Q&A: Clarifying the Intent of Column 661
Clarifying the Intent of Column 661
Question
“Someone who believes only by virtue of philosophical reasoning has an external kind of faith, and in essence some sort of gamble. The first believer claims that there is a God, whereas the second claims that God must exist, and only from there concludes that He probably exists as well.”
These are your words in Column 661. I read it and went back over certain parts several times, and I feel confused.
I believe on the basis of philosophical considerations (since I don’t see any other ways to arrive at rational faith), and of course nothing is certain. After assuming those two premises, I don’t really see a difference between the two kinds of believers the Rabbi described above. It seems that the believer of the first kind is the believer of the second kind, except that you simply cut off the reason for the first believer’s faith. You simply wrote that he believes because he reached the conclusion that he believes, just like the second believer. I really don’t see a difference. It seems to me that the second believer is the only believer who even exists, assuming we’re talking about faith based on philosophical considerations. Even if I reached the conclusion that God exists with 100 percent certainty on philosophical grounds (which sounds bizarre), he still believes because he understands that this is more reasonable, and that causes him to say that he believes there is a God.
Sorry, but it felt to me like chasing your own tail. Maybe I’m missing something here. I’d appreciate an explanation.
Answer
The difference lies in the question of whether he made a decision that the arguments are persuasive to him, or whether he remained at the level of the arguments themselves and the probabilities on both sides. That is the difference between a gamble and faith.
Discussion on Answer
Something just occurred to me, and maybe this is what the Rabbi meant:
A person understands that one thing is more probable but still isn’t convinced. And then he says, okay, if I had to place a bet, I’d go with the more probable option, even though that in itself still doesn’t convince me… I think that makes more sense. It’s like asking: how did the milk run out? It was full when I left the house, and nobody has a key. So the first option (extremely unlikely) is: an alien finished the milk. The second option: someone broke into the house, drank the milk, and left without stealing anything (unlikely, but more likely than the first option).
That is exactly all I was trying to argue in Column 661. When I see that something has a 60% chance, I have two possible paths before me: to decide that this is enough for me and adopt it, or to decide that it is reasonable but not enough for me to adopt it. The first is a decision and the second is a gamble. One person may feel that 60% is enough to adopt the conclusion, while another requires 80% and therefore will not adopt it.
That is exactly what you wrote in your last message.
Understood. Thank you very much.
The decision to adopt faith is really a covenant-making — a key principle in accepting the yoke of Torah. In a relationship too, there is marriage — which is the making of a covenant on the basis of a decision — and opposite it there is a common-law relationship, where people are afraid to decide as long as there is no one-hundred-percent certainty. The covenant principle, analogous to marriage and its implications, is presented beautifully in the discourse of Rabbi Yerucham of Mir on Simchat Torah 5683.
Can’t one say that part of what makes the arguments persuasive is precisely that they are more probable? What kind of person is persuaded by less probable arguments over more probable ones?? It feels to me like the same thing. A person makes decisions based on what is more probable (a rational person, anyway). A person is faced with two options: either there is a God or there isn’t. There are philosophical considerations in both directions; a person decides what seems more probable to him (for example, the principle of causality, the argument from complexity and design, etc.), and that gives greater weight to the choice that there is a God. I chose after understanding the considerations. As far as I’m concerned, you can call that a gamble. An informed gamble, if you like. Maybe it’s just semantics. Sorry for going on and on… Either I’m missing something or I’m repeating your words without realizing it.
Please sharpen your point if you can, because I’m honestly worried that I’m not fully understanding what you mean.