Answer

Hello,
A note: I don’t think the rabbis are caving in. They are an integral part of this insane process. A combination of delusional messianism and frustration over the powers taken by the High Court in some annoying cases is shaping it. They got power into their hands, and now they want to obtain everything they couldn’t achieve over the years until now—in the spirit of “we want Messiah now.” Woe to us from such a messiah.
As for your question, I don’t think it has a clear answer. In principle, it is obvious that the Sanhedrin determines everything. What it legislates or interprets binds the entire Jewish people. It also appoints all the lower courts and of course is also directly or indirectly responsible for ordination. But that does not, of course, mean that the Sanhedrin uses this authority. In my view, the correct model is that the Sanhedrin should intervene only where uniformity is needed, and where it is not, it should leave decisions in the hands of individuals and communities. This is the distinction Yedidia Stern talks about in his booklet between several kinds of justiciability. By the way, even in the proposed law that gives the Rabbinate authority over community and city rabbis, one could say that they merely can decide, but won’t necessarily use that authority. The problem is that these scoundrels can’t be trusted, since their entire aim is to ruin every good piece of ground.
That was the factual situation in the past, during the time of the Sanhedrin. The question of what the ideal model is—especially in a situation where there is no Sanhedrin—is a question anyone can answer however he likes. I don’t think an authoritative and binding halakhic answer can be given here. And even if you find something written, it will be the writer’s personal opinion. For example, the Sefer HaChinuch writes that authority is needed so that the Torah not become like two Torahs. That can be interpreted in the centralist direction, but I interpret it in my direction: it means a framework that can be activated when needed, but ideally freedom should be left as much as possible in the hands of rabbis and communities.
As for Kartman’s remarks (I don’t know him), these are just musings of his heart that he hangs on verses, as is common in our districts. Nobody derives Jewish law from verses, and among other reasons that is because, just like the little sermonettes he extracts from the verses, I can extract opposite ones from them. The verses also say “an eye for an eye,” and so on. [That is why I don’t study the Bible at all, because nobody learns anything from it. Everyone abuses it in the direction of what he already believes. I have never in my life seen someone derive from the Bible an idea that he himself had not already thought of and agreed with beforehand.]
The model of appointment in the past was really not like that. I know of no proof that the public decided who would be the judge or rabbi, or proposed candidates. According to Jewish law, ordination comes from above downward, and nobody is asked. Regarding appointing a communal leader over the public, it is written that one consults the public (it’s not entirely clear who is consulting whom; apparently the public itself is the appointing party). After ordination ceased, there was no longer anyone to appoint rabbis and judges from above, and so people moved to a model in which the community chose a rabbi from below (along with various substitutes for ordination, one of which is today’s Chief Rabbinate exams. This has no binding basis and of course no real validity).
At the margins, I’ll say that if they establish a Sanhedrin today, I’m fleeing to Australia. The collection of scoundrels currently running this rampage are the ones who would serve on it. So I pray every day that a Sanhedrin not arise in our times. And if the Chief Rabbinate is appointed as the Sanhedrin, then Australia is already too close. We’ll need to speak to Elon Musk about a flight to the moon. This corrupt and rotten institution wants to defile even the plots that still remain clean. May God help us all.
Ironically, the Haredim innovated the idea that there is such a thing as exile under Jews, here in the Land of Israel. Now they’ve introduced an even greater novelty: there is exile under the rule of religious Jews who want to impose Jewish law here. And the second exile is more bitter than the first.
As for writing about it, at first glance I don’t know what there is to write here. It’s a non-issue. I can make things up just like anyone else can. Declare what I think and “base” it on sermonettes from verses and hollow ideas good for a short Torah talk at a sheva berakhot celebration. In my opinion, there is no way to establish a solid halakhic position on this issue. Maybe one can find sources that wrote about it, but my view of such sources is that they have no meaning or validity whatsoever. Mere musings. Therefore I don’t engage in collecting and writing such things.
But on second thought, there are in fact a few points connected to the matter that could serve as a basis for more serious writing. I’ll list some of them (almost all of them are discussed in the third book of my trilogy):
1. I’ve written more than once about the value of autonomy in halakhic ruling, and that may be the closest related topic that can be grounded seriously. See for example my article here:
https://www.google.com/url?client=internal-element-cse&cx=f18e4f052adde49eb&q=https://mikyab.net/%25D7%259B%25D7%25AA%25D7%2591%25D7%2599%25D7%259D/%25D7%259E%25D7%2590%25D7%259E%25D7%25A8%25D7%2599%25D7%259D/%25D7%2590%25D7%2595%25D7%2598%25D7%2595%25D7%25A0%25D7%2595%25D7%259E%25D7%2599%25D7%2594-%25D7%2595%25D7%25A1%25D7%259E%25D7%259B%25D7%2595%25D7%25AA-%25D7%2591%25D7%25A4%25D7%25A1%25D7%2599%25D7%25A7%25D7%25AA-%25D7%2594%25D7%259C%25D7%259B%25D7%2594&sa=U&ved=2ahUKEwilt7v7l5mAAxW9VaQEHT_NClsQFnoECAUQAQ&usg=AOvVaw1CguF1-RneRCwYUPMpeELr
If a halakhic decisor has autonomy, then there is no room for a central authority to determine what he must rule.
2. If we go one level lower, one can discuss, similarly, the role of a halakhic decisor vis-à-vis the autonomy of the ordinary person (less directly related, but there is some connection). You can see here:
https://www.google.com/url?client=internal-element-cse&cx=f18e4f052adde49eb&q=https://mikyab.net/%25D7%259B%25D7%25AA%25D7%2591%25D7%2599%25D7%259D/%25D7%259E%25D7%2590%25D7%259E%25D7%25A8%25D7%2599%25D7%259D/%25D7%25A2%25D7%259C-%25D7%25A7%25D7%2595%25D7%259C%25D7%2590-%25D7%2595%25D7%2597%25D7%2595%25D7%259E%25D7%25A8%25D7%2590&sa=U&ved=2ahUKEwiN4-KNmJmAAxUZTaQEHVOLBhcQFnoECAUQAQ&usg=AOvVaw2qE6GAEqdS-Kwdx70P3gET
3. I remember reading an article by Hanina Ben-Menachem explaining that it is impossible to integrate Jewish law into state law because of its decentralization and lack of uniformity. A legal system in the practical world needs to be uniform for the sake of legal certainty (this is a common criticism of Aharon Barak’s doctrine of good faith and contract interpretation). That too is obviously relevant. But it deals with the legal part of Jewish law (and note that even there there is the rule of “kim li”), and not with the other areas of Jewish law.
4. There is of course the Rosh in Sanhedrin, chapter 4, siman 6, who says that after the Talmud there is no authority, and every halakhic decisor is supposed to rule according to his own understanding. But it is not certain that one can understand this to be, in his view, the ideal model. He is describing the normative state of affairs in our time (in which in practice there is no authority). Some of these remarks are also brought in Choshen Mishpat, siman 25.
5. This may perhaps be linked to the controversy over an appellate court, which erupted when Lord Bentwich, His Majesty’s envoy, dealt with establishing a Chief Rabbinate and its religious courts in the Land of Israel and demanded, as a condition, that there be an appellate instance. Rabbinic opposition to that demand was wall-to-wall, and that reflects a conception that there is no place for a central halakhic authority, and every religious court rules according to its own understanding, and nobody can control that. True, in the end they did accept it and established an appellate court (the Chief Rabbinate’s High Rabbinical Court), but that was after the fact because of British insistence, and without it they could not have established rabbinical courts. In this context there is the discussion of “From where did you judge me?” which assumes that a litigant can demand reasons in order to turn to a higher court and appeal (see Rabbi Yosef Karo’s responsum in Avkat Rokhel on this matter, among others).
6. Another point I addressed in the third book of my trilogy is the involvement of Jewish law and halakhic decisors in the management of a community (through the decision-making procedures of the town leaders, their powers, and so on, which also entered the Shulchan Arukh). This is the result of a historical accident following the loss of the monarchy: in the absence of a king, the secular powers passed to the Nasi of the Sanhedrin (which is why he was from the descendants of King David). From that point on, a situation arose in which all questions regarding the management of ordinary life were also directed to halakhic decisors. Communal enactments required the consent of an important person, etc. In my opinion, this has no halakhic basis whatsoever, and I would delete the laws of community management from the Shulchan Arukh. They are there by mistake and are not binding. And the proof is that nobody takes them into account in any community whatsoever.