Q&A: Debriefing on the Shaldag Fighters
Debriefing on the Shaldag Fighters
Question
As is known, an inquiry was conducted into the conduct and decision of the Shaldag fighters in Be’eri to withdraw to the gatehouse while the terrorists were massacring people, and to prevent additional vehicles from entering, when it was clear that they were one team of fighters facing 300 murderers. According to their commander, this was a rational decision to save whatever could be saved, and not to fight to the last drop of blood and die together with the civilians. It is quite evident that there is a tendency to justify the fighters at any cost and to blame only the higher ranks, and because of that a real discussion is being avoided. I mean that certainly the blame lies with the senior commanders and the whole conception, but the conduct of the fighters itself also needs to be examined on its own. In your opinion, what would have been the rational decision, and also the moral and value-based one, to make in that situation? To act like fighters and fight to the end, according to military orders and according to the simple Jewish feeling not to stand idly by your neighbor’s blood and to die together with them, or to retreat based on the supposedly logical consideration of the commander, who claims they had no chance?
Answer
I can’t answer such a general question without knowing the facts.
The tendency to justify the fighters and blame only the senior command is understandable and probably correct. Of course, only up to a certain point—you can see that in the end they are indeed conducting an inquiry.
Making operational decisions on the ground, under fire, is a difficult thing, and errors of judgment can sometimes be forgiven. More generally too, it’s hard to analyze decisions made in battle after the fact, when the dust has already settled, and here there really is an actual lack of data. Beyond that, it’s hard to assign blame when you don’t have the emotional data about the fighters’ point of view, seeing the situation through a keyhole. It’s like watching someone get beaten up in a movie and, after a few viewings, deciding that he should have ducked the first blow, blocked the second, and run on the third.
As for the senior commanders: first, it’s easy to gather technical data, and there is no shortage of subjective data for assigning blame (“we weren’t there”). It’s easy to blame someone who had many years to prepare, saw the broader picture, and could gather data and consult experts—and all that from an executive chair with black coffee