary ownership of the sukkah itself. If so, then even a son who is supported at his father’s table should not fulfill his obligation in his father’s sukkah.
And likewise regarding question 3, I do not understand the Rabbi’s words. Since if according to the Sages the law of “yours” is that the sukkah be “my place of residence,” then in the fact that they disqualify a stolen sukkah, it must be that in a stolen sukkah we do not say that this is his place of residence, even though in practice he will live there on the holiday. Rather, we say that “my place of residence” is a place where I have the right to live.
If so, then also in the case of someone who steals a sukkah, even though he is not considered a thief with respect to the sukkah itself, still his dwelling in the sukkah is not lawful, and it should be similar to one who steals wood and makes it into a sukkah, where even the Sages agree that he does not fulfill his obligation?