Q&A: Rosh Hashanah, Yom Kippur, and Mourner’s Kaddish
Rosh Hashanah, Yom Kippur, and Mourner’s Kaddish
Question
The recent period has led me to think about a few questions:
1. I find it hard to believe that on Rosh Hashanah God really “opens a book” and decides a person’s fate. It is also hard to see this in reality, and there is no real difference between people who repented and those who did not. There are, of course, various explanations, but they do not seem serious to me, and it feels like people are trying to dodge the question.
During this period I feel like I am praying for nothing. I know there are also rationalist approaches in Judaism according to which the whole purpose of the day is to cause and inspire a person to repent, and according to Maimonides perhaps even to satisfy a person’s idolatrous tendency so that he feels a new page is beginning. But it is still hard for me to play the game every year and imagine that I am really changing something Above, and certainly to watch the people around me who truly believe that something changes.
What does the Rabbi think about this? And how should a rational person, or someone who has difficulty believing such a thing, conduct himself?
2. I find it hard to watch secular and traditional Jews who come to pray and fast while committing severe transgressions all year long, when it is clear they are not coming to repent or even to seriously consider that possibility. It feels like for many people the day has lost its meaning and become a display of hypocrisy. What meaning do these days have without repentance? How should one even relate to this phenomenon? I can understand people who fast out of habit or tradition, but someone who really believes and does not try to repent, and the next day will go right back to sinning, is hard for me to accept. Also, do you think there is any real substance to this behavior?
3. What should the attitude be toward Mourner’s Kaddish? Beyond the fact that, in my view, the belief in elevating souls is bizarre, it has no trace in the sources. Most of the medieval authorities (Rishonim) rejected this belief entirely. Likewise, even those who may have thought such a thing was possible did not treat Kaddish as a halakhic obligation. The closest thing is Kaddish recited in acceptance of divine judgment.
The only source one might hang this on is an aggadic passage that cannot be understood literally, and it is not even clear what it is trying to say. And certainly one cannot derive Jewish law from it.
When I looked into the sources of the custom, I saw that this was a French custom that began in the 12th century and somehow caught on because people wanted to think that something could be done for the dead.
What does the Rabbi think of this custom? Is there any benefit to it in his view? Is it a halakhic obligation? And how should a rational person relate to it?
Answer
1. See Column 27.
2. There are people to whom tradition speaks, not because of its content. I also do not really connect to it, but the fact is that there are such people.
3. Kaddishes began after the Talmud, so their force is that of custom. One can find justification for it for us. I also do not know where your certainty comes from regarding the persistence of the soul. My own reasoning says that there indeed is such a thing, although of course no one can know its details.
Discussion on Answer
2. If they do not repent, then they probably do not think that this day will atone for them, but are coming by the force of tradition. Alternatively, there is an opinion that the very essence of the day atones. But none of this is supposed to concern you. Let each person make his own personal accounting.
3. No one turned this into a principle of faith. If you do not want to say Kaddish, then do not say it. Personally, I do not see where your certainty comes from that it does not help. It can help if people see that others care about the deceased and that he influenced them for the good, as in the recitation of Kaddish itself.
There is no dissonance here at all. If it is clear to you that there is nothing to it, then do not say it. The custom is not to move one’s lips but to say Kaddish, and one who does not believe in it is not considered to be saying Kaddish even if he moves his lips. And in general, the Holy One, blessed be He, hates falsehood and His seal is truth, as we see in the Talmud in Yoma regarding “Where is His awesomeness?”
How does this fit with the Rabbi’s remarks about authority regarding facts? And how does it fit with his remarks about formal authority after something has been accepted by the public?
After all, you wrote in several places that even if a person thinks differently from the Talmud, he is still bound by it.
For example, if someone thinks that selecting is not a forbidden labor, he is still obligated to follow the Talmud, which holds that selecting is a prohibited labor.
One could also say that such a person is acting falsely toward himself. Likewise, a person who thinks there is no substance to prayer is still obligated to pray. The Rabbi brought examples of this. So why is his prayer considered prayer here even though he does not believe it changes anything, while here Kaddish is not considered Kaddish?
Granted, it is not the same level of authority, and Kaddish is a custom. But it is still a custom that took hold throughout all Israel and that they accepted upon themselves.
I cannot discuss things at such intervals, and I also do not understand the difficulties you are raising.
Sorry for the late reply. It has simply been a period of exams, so it slipped my mind.
My question is whether there is formal authority in determining Jewish law because of public acceptance, and whether that also obligates a person who thinks otherwise. For example, the case I mentioned of someone who thinks there is no prohibition of selecting and still has to obey the Sages.
Or someone who thinks prayer has no meaning and is still obligated to pray because that is what the Sages established.
Here too there is a custom that the public accepted, so the individual is obligated to act accordingly even if he thinks it has no meaning. This comes up in quite a few of the Rabbi’s posts and answers. If so, should there not also be an obligation to say Kaddish even for someone who thinks Kaddish does not help the dead? If we assume that a person who does not believe Kaddish helps is not really saying Kaddish, one can easily reach the conclusion that a person who thinks a certain Jewish law is incorrect is not obligated to obey it—for example, someone who thinks prayer does not help.
Granted, here it is a late custom and not the same level of obligation, but there is still public acceptance here.
What is the question? I wrote my opinion. Saying something you do not believe in is not an observance of the custom or the Jewish law. The custom is not to move one’s lips but to say Kaddish. Saying it without believing in it is not saying Kaddish. Of course, in my opinion one should say Kaddish.
2. I was not talking about non-believers with a traditional feeling, but more about believers for whom it is clear that they do not repent and do not consider that possibility, yet they come to pray and fast מתוך a belief that their sins will be atoned for.
3. What I meant was the elevation of the soul, not the persistence of the soul. A significant portion of the medieval authorities (Rishonim), if not the majority, completely rejects the possibility of helping the dead after death. All the more so according to more rationalist views like that of Maimonides, where the persistence of the soul or intellect comes through the wisdom attained by the deceased, or according to views influenced by Plato in which certain qualities can cause a certain reincarnation, where it cannot be that one can help him externally.
What I meant was the elevation of the soul. What does the Rabbi think about that, and does Kaddish really help? And what about taking an aggadic passage and turning it into Jewish law, something many have turned into a central principle of Judaism, when not only is this a late custom, but there are quite a few sources against it.
And even according to that aggadic source, it does not seem to be talking about something like Kaddish.
Also, customs do carry authority. What can be done with the dissonance that on the one hand it is not certain that Kaddish helps, and it is hard to believe in it, while on the other hand there is an obligation?