Regarding halakhic ruling — if so, in your understanding has a kind of new rule of decision-making been created for cases of doubt? That is, just as rules developed such as “between Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Meir, the law follows Rabbi Yehuda”; “the law follows the later authority”; “the law follows Abaye in YAL KGM”; “between an individual and the majority, the law follows the majority,” and so on — now is there an additional rule of decision-making?

Regarding customs — is the chapter “In a Place Where They Had the Practice” basically “translated” today into “the community that had the practice”?

This is not a new rule. In a case of doubt, you follow the custom. And that is the custom.

Indeed.

I want to study Jewish law, and I’m Ashkenazi, but I study the Rema and there is the Mishnah Berurah, and there are many disputes over many of the Rema’s statements all the way down to the later authorities of our own time — like, which later authority am I supposed to follow?

Because of this I studied the Beit Yosef in order to understand the passage, but still, in order to cover Orach Chayim you have to learn faster and it’s impossible to linger over everything, and it’s not like learning a passage slowly and carefully — but one should still rule.

In principle you should do what you think. As long as you have not yet fully clarified the issues, follow the custom. And if there are disputes, then act according to the rules for disputes: doubt stringently or leniently, or according to accepted practice.

Does the Rabbi mean Torah-level doubts stringently and rabbinic-level doubts leniently?

What is the definition of accepted practice?

Yes. Accepted practice is a term taken from the laws of a judge who erred. I mean what is actually customary to rule in practice.

Doesn’t that contradict itself?

?

If you mean to ask something, it’s better to ask.

What does the Rabbi mean by what is accepted in practice? If we go stringently in Torah-level matters and leniently in rabbinic matters, where does “what is accepted” come in?

The rules of doubt stringently or leniently were stated when you have no other way to decide, meaning when no Jewish law has been ruled. If the law has been ruled, then you are not in doubt and you follow the custom. So the rule of doubt stringently or leniently does not apply. In other words, the rule of following the custom comes before the rules of doubt. If there is a custom, the laws of doubt do not apply.
Otherwise, in every law that is disputed in the Talmud we would have to follow the rules of doubt and pay no attention to the words of the halakhic decisors or to our own reasoning.

Following up on the question I asked at the beginning of the thread, I’ll present it in another variation —

Let’s say there had not been such a custom of ruling according to one’s community. Would it then have been permitted to rule in a case of doubt according to one’s community (and not, for example, to be stringent in a Torah-level matter when I have no opinion)?
Or in other words — the early authorities who began ruling according to their community even though they were no longer in their original place (Ashkenazim who moved to Sephardic lands and Sephardim who moved to Ashkenazic lands), seemingly were not acting according to the law, since such a custom did not yet exist? Perhaps a historical example is the Ashkenazim who settled in the Old City of Jerusalem in the 19th century but continued to rule according to Ashkenazic rulings.

I assume not. If you were in doubt, then the laws of doubt would apply. But a custom is always created on a vacuum. At first there is a custom to rule like someone because they think like him, like accepted practice. Then it spreads and a custom is formed, and now it has the status of custom also with respect to me.

We had an argument today, and I wanted to ask a few questions:

A. Can I, for example, being of Ashkenazic origin, read a halakhic ruling of Rabbi Ovadia, for example, and act accordingly? I’m not in a position where I can rule for myself.

B. When I don’t know how to rule, am I obligated to follow one particular decisor, or can I sometimes follow Rabbi Shlomo Zalman, sometimes Rabbi Asher Weiss, etc.? Since there isn’t someone I have a reason to follow specifically, there are many sages.

C. Is Rabbi Ofir Malka, who follows the Mishnah Berurah and not Sephardic decisors, acting legitimately? Or is he obligated to follow Sephardic decisors?
Basically: what is the authority of the Shulchan Arukh and the Rema? Do you have to stick to them? Are they just a guiding line?
What authority do they have?

A. I didn’t understand the question. You ended up on a deserted island and found there a synagogue left behind by Robinson Crusoe, and in it a set of the Zohar, Rabbi Nachman, and a single volume of Yechaveh Da’at?
Your origin is not relevant to the matter. In principle Rabbi Ovadia’s rulings are not intended for Sephardim specifically, except perhaps where there are differences in customs and rulings. If there is such a difference, it depends on whether you have a position of your own or not. If you can read his words and the words of others and decide — do so. If not, it is proper to follow the Ashkenazic custom.

B. In my opinion there is no obligation to follow specifically one person, and go out and see what people actually do. That is of course if you are not picking leniencies from this one and that one.

C. I don’t know him, but if that is his position then excellent. If he has no position and he chose them, that seems problematic to me because there is ancestral custom.

D. The authority of the rulings of the Shulchan Arukh and the Rema is that of custom for someone who has no position of his own. It is also proper to take their rulings into account when you formulate your own position. That carries weight.

A. Okay, so in an issue I’m not familiar with, I should act according to Ashkenazic custom. And if there is no custom, then not.

B. So what do I do when Ashkenazic decisors disagree — how do I decide? Just randomly pick someone?

C. He chose that position because he values the work of the Mishnah Berurah. Is that legitimate? Or is there a problem of ancestral custom?

D. Thank you very much. Does the Rabbi have an article on the topic?
Does the third book in the trilogy address it?

B. When you don’t have a position of your own, that is a situation of doubt. In principle one should go leniently in rabbinic matters and stringently in Torah-level matters, but in pressing circumstances one may rely on the lenient view.
C. It seems to me that yes. Rabbi Elchanan Wasserman in Kovetz Shiurim refers to the words of the Rosh’s son (in the responsa Zikhron Yosef) about a rabbi who chooses a decisor and follows him (Maimonides, Rashba, and the like). The son of the Rosh claims that it is forbidden, and Rabbi Elchanan Wasserman writes that it is commonly permitted. Logically it seems to me that this is like choosing a rabbi, and therefore it is permitted.

D. I don’t think I wrote about this.

Why does having a position of my own override the accepted custom?

Because a custom is valid only if you do not have a position of your own. A custom is not supposed to make you act contrary to Jewish law. Therefore, if you have a halakhic position, then you must act accordingly even if there is an opposite custom. The custom is the way to act when you do not have a position, as the Jerusalem Talmud writes: “If you do not know, O fairest among women, go forth in the footsteps of the flock and graze your young goats beside the shepherds’ dwellings.” Only when one does not know do I go in the footsteps of the flock.
All this is with respect to a custom of ruling, meaning that the practice is to rule one way or another in a halakhic dispute. There are customs that are not connected to Jewish law, and there they have status regardless of my own view, because from the outset it is not a halakhic question. Of course, if it is a foolish custom, it should be abolished.

Why is a custom that is not connected to Jewish law not a foolish custom from the outset, and what authority does it have?

Why is that foolishness? Does everything have to be Jewish law? The willow rite and the water libation (which according to one view are a law given to Moses at Sinai) — are they connected to Jewish law? Just as there are rabbinic enactments, so too there are customs that extend beyond what Jewish law requires. Sometimes they have a good reason, and then it is a good custom. When there is no reason, it is a foolish custom.

I think it would be proper for all Haredim to depart from the rulings of the Shulchan Arukh and the Rema, and read the Rema’s words in his introduction to the Shulchan Arukh: “And whoever has a palate to taste will distinguish the dishes by their flavors himself and not rely on others; and one who has not reached this level should not move from the custom, as the aforementioned gaon (Rabbi Yosef Karo) himself wrote in the introduction to his great book.”

The ceremony is over.