Q&A: The Reliability of Tradition and the Validity of Revelation
The Reliability of Tradition and the Validity of Revelation
Question
Over the course of the trilogy, the Rabbi tries to show how the existence of a thin God (which in fact is not all that thin) is, philosophically speaking, the most reasonable conclusion, in a way that leaves almost no room (and perhaps none at all) for any other position short of absolute skepticism about every kind of knowledge-acquisition in reality. But with regard to the reliability of tradition, it is clear to the Rabbi that the arguments do not leave a person in a similar position when weighing whether to believe or deny it. For even regarding the very authenticity of the tradition of the Sinai revelation and the Exodus from Egypt, regardless of what happened at the event itself, critical scholarship raises objections, and certainly its claims cannot be considered completely baseless even if one does not accept them. But from an a priori standpoint, shouldn’t we expect revelation to occur in such a way that it would leave almost no doubt for a person regarding the reliability of the transmission of the tradition (or even that it would be renewed in every generation)? And if so, isn’t that itself a consideration against the reliability of a tradition, since it is open to historical challenge in several ways (a topic you did not go into in depth), and therefore we would not expect the revelation of the Holy One, blessed be He—which is the way a person fulfills his purpose—to be given in a form so vulnerable to historical dispute? And doesn’t the fact that the claim of exposure to revelation was made only before one nation, and not before all humanity, also reduce the a priori likelihood that this is the way God would choose to reveal Himself?
Answer
That is definitely an argument against belief in the tradition, but it has to be weighed together with other arguments and brought to a bottom line.
Beyond that, I think this is a fairly weak argument, because you are assuming something about the way the Holy One, blessed be He, ought to act. That seems a bit presumptuous to me.
Discussion on Answer
First of all, that consideration exists both for you and for me, but I wrote that it is not a strong one. I have written more than once that for me too it joins the overall picture. Beyond that, in my view there is a difference between saying that He does not do things for no reason (which is a general intuition), and a specific claim that is tailored to human beings and infers the proper way for Him to behave (how to reveal Himself).
Rabbi: if the purpose of society cannot be morality (repairing society), then for what purpose were the gentiles created, given that they are not obligated in the Torah? For the sake of the seven commandments? That sounds forced; those commandments are too few to serve as a sufficient explanation. What stops you from saying that the attempt to behave morally, and the reward for living up to it, are sufficient reasons for the creation of man?
And for what purpose were animals created? Clearly there are groups in the world that have no purpose beyond their nature, and with gentiles that also includes their seven commandments. Beyond that, gentiles can also convert, unlike animals.
There may also be human purposes (education, research, understanding the world).
It seems that most animals have no free choice or self-awareness, which makes it easier to see them as serving man rather than as an end in themselves. With gentiles, that is not the case. The possibility of morality as a goal, as well as the other goals you mentioned (the human ones), weakens the expectation of revelation, since they allow for a purpose in creation that would not force God to reveal Himself.
But isn’t that what the Rabbi does in the a priori consideration that leads him to look for revelation in the world (because the purpose of society cannot be the repair of society itself)?