Question

Hello Rabbi,
As someone who grew up in Lithuanian yeshivot, I always understood that what especially distinguishes them in monetary law is that the laws are derived from an ontological reality: all the topics clarify what the reality itself is, while the laws are the outcomes and derivatives of that. It seems to me that this is a fairly clear conception in the Lithuanian method of study, and I always thought this was a strong point of that legal system—that it does not speak about what is proper or advisable, where arbitrariness is merely a byproduct of a legal structure, but about what the acquisition, or the witnesses, and the like, actually did. In other words, there is no arbitrariness, only derivatives of what actually happened.
My question is: A. Does the Rabbi agree with the spirit of what I presented? And if so, is this ontological conception truly and absolutely applicable to Jewish law, at least in monetary matters, or does it function only as a methodological tool of thought?