Following up on my previous question, I should note that my main occupation is with the analyses of Abaye and Rava, but I’ve also drawn a bit from Chabad teaching in the theosophical matters it touches on. So unfortunately my knowledge of philosophy is tiny, almost negligible. Therefore I’ll ask with the necessary caution: can one basically say that logic is the basis of being, the “thing” in its essence, occupying space, the fact that something exists? As you noted, the “law” of non-contradiction is not really such a law, because it does not describe the behavior of an object, which as such would be something additional to the thing itself. And consequently one cannot say that God is subject to it; rather, being itself is, and insofar as it exists, God relates to it. But as you surely know, Chabad teaching holds that God is above the law of non-contradiction. It seems to me that an early source for this is somewhere in the responsa of the Rashba, though I haven’t seen it inside. What this basically means is that contrary to the view that every content spreads across some area, and the object in its purest form is its own area, God can relate to the “thing” as an area, some kind of substrate, for the content revealed in it. In Hasidic terminology this is called a capacity lacking actualization—as though one were saying that God creates something not on the side of the thing itself, but only in order to reveal His ability to create, so that something of divinity is indeed revealed, but there is no area that has received it. So there is only a revelation of divinity. This is also called the higher knowledge, light without a vessel, and in psychological language it is defined as “nullification of existence,” where an object experiences its existence not as an independent point, but only as an outflow from the Absolute—something that will be made present in the days of the Messiah, when “all flesh shall see,” etc. I’d be happy to know what you think of these definitions.

The Rashba is in the responsa; see the index under impossible impossibilities.

By the same token, you could say that Chabad teaching holds abracadabra. So what if it holds something?
As for all the vague formulations brought here, which are indeed very typical of Hasidic teachings, they tell me nothing. I assume they don’t tell you much either.

And calling these “definitions” is really excessive.
By the way, there is a responsum of the Rashba that copies Maimonides’ statement that the Holy One, blessed be He, is subject to logic. And that is the view of most of the medieval authorities, although as I said, it doesn’t really matter to me what the medieval authorities think about this.

First, I didn’t bring Chabad teaching as proof, only as a view that calls for a response, so why the flare-up? Maybe baggage from the past, or stereotypes about questions of a certain type.
And as for the Rashba in question, it really does seem that he holds that God is subject to logic, but the Tzemach Tzedek cites him as proof for his own view. But that doesn’t matter much. Fine—this master of the wheat is himself, so only he requires a response.
As for the body of what I wrote, my language really is full of imagery; I’ll try to simplify.
As for the substance of the request: I’m asking for a response to the picture it presents of God’s ability merely to reveal His ability to create without producing an independent created being, one that does not merely stand as reflecting the source.
Hope this is clearer.

Really not any clearer. And you’re close to being blocked. Consider yourself warned.