The big problem is that the owner of the ox with established goring behavior is exempt “completely” if he used minimal guarding.
So where did the need to deter the owner go?

According to the view that the status of innocuousness remains in place, there’s no issue to begin with. And according to the other view, there’s no point in fining him for deterrence four times, “so that he should guard his ox,” because apparently that doesn’t work on him. His judgment is left to Heaven.

“Doesn’t work on him” and “does work on him” is not a dichotomy.
The same owner will sometimes bother to tie it with a thicker rope, and when he’s in a hurry he’ll make do with a thinner rope.
There’s no logic in exempting him just because once again he hurried and didn’t guard enough.
Especially since we’ve basically smashed the deterrence by telling him that from now on he’s exempt with superior guarding.
He’ll have absolutely no!!!!! incentive to bother with a thick rope even when he isn’t in a rush.

And also, all this talk about leaving his judgment to Heaven — why do that? What’s the logic?
The greatest injustices are always done in the name of Heaven, as is well known.

And especially since the fine isn’t only about deterrence, so we won’t obligate him just so the damager can throw money into the sea.
There’s also an element of compensation here.
So where did that element go?

Beyond that, according to Jewish law there is no moral need!!!! to guard an ox with established goring behavior with superior guarding.
A person’s baseline level of responsibility for watching his property is minimal guarding.
(Otherwise there’d be no reason to exempt an ox with established goring behavior, since he didn’t guard it and damage occurred.)
So why fine a person and deter him over something beyond that?

Have a good week.
My feeling is that you’re too angry and bitter to really clarify the issue. In my opinion, the explanation I offered you is entirely reasonable. I’ll answer once more briefly, but I don’t think there’s much point in continuing.
1. A legal system always works with some set of rules, and you can always point to exceptional cases (that one will tie with a thick rope or a thin rope, and so on). Those aren’t real objections.
2. An innocuous ox incurs half damages as a fine, and therefore I explained that to be exempt, superior guarding is required. This is done in order to encourage him to guard, even though at this stage there isn’t a great concern for damage (with an innocuous ox), and strictly speaking he would be exempt. The fine in the first three instances is to accustom him to guarding and make it part of his awareness,
and therefore superior guarding is required in order to be exempt from the fine, even though the guarding actually required (for an ox with established goring behavior) is only minimal.
After three times, he is already liable by law for full damages, and therefore minimal guarding is enough to exempt him.
At that point we no longer impose the fine in such a case (when he used minimal guarding), because now we’re in a situation where ordinary guarding is what’s required, and that is what he did.
What sense would it make to punish him in a case where he did what was required of him?!
And that’s after he was already punished three times (when by strict law he shouldn’t have had to pay).

I don’t see any problem with this explanation.
3. By the way, with an innocuous ox we don’t obligate him to use superior guarding. He isn’t obligated to do that, and he’s allowed to take the risk. But if he doesn’t use superior guarding and damage occurs, he’ll pay a fine. If he wants to be exempt from the fine, he needs superior guarding. That’s his choice.
4. Leaving judgment to Heaven is an inseparable part of Jewish law. (For someone who doesn’t believe in Heaven, obviously this won’t be acceptable, but I don’t see an objection here.)

What does that have to do with bad things being done in the name of Heaven?
Who spoke here about acting in the name of Heaven? Are there not plenty of transgressions for which human courts do not punish and instead leave judgment to Heaven? A prohibition that involves no action, one linked to a positive commandment, one linked to monetary payment, failures to fulfill positive commandments, cases with no witnesses and warning, and more and more. Moreover, when a religious court sees that there is a need, it can punish outside the strict law, and all these rules define only the halakhic obligation. Beyond that, it’s a matter of the court’s discretion. If they see that a person was negligent and deserves punishment, the court will deal with him (and not only Heaven).
5. In principle, a fine has no compensatory element for the injured party. When we impose a fine, the money goes to the injured party because there’s no point in giving it to someone else. But obviously there’s no need for him to throw the money into the sea, because he pays it to the injured party. Theoretically, if there were no possibility of paying the injured party, I really would say he should throw it into the sea (though that too could be debated further).

Hello and blessings,
I understand that I sounded bitter.
It seems to me that I’m really not in that place anymore (maybe some of it floated up a bit),
and I’ll address the substance of your points inline, in red.
‫
Have a good week.
My feeling is that you’re too angry and bitter to really clarify the issue. In my opinion, the explanation I offered you is entirely reasonable. I’ll answer once more briefly, but I don’t think there’s much point in continuing.
1. A legal system always works with some set of rules, and you can always point to exceptional cases — absolutely! (that one will tie with a thick rope or a thin rope, and so on). Those aren’t real objections. I explained below that the example I gave is not exceptional at all; on the contrary, it’s the classic case that happens in this area.
2. An innocuous ox incurs half damages as a fine, and therefore I explained that to be exempt, superior guarding is required. This is done in order to encourage him to guard, even though at this stage there isn’t a great concern for damage (with an innocuous ox), and strictly speaking he would be exempt. The fine in the first three instances is to accustom him to guarding and make it part of his awareness — okay.
And therefore superior guarding is required in order to be exempt from the fine, even though the guarding actually required (for an ox with established goring behavior) is only minimal. I don’t understand.
If a person has no responsibility for a remote possibility of damage
(which is basically the logic of minimal guarding for an ox with established goring behavior),
then we have no justification to obligate him in the case of an innocuous ox when he used minimal guarding.
He is aware of the required level of guarding and fulfilled it completely!!!
My logic requires that in order to impose a fine, there must be conduct that is morally insufficient — which, even if it isn’t enough to create monetary liability, still casts blame on the fined person.
After three times he is already liable by law for full damages, and therefore minimal guarding is enough to exempt him.
At that point we no longer impose the fine in such a case (when he used minimal guarding), because now we’re in a situation where ordinary guarding is what’s required, and that is what he did.
That itself is the difficulty: why are we now only at the level of ordinary guarding?
What sense would it make to punish him in a case where he did what was required of him?!
We should still be trying to accustom him to heightened awareness of guarding, like with the innocuous ox.
And that’s after he was already punished three times (when by strict law he shouldn’t have had to pay).
Let me summarize your view (as best I understand it):
A. that we place hope in a person to act beyond the standard, and that gives us the right to fine him half damages.
B. after we’ve seen several times that the person does not act as expected, then “our hope has been disappointed” and we have no reason to fine him again.
My response to the above:
A.
1. Morally, obligating a person in order to incentivize him beyond the standard seems unfair to me.
2. This is a very major innovation in the very law of half damages for an innocuous ox.
Basically, we now have two liabilities: liability when the owner is at fault, which is when he didn’t guard at all, and an additional liability because I want to incentivize him to guard beyond the standard.
3. A lion, bear, leopard, and cheetah, and likewise tooth and foot damage, which are considered forewarned from the outset — why would a fine not apply there too when the owner used minimal guarding? Don’t we want to incentivize the owner there as well to guard better?
B.
I think viewing a person whose ox caused damage three times as someone with no chance of guarding his ox is too simplistic and too dichotomous.
And I’ll bring several points to prove this.
(I don’t think they’re exceptional, and mainly in my opinion they show that the first approach is the simplistic one, and we have no reason to assume it.)
A. If the owner has another ox that is still innocuous, would we not obligate him when he used minimal guarding for that ox? Haven’t we already given up on him?
B. If an ox saw three oxen and did not gore, thereby reverting to innocuous status, and the owner used minimal guarding — would he be liable? According to your reasoning there’s no reason, since the owner has already proved to us that he isn’t someone who uses superior guarding, so what difference does it make that the ox calmed down and stopped goring?
C. If an ox is forewarned for goring with its right horn, and its owner used minimal guarding and it gored with the left, would we exempt him because this owner is not someone who uses superior guarding?

And truthfully, even without these points, the basic assumption of “we tried and it didn’t work” is baffling to me.
I’ll explain: when an ox becomes forewarned, what has been clarified is the nature of the ox — that it’s bad-tempered and gores.
There is no proof here about the owners, that they are essentially negligent people, because it could be that they guarded the ox properly for several months and prevented many damages,
and then on the very day they were negligent in guarding it, the ox again caused damage.
So even if the owners failed several times in guarding it, we should still require “superior and airtight guarding” and “a fine of half damages,” which would certainly prevent more cases of damage.

Let’s imagine it in practice: a cattle dealer is constantly moving around with his ox, and each time he needs to tie it to a different fence or a different tree,
and he always has two options in how to guard it — whether with a thick rope or a thin one, whether with a stronger fence or a weaker one.

And our interest is that the owner should always make the effort to guard it with superior guarding, which is really beyond the standard — add another knot to the rope, strengthen the fence with a few stones, etc.

So we have a dealer with an ox where several times it already happened that he was negligent in guarding it, and then it became clear to us that the ox is a gorer and hot-tempered
(and dozens of other times he guarded it well and major damages were prevented, but there’s nothing to say about those because no one counts them).
Now the case happens again: the dealer was in a rush and tied the ox carelessly, didn’t pay too much attention to the knot, relied on the fact that only a normal wind would come and he’d be right back…
and again it took him a long time to return, and meanwhile there happened to be an unusual wind, and the ox got loose and caused damage.

Why would we say there is no point in reminding this owner to use superior guarding by obligating him now for half damages?
What basis do we have for saying he’s the kind of person who can’t be reminded?

And beyond that, by getting up and telling him: from now on, if you use minimal guarding and your ox causes damage, you’ll be exempt —
then we are knowingly causing him to stop making the effort every time to use superior guarding. Why should he bother if he’s exempt anyway?
That point feels very stupid to me, because with our own ten fingers we are reinforcing negative behavior — so why should we do that?

This is where the connection to conspiring witnesses jumped into my mind.
The biggest question I have there is about building a system that lets the wicked escape justice.
I don’t see any problem with this explanation.
I hope I managed to explain myself.
3. By the way, with an innocuous ox we don’t obligate him to use superior guarding. He isn’t obligated to do that, and he’s allowed to take the risk. But if he doesn’t use superior guarding and damage occurs, he’ll pay a fine. If he wants to be exempt from the fine, he needs superior guarding. That’s his choice.
I don’t recall that being the law. As I remember it, every obligation of guarding, even for an ox with established goring behavior, is a question of whether there is an obligation to guard or only that he’ll pay if damage occurs. I’d be glad if you could point me to a source that distinguishes here between an innocuous ox and one with established goring behavior.
4. Leaving judgment to Heaven is an inseparable part of Jewish law. (For someone who doesn’t believe in Heaven, obviously this won’t be acceptable, but I don’t see an objection here.)
There is belief in heavenly judgment, and there is handing judgment over to Heaven.
Belief in heavenly judgment means that even though I have no ability to punish him — whether because I have no certain identification, or because the wrong is too slight (indirect causation and the like) — I am fully confident that Heaven will exact payment from him.
By contrast, handing judgment over to Heaven means that although he definitely did a wrong that justifies punishment, and I do have the ability to punish him, I will hand his judgment over to Heaven because I don’t have the strength/desire to deal with it.
In my opinion this is a concept that is fundamentally warped and contradicts the whole basic idea of human justice.
(To me this recalls a parallel in Rabbi Kook’s words about fear of sin that leads to fear of thought, and similarly fear of action and handing matters over to Heaven.)
What does that have to do with bad things being done in the name of Heaven?
With the fact that we have no reason to give up justice here for the sake of Heaven.
Who spoke here about acting in the name of Heaven? Are there not plenty of transgressions for which human courts do not punish and instead leave judgment to Heaven? A prohibition that involves no action, one linked to a positive commandment, one linked to monetary payment, failures to fulfill positive commandments, cases with no witnesses and warning, and more and more. Moreover, when a religious court sees that there is a need, it can punish outside the strict law, and all these rules define only the halakhic obligation. Beyond that — it’s a matter of the court’s discretion. If they see that a person was negligent and deserves punishment — the court will deal with him (and not only Heaven).
5. In principle, a fine has no compensatory element for the injured party. When we impose a fine, the money goes to the injured party because there’s no point in giving it to someone else. But obviously there’s no need for him to throw the money into the sea, because he pays it to the injured party. Theoretically, if there were no possibility of paying the injured party, I really would say he should throw it into the sea (though that too could be debated further). Okay.

What also bothers me here is that it seems the Tannaim didn’t even begin from logic!!!
They didn’t sit down and think about what the right thing to do is, how far a person is obligated in guarding.
Rather, they started from the verse; somehow they reached the conclusion that this is an “inclusion after inclusion”
(not that I understand how, because you definitely need to write “and its owner did not guard it” so that we don’t think he is liable when he did guard it — following Rabbi Eliezer’s reasoning that an ox with established goring behavior has no guarding except a knife),
and then they relied on an arbitrary rule that an inclusion comes to exclude
(the logic of which only makes sense if we assume the text is sacred, was not subject to edits of various kinds, and was handed by God Himself, in which case one can infer from every tiny detail and say that the second inclusion comes to exclude),
and from this they reached a conclusion about what level of guarding is required from the owner of an ox (minimal guarding),
and as a result they invented a new understanding of a fine as an incentive even in a case where the person used the required minimal guarding
(and of course they remained inconsistent with things that are “forewarned from the outset,” where suddenly we do not incentivize superior guarding through a fine).
Do you believe that God, who gave us reason, would want us to determine the course of our lives according to such a system of reasoning?

If He gave the Torah and then went away and disappeared, then one could basically say that the mechanism got warped and it’s not His fault.
But then there’s no real reason to keep the Torah.

But if He is still present and aware of what they did to His Torah,
do you think God, who created for us the rationality by means of which we are supposed to arrive at the conclusion that it is right to serve Him, keep His commandments, etc.,
does He want us to be bound to such a system of rules, which in my eyes is super crooked?

And basically (sorry for the bluntness, I don’t want to sound too bitter to you), it feels to me like cancer,
where certain cells stopped obeying instructions and act independently in exponential multiplication.

So here too, we began from logical reasoning, and continued into a system that in the end brings us to the end of reason and the twisting of the mind.
And again, true, this is only one example,
but it really shows us that the whole Torah system operates in a “warped” way.
It created a mechanism of “do not deviate” that has gotten us stuck (for 1,500 years already) with decisions of people who were supposedly less wise than we are,
people who were conservative and not liberal (in many senses),
people who did not begin from logic but looked for hints in the Torah for everything, and from that decided their assumptions.
Does it make sense that He would want us to be enslaved to such a mechanism?

Or should we come and say: enough.
This is actually a sign that my whole assumption that the Torah is from Sinai is simply mistaken.
True, I still have the question of what exactly the Creator’s intention in the universe is —
a question that until now I explained through the existence of the Torah.
(By the way, there was a very big hole in that explanation,
because to assume that the meaning is contained in something God gave only to one tenth of a percent of the planet is itself no less of a question.)
But given that I see that the Torah, as the sages learned it, creates such crooked mechanisms,
and given that it seems to me that God desires good and morality
(because otherwise I have no reason to think He gives a Torah and wants something from His creatures),
then maybe I was mistaken,
and the truth is that He did not give the Torah.
(Actually, like a leaning tower: the greater the tilt, the more the center of gravity moves outward, and eventually the whole tower falls.)
So even though I see that man is a religious creature and needs religion for psychological stability,
still, this specific Jewish religion in the end also leads to very major distortions.
So maybe it isn’t true,
or at the very least it is no longer valid today!!!
Have a good and blessed week.

I’ll just apologize for the flood.
I basically reached all my conclusions more or less on my own.
All these questions had been bothering me since age 13.
I was a voice crying in the wilderness,
and I was small and young, so I believed the problem was in me.
I spent years trying to bend my logic,
until a few years ago I stopped and rethought things, and understood that I no longer had any reason to believe.

I simply didn’t find a person who openly declares commitment to truth,
who says that there is no way, not even for God, to obligate a person to believe false facts
(with the qualification that then the person will doubt his own perception, but then it’s no longer belief in false facts),
who says that human values like universal justice, equal rights, and so on are values not only because of the Torah,
and then we open the Pentateuch and start hair-splitting over whether the Torah agrees with the above.

Even when I read your books, I wasn’t impressed enough that you were that kind of person.

(In the book God Plays Dice,
I saw a fresh approach to evolution,
a realistic approach that can fit with the existence of a good and beneficent spiritual entity,
an entity that gives meaning to the whole universe,
which is basically what random evolution takes away from us.

I read The Science of Freedom eagerly 4 or 5 times.
Here I agreed less.
My conclusion was that although a person (and animals too) has an inner engine that they themselves activate,
and they do not behave passively under forces that act on them (like water flowing down a river),
still there is no choice!!!
because desires, drives, and passions distort thinking,
and cause repression of the prohibition,
and then once the prohibition is repressed there really is no reason not to decide on the wrong step.
I know it’s a bit beside the point to comment like this on an entire book,
and I’d need quite a few more pages just to begin explaining my thesis.)

In any case, I didn’t understand from the books that we’re talking about a person who is alive and kicking (oh yes, very much so),
and I moved on with my life.
On Friday I was watching YouTube and saw you being interviewed by Roi Yozovich,
and then he mentioned that you have a blog
and that you’re a “Reform” rabbi.
So I immediately ran to check.
And wow, I got excited.
And from there comes the desire to talk about a thousand and one questions that troubled me,
and then I moved on with my life.

So I hope you understand me.
I intend to buy the trilogy,
to study your line of thought thoroughly,
and then check whether it seems right to me or not,
and then maybe come by for a conversation or two to clarify and work things through.

All in all, I’m looking for a formula that will allow me to believe in religion.
Right now I’m in an impossible position, forced to live as a devout Haredi
when I have no faith at all.
It’s really hard.
And I’m looking for a solution to this situation.
Best regards.

I completely understood the issue, and I think such a flood is very natural for a person in your situation (I’ve met quite a few like that). The bitterness and anger (which are justified) build up with no way to let them out, all while life forces you to ignore them in day-to-day living. That’s very frustrating, and rightly so. In what I wrote here, I only noted that in such a state it’s hard to conduct a discussion and really clarify the issue.
As for the matter itself, with your permission, for that reason I won’t continue the discussion with you about the innocuous ox (I really don’t think you’re right). But I will write a few points that in my view are very important as an introduction to the discussion, especially in light of what emerged from our exchange so far. Of course, you can see them at length in the trilogy:
0. Needless to say, there is certainty in nothing. I’m looking for plausibility, not certainty.
1. Plato is dear and Socrates is dear, but truth is dearest of all (this was quoted in a responsum of Rabbi Isaiah di Trani, Chavot Yair, and many others). That is my guiding light. If the truth is that the whole thing is nonsense, then it should be abandoned. I do not believe in labels like heresy and the like. (If the heretic is right, then I’m a heretic, Reform, Buddhist, or whatever. Labels really don’t bother me.) I also prove that there is no possibility of demanding authority regarding facts (I understand you already read that in my writings, perhaps in the last column). A person has to reach his own conclusions, whatever they may be, and act accordingly. That is a simple logical claim (which requires no sources).
2. In my opinion, it is important to clarify belief in God itself, and also the giving of the Torah and the obligation toward what was given there, before entering discussions about the innocuous ox. The reason is twofold:
A. If one reaches the conclusion that He exists, then one is more ready to accept explanations that in a tabula rasa situation would not be accepted. It is important to understand that this is not bias but a completely reasonable way of thinking. To discuss the innocuous ox and infer from that that there is no God or that no Torah was given by Him — that is a problematic inference, even if you were right about the innocuous ox (and as I said, in my opinion you are not).
B. If one reaches the conclusion that the Torah was given, I argue that what follows is that the Torah has purposes other than morality. (In my view Jewish law and morality are two completely independent categories, and even the “moral” laws are not really such.) I call these “religious purposes” or “religious values.” There is a detailed discussion of this at the beginning of the third book, and also in various places on the site and in lectures I gave. It follows from this that clarifying what the Jewish law is does not overlap with clarifying what is morally or legally correct. In this you can find an answer to various difficulties raised by different laws that do not fit ordinary moral thinking (including the innocuous ox, where you are looking for legal and moral logic, but it is not clear that this assumption is justified). And with that comes the answer to your question of why they did not begin from logic but from strange assumptions (in your eyes). From my perspective, the difficulty is דווקא why they sometimes do bring moral logic in.
One indication of this is that the descendants of Noah are required to uphold morality and justice, but Jewish law is not required of them (including civil law). And since morality is universal by definition, the moral demand made of Jews is the same as that made of non-Jews. It follows that Jewish law, which is unique to Jews and does not obligate others, is not intended to achieve moral values. Of course, this raises the question of how one interprets Jewish law if it is all just “Scriptural decrees.” I argue that despite this, not everything is a “Scriptural decree” in the accepted sense, and in fact the very concept of a Scriptural decree is itself interpreted incorrectly (for example with regard to conspiring witnesses, which you mentioned. I have an article about this on the site).
3. In my assessment, the sages of the Talmud, and certainly all the sages of later generations, were human beings like you and me. They could make mistakes, and they made considerable use of that ability. On the other hand, I do not think they were fools or wicked. Therefore, if something of theirs seems like that to you, I would check it again (calmly). Their authority does not stem from their being all-knowing and incapable of error, but from the fact that we accepted it upon ourselves (like the laws of the Knesset). That is the legal framework of Jewish law, for better or worse, whether they were right or not. Indeed, we got into a tangle of over two thousand years without a Sanhedrin (what I call a “historical accident”), and this causes most halakhic decisors to become fossilized, mostly unnecessarily in my view. In the third book I deal with this and show how much can be updated and changed even without a Sanhedrin.

All this is detailed in the trilogy (and also in various places on the site). Here I only described the points and of course did not prove them. But in my view they are important when approaching such an inquiry. And it is worth keeping this framework in mind, because the whole structure of the trilogy is based on it. There is a logic to the order in which I arranged the books one after another. Although they are seemingly independent, there is a connection between them and the order matters. One thing is built on another until the full picture emerges (as I understand it). I’ll repeat that while reading, it is very important to be attentive and willing to accept. Anti-feelings and frustrations lead people to biased thinking and mistaken conclusions. Of course, “pro” feelings do that too. One has to maintain balance.

Much success,

I’ll respond, as is my custom, inline in your words in red:

I completely understood the issue, and I think such a flood is very natural for a person in your situation (I’ve met quite a few like that). The bitterness and anger (which are justified) build up with no way to let them out, all while life forces you to ignore them in day-to-day living. That’s very frustrating, and rightly so.
Two years ago I was in that kind of state, completely flooded with feelings of anger and hatred.
Today, generally speaking, I’m no longer there.
I’d say I’m past the anger and past the mourning, and I’m looking to see whether maybe there is still hope.
In what I wrote here, I only noted that in such a state it’s hard to conduct a discussion and really clarify the issue.
I think that since this is in writing, that also adds to the difficulty.
In a face-to-face conversation, a person raises an argument and the other responds, and then they stay focused on one topic.
Whereas in correspondence, where there’s no immediate response, I just keep going on to more arguments, and then it sounds like I’m flooded.
Likewise, because writing allows for precision and sharpening the message,
and because it’s important to me that the message come across sharply
(I build simulations in my head of what you’ll answer and try to sharpen things to save unnecessary responses),
that’s why I sound so bitter.
As for the matter itself, with your permission, for that reason I won’t continue the discussion with you about the innocuous ox (I really don’t think you’re right).
Okay.
But I will write a few points that in my view are very important as an introduction to the discussion, especially in light of what emerged from our exchange so far. Of course, you can see them at length in the trilogy:
0. Needless to say, there is certainty in nothing. I’m looking for plausibility, not certainty. Completely agree.
1. Plato is dear and Socrates is dear, but truth is dearest of all (this was quoted in a responsum of Rabbi Isaiah di Trani, Chavot Yair, and many others). That is my guiding light. Completely. If the truth is that the whole thing is nonsense, then it should be abandoned. I do not believe in labels like heresy and the like. (If the heretic is right, then I’m a heretic, Reform, Buddhist, or whatever. Labels really don’t bother me.)
How I love this line.
I remember that when I still believed, I used to tell the people around me that on the day it became clear to me that Judaism wasn’t true, I would stop being Jewish.
I remember the raised eyebrows,
and my counterargument: do you want to tell me that the reason you’re Jewish is not because it’s true? Then why is it?
Today, now that I no longer believe, I’m of course afraid to speak in that language, lest they suspect me of heresy and excommunicate me from the community.
I also prove that there is no possibility of demanding authority regarding facts (I understand you already read that in my writings, perhaps in the last column). A person has to reach his own conclusions, whatever they may be, and act accordingly. That is a simple logical claim (which requires no sources). Completely.
2. In my opinion, it is important to clarify belief in God itself, and also the giving of the Torah and the obligation toward what was given there, before entering discussions about the innocuous ox. The reason is twofold:
A. If one reaches the conclusion that He exists, then one is more ready to accept explanations that in a tabula rasa situation would not be accepted. It is important to understand that this is not bias but a completely reasonable way of thinking. Within certain limits, and one has to be very careful not to take it too far.
To discuss the innocuous ox and infer from that that there is no God or that no Torah was given by Him — that is a problematic inference, even if you were right about the innocuous ox (and as I said, in my opinion you are not).
The innocuous ox by itself — no, but it’s many laws repeated over and over that eventually bring you to a certain conclusion.

B. If one reaches the conclusion that the Torah was given, I argue that what follows is that the Torah has purposes other than morality. (In my view Jewish law and morality are two completely independent categories, and even the “moral” laws are not really such.) I call these “religious purposes” or “religious values.” There is a detailed discussion of this at the beginning of the third book, and also in various places on the site and in lectures I gave. It follows from this that clarifying what the Jewish law is does not overlap with clarifying what is morally or legally correct. In this you can find an answer to various difficulties raised by different laws that do not fit ordinary moral thinking (including the innocuous ox, where you are looking for legal and moral logic, but it is not clear that this assumption is justified). And with that comes the answer to your question of why they did not begin from logic but from strange assumptions (in your eyes). From my perspective, the difficulty is precisely why they sometimes do bring moral logic in.
One indication of this is that the descendants of Noah are required to uphold morality and justice, but Jewish law is not required of them (including civil law). And since morality is universal by definition, the moral demand made of Jews is the same as that made of non-Jews. It follows that Jewish law, which is unique to Jews and does not obligate others, is not intended to achieve moral values. Of course, this raises the question of how one interprets Jewish law if it is all just “Scriptural decrees.” I argue that despite this, not everything is a “Scriptural decree” in the accepted sense, and in fact the very concept of a Scriptural decree is itself interpreted incorrectly (for example with regard to conspiring witnesses, which you mentioned. I have an article about this on the site).
Very interesting — I’ll check it thoroughly, of course.
3. In my assessment, the sages of the Talmud, and certainly all the sages of later generations, were human beings like you and me. They could make mistakes, and they made considerable use of that ability. On the other hand, I do not think they were fools or wicked. Therefore, if something of theirs seems like that to you, I would check it again (calmly). Definitely.
Their authority does not stem from their being all-knowing and incapable of error, but from the fact that we accepted it upon ourselves (like the laws of the Knesset). That is the legal framework of Jewish law, for better or worse, whether they were right or not. Indeed, we got into a tangle of over two thousand years without a Sanhedrin (what I call a “historical accident”),
that’s not some little accident — that’s one massive cosmic collision.
And this causes most halakhic decisors to become fossilized, mostly unnecessarily in my view. In the third book I deal with this and show how much can be updated and changed even without a Sanhedrin.
Since you’re so rare in your type and people are driven by fear, I expect that in the end you’ll pretty much remain a voice crying in the wilderness and Judaism has no future.
All this is detailed in the trilogy (and also in various places on the site). Here I only described the points and of course did not prove them. But in my view they are important when approaching such an inquiry. And it is worth keeping this framework in mind, because the whole structure of the trilogy is based on it. There is a logic to the order in which I arranged the books one after another. Although they are seemingly independent, there is a connection between them and the order matters. One thing is built on another until the full picture emerges (as I understand it).
I’ll repeat that while reading, it is very important to be attentive and willing to accept. Anti-feelings and frustrations lead people to biased thinking and mistaken conclusions. Of course, “pro” feelings do that too. One has to maintain balance.
Absolutely — that’s the most important thing in the world, and I always remind myself of it. I was educated to be capable of saying “I was wrong,” and I’m very proud of myself when I get there.

Much success,
To you too — it’s refreshing to hear your brave voice.

I’ll just say that I’m more optimistic than you about the future of Judaism. I think there are voices that are absorbed long after they are spoken (like Maimonides, Rabbi Kook, Rabbi Shagar, and others), when the ground is ripe to absorb and grow them. Maybe that itself is a result of my faith, but I do not believe in divine intervention in the world, so this is faith in faith itself and not in God.
One must not forget that Judaism is not Haredism, and as for the future of Haredism, if you are right then that is very optimistic from my point of view. A completely different Judaism is definitely being born now (and I definitely feel myself part of it). It may be only a momentary flash that will fade, but I actually think it’s very hard to predict what things will look like here in a few more decades. And from the other side too — do you know how many times people have already eulogized Haredism? In the meantime it’s alive and kicking (unfortunately).
And beyond all that, I do not deal with or take interest in the future of Judaism. That’s not my concern. If it is destroyed, then it is destroyed. I do what seems right to me, and whatever happens, happens. Why concern yourself with the hidden matters of the Merciful One?!