Q&A: The First Existent
The First Existent
Question
Hello! In the first part of the fourth talk, you wrote about “theological” and “philosophical” arguments.
You wrote that if a person determines about himself that he trusts his own eyes, then he necessarily believes that there is an intelligent creator who mediated this. But in the course of the discussion you added another step that I didn’t understand, where you wrote:
that usually he will look for an additional justification, a second-order one, for belief in God and for why he should trust his eyes. (page 337, third paragraph). [This idea appears again near the end of the argument in the section responding to the evolutionary objection, where you explained that it is invalid because your trust in the theory of evolution is circular—so here too we see that you are asking for a second-order explanation].
But philosophically, isn’t the claim and conclusion that come from the first-order argument enough, and one can stop there? Why is a second-order grounding needed at all? Just as you wrote—the trust a person gives his eyes is simply because that is his intuition. And his conclusion that God exists is simply the conclusion of that argument.
So in summary: why is an additional second-order argument needed to validate that assumption and conclusion?
Have a good week! And good night
Answer
After a person performs a self-diagnosis and discovers that he trusts his eyes, and from this it is clear that he implicitly assumes that there is a God (because otherwise there would be no justification for that trust), he can still wonder about that very implicit assumption that there is a God. Where does it come from? Maybe there really is no God and trust in the eyes is unjustified—it is an illusion. Here one can use the “philosophical” argument from the third talk.
Discussion on Answer
Everything was explained there very clearly, and here too. A person can make do with intuition, and then he does not need proofs. That is true of any proof of any kind. But many people are not satisfied with that and look for proofs and arguments. A “revealing” proof does not prove that there is a God; it only proves that I believe in Him. Therefore I can still wonder and look for proofs for this belief of mine.
There was a bit of a delay, so I’ll summarize briefly:
I asked why one needs a second-order justification for a revealing proof regarding our capacity for sight. If we do not accept that justification, would we abandon the basic belief that our eyes see correctly?
To that you answered:
That for someone who is satisfied with that, it is enough for him.
Second, that the proof does not prove that there is a God, only that I believe in Him.
So regarding the first possibility: in your opinion, from a philosophical standpoint do we need that added second-order explanation? Isn’t it superfluous? After all, every philosophical inquiry into something external to us stops only after an infinite regress of inquiries; the initial and basic assumption is always that we are thinking correctly. If so, the revealing proof shows that behind this ability stands a creator. But direct proofs for a creator—philosophical, inferential ones—will always come afterward…
This is somewhat similar to what you wrote in the book about the difference between physical entailment and logical causation regarding the statement: if there is rain, there are clouds.
As for the second explanation you wrote, it is even stranger, and it reminds me of what you answered Hillel several times in the first talk regarding the ontological proof, after he claimed that the proof can only prove that God exists in the intellect but not in reality. There you dismissed Hillel’s question because it was merely a skeptical claim—but why not here? (And even more so: if you do not trust your eyes and that you are coordinated with reality, then how would you know that the world is complex at all? Maybe it is simply… solipsism.)
I answered everything.
Could you still answer anyway? Even just one last time, because it seems to me that the points I wrote really were not mentioned earlier.
All right, one last time.
These are not two possibilities but two aspects of one thing: this argument proves that I believe in God, not that God exists. And if someone is not satisfied with merely having an intuition of God’s existence, he will look for a proof.
I do not see a question here that still needs answering regarding this picture. Clearly every philosophical argument begins from intuitive assumptions, but there is certainly room to suspect whether this intuition is genuine or merely built into me (through education, environment, or just biases). Therefore some people will look for proofs. Intuition is not a trump card in every situation, and the critique of logic is required.
The second question was answered in my message above.
Thank you very much! I think I understood.
I have another question, but in my opinion it belongs to a slightly different discussion, so I’d be happy to open a new question.
Thank you very much.
But I came out more confused than when I went in. Throughout the introduction you wrote at length that we begin from the assumption that he trusts his eyes.
If so, why would he question the very implicit assumption that there is a God and ask where it comes from? That is exactly the purpose of the proof—that even if he has no external justification at all for belief in God, the proof is still valid…
Or let me ask it another way: if he finds no grounding at all for belief in God (for example, he does not accept the arguments from the third talk), must he abandon trust in his eyesight!? He is not an atheist who positively assumes that there is no God; he is simply unconvinced by the other proofs.