Q&A: A Doubt Does Not Override a Certainty
A Doubt Does Not Override a Certainty
Question
The simple understanding of the rule that a doubt does not override a certainty is that it is based on logic, and according to several later authorities (and that also seems to emerge from some medieval authorities), the meaning of “a doubt does not override a certainty” is that as long as I had a certain certainty at some point, then so long as it has not been proven otherwise, I am not in doubt at all that the reality has changed. In other words, this is not a rule for deciding doubts by following the side of certainty; rather, this rule—that a doubt does not override a certainty—tells me that there is nothing to be doubtful about in the first place, even in a doubt where there is a majority, and even in an “ordinary doubt,” and this is something we know from logic.
The question is: what exactly is the logic behind this? Meaning, what is the logic in saying that I am not in doubt at all? After all, there is a majority indicating that it did change. I do understand it if we say that despite the fact that there is a doubt here, we rule in favor of the certain side because the certain side is stronger than the doubtful side, even if this is a doubt in which there is a majority. But to claim that there is no doubt here at all, and that no doubt ever arose—that itself is a novel claim, and on logical grounds alone I would not have known it. (I read the pamphlet on legal reasonings, but I still can’t understand how this rule is to be understood in light of that.)
Answer
There is no logic to that at all, and I don’t think anyone says such a thing. When there is a majority against the “certainty,” it is no longer certain. It may be that from a legal standpoint we still continue to follow the “certainty” despite the fact that there is a majority against it (for example, according to Shmuel, that in monetary law we do not follow the majority), but that does not mean there is no real doubt here.
Discussion on Answer
I didn’t see there even a hint of such an approach (when there is a majority against the certainty). In any case, this is obviously a legal statement, not a factual one.
In the passage in Pesachim (9a), they use the rule that a doubt does not override a certainty even when there is a majority against the certainty (Rashi there, and also Tosafot), and Birkat Shmuel did not distinguish.
It is clear to me that this is not a factual definition, but even if it is a legal definition, what is the practical legal difference between saying that there is no doubt here at all and saying that there is a doubt here, but I rule in favor of the certain side against the doubt?
One can think of practical differences. For example, regarding doubtful impurity and the like.
This is brought in Birkat Shmuel, part 2, siman 2 on Bava Metzia (there he writes this very briefly and does not elaborate further, and says it in the name of Rabbi Chaim). I’d be glad if the Rabbi could take a look there.