Q&A: On Skepticism
On Skepticism
Question
Hello Rabbi Michi. I’d be glad to know what you think about the following remarks by the 19th-century psychologist and philosopher William James, from his article “The Will to Believe” (1896):
“Skepticism, then, is not avoidance of choice; it is a choice of a certain kind of risk. Better to risk losing the truth than to risk the chance of error—that is precisely the position of the rejecter of faith. He actively bets just as much as the believer does; he bets on all the other horses except the hypothesis of faith, just as the believer bets on the hypothesis of faith against all the other horses. Whoever preaches to us that skepticism is our duty until ‘sufficient evidence’ for religion is found is like one who tells us, in the face of the faith-hypothesis, that it is wiser and better to yield to our fear that it is wrong than to yield to our hope that it may be true. This is not intellect standing against all the emotions, then; it is only intellect dominated by one emotion alone. And what, then, justifies this emotion’s claim to supreme wisdom? Among the various deceptions, what proof is there that the deception born of hope is worse than the deception born of fear?”
Answer
He draws a comparison between the skeptic and the believer and sees both as making bets. That is of course a mistake. The believer is not betting, but reaching a conclusion (even if it is not certain). The skeptic who has no position may perhaps be betting. But even there, one has to discuss what it is right to bet on in his situation. That brings us to Pascal’s Wager, and I’ve already written my view about it on the site (search here).
Actually, if he himself believes as a result of a bet, then he does not really believe.
Discussion on Answer
I’m currently writing a column about that.
The wager in James’s remarks—isn’t it about the question of which basic assumptions and intuitions it is worth relying on in the decision-making process?