Q&A: Several Questions About the Labor of Tying
Several Questions About the Labor of Tying
Question
Hello Rabbi,
I wanted to know: in the Mishnah (Sabbath 113a) it is explained that a knot must be permanent in order for one to be liable for it under Torah law. Why does the knot need to be permanent? In the other labors this rule seemingly is not stated at all.
Answer
Anything produced through the labors of the Sabbath must be lasting. This is a general principle, not only in the case of tying. But in most labors this has no practical significance. Is there such a thing as cooking or grinding that is not lasting? Or trapping that is not lasting? (In trapping, perhaps if one catches something only in order to release it immediately.)
Here is a quote from Shemirat Shabbat Kehilchatah:
Chapter 1, סעיף 18: (d) “Permanence” — Under Torah law, a person is liable for performing labor only if its result endures for a significant period of time. But if its result does not endure in this way, he is exempt under Torah law, though it is rabbinically prohibited. Therefore, one who writes with ink on paper is liable under Torah law, since the writing lasts over time; but one who writes on a window covered with steam is exempt, because this is not writing that endures, though it is rabbinically prohibited to do so; one who ties a permanent knot is liable, whereas one who ties a non-permanent knot is exempt, but it is rabbinically prohibited.
Discussion on Answer
I don’t understand this insistence. It is a sweeping rule in all the labors. In temporary building too, you do not violate the prohibition of building (as with a temporary tent, for example). And it is not true that this was said only about tying. True, anything temporary exists at the moment that it exists. That is a tautology. So what? It has to be something enduring. That’s all.
Let me ask it differently: an enduring labor is a condition in all the labors. But in the labor of tying there is a different definition called “a permanent knot,” and there Rashi explains that the person must tie it for a long time. This does not exist in the other labors: if a person plans to build a building, for example, which he will demolish a week later, that is not defined as “non-permanent building”; rather, he would violate the labor of building. In contrast, in tying, if a person plans to tie a knot that will last only for a limited time, then he is not liable, because the knot “is not permanent.” So I am asking why this is different from building, for example.
That is not a different definition, but the same definition. As I understand it, if a person ties a permanent knot and unties it a day later, he has desecrated the Sabbath. The knot must be of a kind that can last for a long time, regardless of the intention of the one tying it and regardless of what actually happens. Perhaps there are views that disagree, but as far as I remember, this is the accepted understanding.
That is certainly not the case. A permanent knot is definitely connected to the intention of the person tying it—that it should be forever and not for a limited time. And if a person tied it from the outset for a limited time, he is liable only rabbinically. That is the view of all the medieval authorities (Rishonim), especially Rashi throughout 111b–113a, who mentions in several places that the knot must be permanent, meaning that the person ties it “forever.” And there he writes in several places that he has no intention of untying it, and if his intention is to tie it on condition that it remain for a certain amount of time, he is liable only rabbinically. We have not found such a definition in the other labors—that if one did a labor intending it to last only for a limited time, he would not be liable under Torah law. Once the labor was done, even if he intended it only for a limited time, he is liable. Only in tying is one liable only if he tied it with the intention that the knot should remain forever.
See here: https://www.yeshiva.org.il/midrash/33712?gad_source=1&gclid=Cj0KCQjwpNuyBhCuARIsANJqL9MCn3bW-G_7eQhYY3gwde0dtoBs8wbNL7ZqzN4wSQP3YzkGkwFM7MsaAmTdEALw_wcB
In the second chapter: the time period.
First of all, we do not find this stated explicitly anywhere except in the labor of tying. There (113a), Rabbi Yehuda has to say this as a clear condition of the labor, which makes it sound like the matter is not so obvious.
Also, even in tying there is no real case of something not being permanent—after all, once a knot has been tied, the labor has been done. How is this different from building that lasted for a few minutes, where I am nevertheless liable for the labor of building?