Got it, thanks.

The view of the Yere’im in Sanhedrin 85a is that when there is no prohibition against striking or cursing—for example, when one’s father does not act as part of your people—then he is automatically exempt not only from lashes but also from monetary payment.
That is, in his view, if there is a prohibition then there is liability for payment, and if there is no prohibition then there is no liability for payment. In other words, logical equivalence.
So it comes out that according to him, if there is liability for payment, then automatically there is a prohibition. If so, according to him the source for the prohibition against causing damage is the fact that there is liability for payment.
Do you agree with me about this?

First of all, you asked what my own view is after all the dialectical analyses. If you want to enumerate the views of the medieval authorities and later authorities, that’s a different discussion.
As for the Yere’im, maybe. But one could push back and say that if there is no prohibition then there is no liability for payment, but that doesn’t mean the prohibition is learned from the liability for payment—they just go together. But even aside from that inference in the Yere’im, there is a view that explicitly derives the prohibition from the payment obligation, and that is the She’iltot (and I believe also the Levush). But in my opinion that is not reasonable, because a prohibition requires a formal warning verse, and that is the Talmud’s question: “We have heard the punishment—but from where do we know the warning?”

There is a Nachmanides on Vayishlach, chapter 34 verse 13, “And in my opinion etc.”
If you read it, what do you understand his view to be:

– Option A: that the commandment of laws for the Noahides has two parts: one part is a positive commandment (to establish courts, etc.) and another part is a prohibition (to steal, to cause damage, fraud, rape, seduction, etc.)

– Option B: the commandment of laws is a positive commandment, except that if one violates it passively (for example by not establishing a religious court), then one is not liable to death for it, whereas if one violates it through positive action (stealing, causing damage, etc.) then one is put to death for it.

[By the way, according to the view of Nachmanides that the prohibition of theft is included under the law of laws, why is there another separate commandment among the seven Noahide commandments of “do not steal”?]

If you want to clarify Nachmanides’ view, please bring the quotation.

Sorry. Here it is:

“And how did the righteous sons of Jacob do this deed, to spill innocent blood? And the rabbi replied in the Book of Judges (Maimonides, Laws of Kings 14:9) and said that the descendants of Noah are commanded concerning laws, and this means to appoint judges in every district and district to judge regarding their six commandments, and a Noahide who transgresses one of them is executed by the sword. If one saw someone transgress one of them and did not judge him to execution, then the one who saw this is himself executed by the sword. And for this reason all the people of Shechem became liable to execution, for Shechem had robbed, and they saw and knew and did not judge him. But these words are not correct in my eyes, for if so, our forefather Jacob should have been first and foremost to merit their death. And if he feared them, why was he angry at his sons and why did he curse their anger many years later and punish them and divide them and scatter them? Surely they merited reward and performed a commandment and trusted in God, who saved them. And in my opinion, the laws that were counted for the descendants of Noah among their seven commandments are not only to appoint judges in every district and district, but He also commanded them regarding the laws of theft, fraud, oppression, a hired worker’s wages, the laws of bailees, rape and seduction, primary categories of damages, one who injures his fellow, the laws of lender and borrower, and the laws of buying and selling, and the like—just as with the laws that Israel was commanded. And they are executed for them if one steals or oppresses, or rapes or seduces another man’s daughter, or sets fire to his stack and damages it, or the like. And included in this commandment is that they should also appoint judges in every city and city, like Israel. But if they did not do so, they are not executed, because this is for them a positive commandment. And the Sages said only (Sanhedrin 57) that ‘for them, their warning is their death,’ and only a prohibition can be called a warning. And such is the way of the Gemara in Sanhedrin 59.”

Option A sounds more plausible in his words. As for the question why theft is counted as a separate commandment, that is a good question. It may be that this only defines ownership, so that there will be a basis for judges who are appointed to adjudicate and act accordingly. From that, one can now establish a prohibition on injury and damage, etc., since all of these are violations of ownership of property. Another possibility is that all these laws are details within the commandment of theft.

In the view of the She’iltot, which learned the prohibition against causing damage from the liability for payment, does it really mean that someone who causes damage violates “one who strikes an animal,” or does it mean that from the obligation to pay I can know that there is a prohibition, because otherwise why should there be an obligation to pay, but its source is X?

It does not seem that there is another source. But in truth, the claim itself requires further examination.