Q&A: Rules of Interpretation and Grammar
Rules of Interpretation and Grammar
Question
Hello Rabbi,
In lesson no. 3 of the new series on the rules of interpretation, the Rabbi drew a comparison between the way the rules of interpretation were transmitted and the formation of artificial grammar as a secondary product of learning a natural language (which is absorbed through what is called generative, universal grammar, etc.). On a superficial level, it is commonly said in generative linguistics that “the native speaker does not make mistakes”—because the category of correct/incorrect is not really relevant to natural language; rather, something is understandable or not understandable. Only in artificial grammar, which is an analytical tool, are there rules and deviations from them.
I wanted to ask whether, in the Rabbi’s opinion, this way of thinking can be applied to the rules of interpretation as well, and say that in fact there is a range of possibilities for correct interpretation through exegesis, and not necessarily only one meaning, or one Jewish law, that can be correct. Just as in language one can use a certain word or the same sentence to express different ideas—”I am going” can be interpreted as “I am currently moving my legs right now,” “I am leaving in a few minutes,” “I intend to come tomorrow to the event we spoke about,” “I am a person characterized by walking a lot”—it all depends on context and intention (and that is without even getting into the more complex variations of using metaphors, expressions, slang, etc.). It could be that in the picture the Rabbi presented, in which Moses sits with the Holy One, blessed be He, and learns the meanings of the various expressions in the Torah in the language of exegesis, there is not only one meaning for each expression—it could be that the same expression can be interpreted in several directions (perhaps even contradictory ones!) and still be understandable in the “language of exegesis”—so that there can be a dispute from which several different Jewish laws emerge (perhaps even contradictory ones?) that legitimately arise from the same expression in the Torah, and there is in fact no contradiction between them, but simply a different understanding by different sages, and perhaps legitimacy to act in accordance with any such understanding if it is not far-fetched (that is, if it can be understood in the language of exegesis).
Basically, according to this, the transmission of the rules of interpretation to Moses is not necessarily the transmission of a one-to-one translation of every plain-sense expression into an exegetical expression, from which the grammar is then developed over time in a way that enables use of the rules; rather, as in a natural language, the examples can be many and varied even for the very same expression, yet still not be mistaken. (And in fact this is more a matter of transmitting the language itself, the regularity, and not a precise transmission of the specific content that the Holy One, blessed be He, wants each expression to convey.)
I would be glad to hear your response!
Thank you very much
Answer
I do not agree with the first claim, although of course it depends on definitions. A native speaker can certainly make mistakes. The inventors of the language did not make mistakes, because what they established is the language. But users of the language certainly can make mistakes. Even before the system of rules that conceptualizes the way the language is used came into being, there were still correct ways of using it; it is just that the formal rules describing them had not yet been conceptualized. Therefore, even at that stage there is incorrect usage.
Therefore, as I understand it, there is no room for your questions.
I completely agree that there is no one-to-one correspondence between the plain sense and the exegesis. The correspondence between them is not a matter of translating a word from here to there and back. A verse is translated in its plain sense into one thing and in exegesis into another, but the verse is the basic unit of correspondence. Not a word and not an expression, but a sentence.
Discussion on Answer
A. The examples are the same as for a non-native speaker. If someone says “I goed for a walk,” that is an error, even before the rule was conceptualized that the past tense has a particular ending. It was true beforehand as well, but such a formal rule had not yet been formulated.
B. Yes.
Why is that an error? In what sense was it true even before the conceptualization? Do you mean an error in the sense of deviating from some convention, or in a more essential sense?
I will explain in greater detail. My claim is that the rules of grammar are only a conceptualization of what already existed beforehand. When a language is born, it is spoken according to certain rules, except that the speakers are not aware of them. They use them without being aware. At some stage the grammarians come along and formulate the rules explicitly. They do not create them; they conceptualize and formulate them.
Now there are two possibilities: even after the conceptualization there is no such thing as an “error,” because language use is free. There is no law that requires correct usage (put differently: making a mistake is not an “offense”). If so, then both after the conceptualization and before it there is no such thing as an error in speech. That too does not fit your claim (that after the conceptualization there are errors and before it there are none).
But that is not a reasonable assumption in my view. True, it is not an offense, but it is a deviation. Deviation from the rules is a linguistic mistake, and indeed it is not an offense and one is not punished for it. Still, it is an error, incorrect speech. On this assumption—which you also agree with, since you agree that after the conceptualization there are errors—then before the conceptualization there were the same errors as well. After all, the same rules prevailed then too, except that they had not been formulated. So what difference does it make to the question whether or not there are errors in speech?
You apparently assume that the process of conceptualization has normative significance. That is, beforehand we indeed used those same rules (in an unconscious and unformulated way), but then deviation from them was “permitted” (that is, it was not an error). But after the conceptualization, an obligation was created to speak according to the rules, and now there are errors in speech. But in my view this is an unreasonable conception. Conceptualization is not an act of legislation but of reformulation. It has no normative status, only a descriptive one. Therefore the normative situation did not change as a result of the conceptualization. What changed is only our awareness of the rules.
This dispute can be seen as a matter of definition (semantics), and this is not the place for it.
Thank you very much.
Thank you for the answer.
A. What, in your opinion, is the meaning of incorrect usage of language by a native speaker? Could you give an example?
B. Do you accept that beyond the fact that there is no one-to-one correspondence, there can be a correspondence between one sentence and several different meanings in exegesis?