Q&A: Ethnic Customs and the Authority of the Local Rabbi
Ethnic Customs and the Authority of the Local Rabbi
Question
If I did not receive halakhic customs from my parents, does the rule “do not forsake the teaching of your mother” apply to me? Or perhaps I am not obligated to follow the customs of any particular ethnic community? At the moment, my approach is that customs observed by the entire Jewish people (Sephardim and Ashkenazim alike) I do observe, but customs observed only by one side I treat as a rabbinic-level doubt, and therefore I do not observe them. For example, on Passover I eat rice, following the Sephardic custom, and with selichot I am lenient like the Ashkenazic custom and do not begin on the first of Elul as the Sephardim do. Another example is that Ashkenazim are lenient regarding fish with milk, while Sephardim are stringent, and I follow the lenient view in rabbinic commandments such as this, without identifying myself with any particular community. I should note that my father is Polish and my mother is Moroccan, and both are secular. The question is whether I am acting properly.
Answer
As for customs, absurd as it may sound, the laws of custom themselves are rooted in custom. The practice of ethnic customs became widespread, though it never really existed in the past, and the practice also became widespread that one’s community is determined by the father, even if he is not observant of Torah and commandments. His father or grandfather did observe.
But one should know that custom has no force in a place where you have your own halakhic position. Only where your grasp of the Jewish law is uncertain should you follow custom. Or in matters that are not Jewish law at all, meaning not a custom of legal ruling, but are entirely just custom. Prayer rites are mostly custom, with no halakhic root, so there the law of custom applies. But when the question is halakhic and the Rema rules one way and the author of the Shulchan Arukh rules another, in my opinion a Sephardi is not obligated to act like the author of the Shulchan Arukh if he himself thinks like the Rema, and vice versa. In such a case there is no reason to follow custom.
There is a responsum by the son of the Rosh, in Zikhron Yosef, who argues that there is no validity to the custom of a community to follow a particular decisor, such as Maimonides or the Shulchan Arukh. What matters is the local rabbinic authority, who must rule based on his own understanding, or the person himself if he is capable of ruling for himself. True, many halakhic decisors disagreed with him, and there is an interesting discussion in Kovetz Shiurim, but I, in my humble opinion, agree with him.
Discussion on Answer
For the halakhic source of the concept “the leading sage of the generation,” see my late father and teacher’s book, part 1, page 84; it can be accessed here: http://www.eretzhemdah.org/data/Uploadedfiles/ftpuserfiles/books/government_and_country/1.pdfAs for “the local rabbinic authority is dead” — the meaning is that there are places that accepted upon themselves the rulings of a Torah scholar even after his passing. See here:
Responsa Rashba part 1, siman 253
And in this way, every place where they have practiced doing all their acts according to one of the great halakhic decisors, in a place where they have practiced doing all their acts according to the laws of Rabbi Alfasi, of blessed memory, and in places where they have practiced doing all their acts according to the composition of Maimonides, of blessed memory, these great ones are treated as their rabbi. However, if there is there a sage who is knowledgeable and fit to issue rulings, and he sees reason to forbid what they permit, he conducts himself with prohibition. For these are not exactly like his rabbi, since if, while in his rabbi’s place, they were to act not in accordance with his words, they would be treating their rabbi’s honor lightly in his own place.
When I said there is no source, I meant no primary source. Regarding the power of a religious court to expropriate property, there is a source, at least according to the views that this refers to the supreme religious court of the generation. But a general authority for the leading sage of the generation, I know of no source for that. True, some medieval authorities wrote this without a source, but the matter is puzzling. From where does this authority emerge? The authority to expropriate property proves the opposite, namely that authority was granted specifically for that, and not for all the other powers of the Sanhedrin. Otherwise, what distinguishes the Sanhedrin? And the words of Sefer HaChinukh are well known, but puzzling and not agreed upon. Perhaps the authority is as Rabbi Kook wrote, based on the agreement of the entire Jewish people, which is like the authority of the Sanhedrin, but then again it is a matter of agreement and not authority. And where there is no agreement, there is no authority. That is unlike a situation in which there were halakhic authority for the leading sage of the generation; then it would not depend on agreement, just as the authority of the Sanhedrin does not depend on agreement. The practical difference is that even if you hold that a certain person is the leading sage of the generation, you have no obligation whatsoever to obey him, and indeed that is the situation in our time regarding those accepted as the leading sages of the generation. Some medieval authorities also wrote that the supreme religious court of the generation can impose corporal punishments, but that too has no source. It is simply an exigency of the hour, in their view, and not a law derived from any source. And regarding a place where they practiced following one decisor, the words of the responsa Zikhron Yosef are well known, by the son of the Rosh, also cited in Kovetz Shiurim on Bava Batra if I recall correctly, where he wrote that this has no force, at least where there is a local rabbinic authority, as you yourself also cited here from the Rashba. In any case, this is not “the locale of Maran” because he was the rabbi here and therefore has authority; rather, at most it is like a custom that they accepted upon themselves to follow his view, and not an obligation by force of authority. The practical difference is that the same mouth that prohibited, meaning the public, is also the one that permits, unlike a situation of halakhic authority. In any event, here in the Land of Israel that is not the situation. Even in Rabbi Yosef Karo’s own time they did not practice here according to his view.
Questioner:
I understood that in Beit Yosef, Rabbi Karo claims that his halakhic ruling has force only where there is no custom, but where there is a custom, the Jewish law follows the custom. How does that fit with what you wrote, that the force of customs exists only where the Jewish law is uncertain?
In addition, you wrote that where one’s grasp of the Jewish law is uncertain, or in matters that are not customs of legal ruling, one should follow custom. The question is: which custom should one follow, since each community has different customs? Does one need to choose a specific community and follow its customs in that context? Or perhaps one may combine customs from different communities as one sees fit? Or perhaps I am obligated to follow Ashkenazic custom because my father is Ashkenazi?
Also, suppose that in most places I do not have a clear decision as to what the Jewish law is, that is, my grasp of the Jewish law is uncertain. Am I allowed to follow the lenient view in rabbinic matters and the stringent view in Torah-level matters? For example, in the case I gave of fish with milk?
Likewise, regarding a custom that is not a custom of legal ruling, for example selichot beginning from the start of Elul among Sephardim, or a house-dedication custom, is there an obligation to follow such customs when they are customs observed by a certain community, not a custom of all Israel such as head covering, for example?
Sorry for the many questions; this is simply a subject that confuses me greatly, and the views among halakhic decisors are very divided on it.
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Rabbi:
As I wrote to you, the laws of custom are themselves rooted in custom. They have no real basis, and everyone does what seems right to him. Therefore all I can tell you is what people are accustomed to do regarding customs. Today it is customary, unlike in the past, for a person to belong to a community according to his ancestry, that is, his father, and from there he takes his customs. When it comes to a community, this is certainly the result of a choice and a decision to belong to it. In every place there are several communities, so the place itself determines nothing. I do not know this statement of the Beit Yosef. In any case, presumably his attitude toward customs was different from mine. He was a decisor who relied on precedents even in the purely halakhic realm, since he himself writes that he rules according to the majority of three decisors: the Rif, the Rosh, and Maimonides, although even he himself sometimes departs from that. To combine customs from different communities seems the strangest thing to me. If they have already convinced me to do meaningless, baseless things just because I was born Ashkenazi or Sephardi, why would I do so without even belonging to that community? Either follow your father, or do not observe customs at all, unless there is something among them that speaks to you, in which case do it simply because you want to. When you do not have a position on some issue, either appoint a rabbi for yourself who will decide for you, or act according to the laws of doubt. Fish with milk is a meaningless matter with no source, and there is no reason in the world to do anything about it. We have already discussed ethnic customs. I did not understand the question about selichot customs. With customs, the practice is to do what is accepted in your community, meaning your father’s community.
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Questioner (another one):
Hello Rabbi, I would like to ask whether Moroccans who came to the Land of Israel are obligated to cancel the custom they practiced abroad and conduct themselves according to the custom of Maran in the Land of Israel?
In addition, regarding the customs my forefathers practiced, such as the Rema in the Nine Days, am I obligated by them?
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Rabbi:
Why are you asking specifically about Moroccans? Rabbi Ovadia wanted to claim that everyone must follow him in the locale of Maran. But that is an invention with no basis, and nobody accepts it, rightly so.
I will add that personally I do not think there is any obligation at all to follow any custom, not Maran, not the Rema, and not anyone else. A person should act according to what he himself thinks, even if he is Ashkenazi and thinks like the author of the Shulchan Arukh, and vice versa. Only if your grasp of the Jewish law is uncertain should you follow custom. And if he is not capable of ruling, let him appoint a rabbi for himself.
As for the second question: yes. The whole matter of the Nine Days is custom, and therefore ancestral custom has importance. In matters of Jewish law there is room to deviate from ancestral customs.
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Questioner:
According to the Rabbi’s position regarding a person who can rule Jewish law for himself and is not obligated to any custom between Maran and the Rema, but after all we accepted the rulings of Maran because 200 sages relied on the local rabbinic authority of Israel and we accepted his method of ruling, so why not rule according to the author of the Shulchan Arukh?
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Rabbi:
Those are folk tales. I did not accept his method of ruling, absolutely not. As I explained, there is no such concept as a dead local rabbinic authority. I will add that in the responsum of Rabbi Yosef son of the Rosh it is written that one should not follow any particular decisor; rather, the local rabbinic authority rules according to his own understanding. Beyond that, when your grasp of the Jewish law is uncertain you follow custom. But when you have a position, you do what you understand and do not go looking for customs. Therefore even if, when I am uncertain, I follow the author of the Shulchan Arukh, that is only because I am in doubt.