Q&A: The Logic Behind the Law of a Pursuer
The Logic Behind the Law of a Pursuer
Question
Hello Rabbi,
In the last lecture in Ra’anana about dilemmas involving human life, you elaborated on the reasoning at the basis of the law of a pursuer. Today I came across a Talmudic passage in Pesachim from which it seemingly emerges that there is a verse that serves as the basis for the permission to kill a pursuer, and the Talmud does not challenge the verse by asking: why do I need a verse? It is logical reasoning. Here is the passage:
Babylonian Talmud, tractate Pesachim 25a
Rabbi Yohanan said: One may use any means for healing, except for idolatry, forbidden sexual relations, and bloodshed. Idolatry — that is what we said. Forbidden sexual relations and bloodshed — as it was taught in a baraita: Rabbi says, “For as when a man rises against his fellow and murders him, so is this matter” — and what does a murderer have to do with a betrothed young woman? Rather, this comes to teach and is found to learn: it compares a murderer to a betrothed young woman. Just as a betrothed young woman may be saved at the cost of his life, so too a murderer may be stopped at the cost of his life.
Rashi on tractate Pesachim 25b
“May be saved” — permission is granted to one who sees that he is pursuing her to save her by taking the life of the pursuer, as it is written (Deuteronomy 22), “and there was no rescuer for her” — implying that if there is a rescuer, he must save her by whatever means he can, even by killing him, if he cannot save her by injuring one of his limbs.
Seemingly, it is difficult to understand why the commentators try to explain the reasoning at the basis of the law of a pursuer, when there is a derivation from a verse that permits it.
Answer
Maimonides also brings a verse for this (in chapter 1 of Hilkhot Rotzeach, if I recall correctly, “then you shall cut off her hand”), and if I remember right I mentioned this in the lecture as well. My claim is that despite the fact that a verse is cited, it is clear that this is based on logical reasoning. First, without the reasoning, we would not have learned this from those verses, because none of the sources cited says it explicitly. Only because the interpreter understood the logic did he derive it from the verse. For example, in the Rashi you quoted, why assume that one saves her by every possible means up to and including killing? That is an extraordinary novelty in capital law, and there would have been no basis to infer it from the verse. Rather, because there is such a logic, he inferred it.
The question why a verse is needed when there is logical reasoning arises with respect to many laws, and there are several possible answers. Perhaps the reasoning is not sufficiently strong on its own. Perhaps the verse comes to add a religious layer on top of the legal reasoning. Rabbi Yitzhak Zev Soloveitchik explains that there are two laws regarding a pursuer, and similarly in Afikei Yam, vol. 2, siman 40, it is explained that the law of a pursuer is not only a permission to kill the pursuer but also that he incurs a death liability. For that reason, the rule of “liable for death and therefore exempt from monetary payment” applies when a pursuer breaks vessels. And for that, a verse is certainly needed.