Q&A: Is a Wicked Command from God Really Binding?
Is a Wicked Command from God Really Binding?
Question
If, theoretically, God were to command us to do an evil act (something anti-moral)—for example, to murder random people for no reason at all (assuming we know that the command has no purpose beyond the murder of human beings itself)—would there still, in principle, be an obligation to obey the divine command? (I do not mean the question of what would be preferable to do, but whether such a divine command would even have any validity for us at all.)
Answer
Clearly it would have validity. A divine command has validity regardless of its content. But you could say that standing against it is a moral command, and therefore you are in conflict. Still, the moral command also gets its validity from God, so ostensibly if He commands otherwise, that overrides morality. That was the case with Abraham at the Binding of Isaac.
But this is an ill-defined question, because God does not command such things, and it may be that even hypothetically He cannot command them, because by His nature He is good. It is like asking: if God were a human being, could you shoot Him in the head and kill Him? Answer: God is not a human being, and that situation is undefined. “God who is a human being” is a logically contradictory expression. So too “God who commands evil.” And that is not necessarily connected to the Euthyphro dilemma. a0
Discussion on Answer
Because He is good.
And how do we know that He is good?
(Apparently you cannot bring proof from the Hebrew Bible (Tanakh), because it could be that He simply wanted us to think that He is good. And from the creation and governance of the world as well, you also cannot bring proof, since in the end there is evil in the world too, so it is not necessary that He is only good and an absolute benefactor.)
So basically, a conflict between a commandment and morality cannot really exist except in specific cases, namely in circumstantial variables?
You assume this is possible and ask, and I answer that in my opinion it is not possible, so there is no question. Every divine attribute is necessary, and therefore if He is good then He is necessarily good. Our tendency to do good and the command to do good come from Him. He said that too. So yes, maybe He fooled us. It is also possible that you do not exist and that I am talking to myself. Anything is possible.
Nice Guy, I did not understand the question. What is unclear in what I wrote?
The question is whether, in a case where I see something that in my opinion is a command of the Creator, and on the other hand something that in my opinion is immoral, should I assume that my moral perception is mistaken?
I did not understand. What does it mean that you see something that is a command of the Creator? Give an example.
Suppose that in my opinion the commandment to blot out Amalek is not moral (without getting into the above discussion).
Should I assume that I am mistaken in my moral perception or not?
Absolutely not. Jewish law instructs you to do it, but that does not mean it is moral. Sometimes the halakhic value overrides the moral cost. See column 541.
But blotting out Amalek is already a real issue. You said God cannot command evil because He is good, but the command to blot out Amalek looks like a command to do evil. So what do you do in such a situation? Assume that the command is actually for good? And then what? Assume that the moral sense is mistaken in this case?
Did you see the above-mentioned column? The moral sense is not mistaken. The command is because of a religious reason that overrides the moral cost. See there.
I read it but I still did not understand..
God commands me to blot out the memory of Amalek.
My moral sense tells me that this is an evil command.
I will obey it, but the question is whether the moral sense is right in saying that this is an evil command? And if so, does that not lead to the conclusion that God commands evil too?
If a doctor instructs you to undergo surgery and it hurts, does that mean he is wicked and wants what is bad for you? That he does not care about your pain? And when you report that it hurts, does that mean your sense of pain is defective?
So too with regard to the command to blot out Amalek. It has a religious purpose that overrides the moral cost. But such a command does not mean that the Holy One, blessed be He, is not moral, and when you feel that it is immoral, that does not mean your moral sense is defective. On the contrary, someone who does not feel that way has defective morality.
Why do we assume that God cannot command evil? (If we set aside the Euthyphro dilemma.)