Q&A: Pluralist and Monist
Pluralist and Monist
Question
Hello Rabbi. More power to the Rabbi for the pluralist and monist lectures. With the Rabbi’s permission:
1. In the Rabbi’s view, is Rashi—who says regarding a dispute, “sometimes this reason applies and sometimes that reason applies”—a pluralist or a monist? I didn’t quite understand whether in his view there is one truth. 2. Rabbeinu Peretz in Eruvin says that “these and those” applies even in a factual dispute, because each one is justified! Each interpreted the verses correctly according to his approach, even though there is one truth. Does the Rabbi accept this explanation? 3. The Chida says that “these and those” means that the mistaken opinion clarifies the correct opinion for us. Why doesn’t the Rabbi explain it like him? 4. Regarding Rachel and regarding Nadav and Avihu, several explanations were given for the reason for their deaths. Does the Rabbi accept the superposition explanations—that all the explanations are correct? Or does the Rabbi say that it is possible that at least 2 or 3 of the explanations are in the category of “one of them is false”? Thank you very much, Rabbi.
Answer
I assume you heard in the lecture about harmonism. In my opinion, almost everyone who spoke about this topic meant that, just in different formulations.
1. A harmonist. He says that the reasons are valid, and their weight changes under different circumstances. There is one truth made up of all the reasons.
2. Something like this was written at length by Rabbi Yitzchak Hutner, whose words are brought at the beginning of the book Understand the Years of Generation after Generation. For example, regarding the way the beams of the Tabernacle were loaded into the wagons, where there is a dispute about the facts. His claim is that the dispute is about the interpretation of the verses, and the wording of the verses allows for both interpretations. So in reality, of course, only one was right, but they are not dealing with reality; they are dealing with interpretation of the verses, and in that respect, “these and those.”
3. Because that empties the concepts of truth and “the words of the living God” of content. Breakfast also gives me strength and helps me in this, and so does the comfortable chair I’m sitting on. However, if he too means that the reasons of all sides are valid, and that in this way they help me reach the correct conclusion, then he too is a harmonist.
4. In light of the Talmud in Gittin 6b (“He found a fly and was not particular; he found a hair and was particular”), it does seem definitely possible. Again, this is harmonism. As for the matter itself, it is not likely. There is no reason to think that several causes arose simultaneously, each of which independently required death. In reality, only one was right, but as an interpretation of the verses or as an educational homily, there can be truth in each of the possibilities.
From all this you can understand that there is no point in dealing with all these methods before clarifying the issue on the conceptual level. This is where almost everyone who dealt with it made a mistake—by not first offering a conceptual analysis. The conceptual analysis leads to harmonism, and this has two implications: 1. Once I have reached the conclusion that this is the truth, what is the point of dealing with all the commentators’ words on the matter? I already know the conclusion. 2. According to the principle of charity, one can understand that almost everyone who dealt with this really meant harmonism, just each time from a different angle.