Q&A: Love
Love
Question
In Two Carts and a Hot-Air Balloon you write that “there are statements, or references (not descriptions), that can indeed relate to a thing in itself, and not to its form. One of these exceptions is the statement that a certain thing exists,” and in a footnote you add that “an interesting exception is love for a certain person. It is hard to assume that the object of love is the collection of that person’s traits. It seems more plausible that one loves the person himself, and not his traits.” Could the Rabbi explain in more detail what he meant by these remarks? How, in the process of love, does a person gain cognition of the thing in itself that he could not attain beforehand, and what kind of cognition is this? And in your view, is this also true regarding the idea of love of God (as opposed to Maimonides’ words that one should contemplate His deeds)?
Answer
See Column 22 and here: https://mikyab.net/%D7%9B%D7%AA%D7%91%D7%99%D7%9D/%D7%9E%D7%90%D7%9E%D7%A8%D7%99%D7%9D/%D7%9E%D7%A9%D7%9E%D7%A2%D7%95%D7%AA-%D7%90%D7%A4%D7%9C%D7%98%D7%95%D7%A0%D7%99%D7%AA-%D7%9C%D7%A8%D7%92%D7%A9%D7%95%D7%AA-%D7%91%D7%94%D7%9C%D7%9B%D7%94
Discussion on Answer
Briefly: my claim is that there is an encounter with the thing in itself through its appearances—the person through his characteristics and traits. So the bond that is formed is formed by means of and through the characteristics (the phenomena), but after it is formed it pertains to the noumenon. Therefore from that point on, it is possible for the traits to change while it does not change, or at least does not disappear. It is possible that the traits will affect its quality, and in rare cases even dissolve it completely.
Even there, in your discussion of this point, you write that “when I dealt with this distinction years ago, one of my female students remarked that in her view love toward someone, too, is directed at the essence of the beloved and not at his traits. The traits are the way to encounter him, but afterward the love is directed at the bearer of the traits and not at the traits themselves, and therefore it may survive even if the traits change in some way. Perhaps this is what the Sages meant in Ethics of the Fathers: ‘Any love that depends on something—when the thing ceases, the love ceases. But any love that does not depend on something—when the thing ceases, the love does not cease.’” But I still haven’t understood how a Platonic emotion can be directed toward an object to which we have no access (the thing in itself / matter). And do you really think that a change in traits should not affect the degree of our love toward the person we are supposed to feel it for?