Q&A: Appeal to Authority
Appeal to Authority
Question
In column 63, and also in several other places, you repeat that you relate to the claim, not to the person making it. And that this is the way to clarify the truth, etc.
In the Talmud there are many disputes about what a certain tanna said, or halakhic rulings that are based on one of the disputants, such as “the Jewish law follows Rav in matters of prohibition, and Shmuel in monetary law” (Bekhorot 49), and likewise: the Jewish law follows Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi against a colleague, Rabbi Yosei against his colleagues, and Rabbi Akiva against his colleague (Eruvin 46b), etc.
And similarly the concept of “like tannaim,” which seems to me at least to show that, so that an amora should not be challenged by the ‘authority’ of a tanna who disagrees with him, the Talmud takes the trouble to find a tanna with whom the amora can associate his view, and only then do they discuss the content of the matter.
I would be glad if you could address the above and clarify what I am learning.
Answer
When we’re dealing with a claim, the person making it is irrelevant. When we’re dealing with a tradition or a fact, then it very much does matter. A claim can be examined on its own merits; facts are based on the trust you have in the witness who testifies to them.
As for the rules of Jewish law, that’s a different matter altogether. Jewish law was fixed in order to put an end to disputes and establish a bottom line. This isn’t just some statement about the person himself. By the way, even regarding those determinations, despite the formal ruling, halakhic decisors and later sages did not really stick to them. We do not derive rules from generalizations, even where an exception was stated. Therefore Maimonides allows himself to rule like Abaye in topics that are not part of Ya’al Kegam (“do not form separate factions,” “if one acted, it is ineffective”).
Even in a legal system, the person making the argument is not what matters, but the argument. But if the court or the legislature has decided, then we do not argue. There is legal authority.
I have written more than once about substantive authority and formal authority. There is formal authority in Jewish law, and opposite it there is no place for autonomy. But it is incorrect to attribute formal authority to institutions or individuals that do not have such authority. That is the value of autonomy.
Discussion on Answer
I answered that. It says that in a collective way, but that is for purposes of halakhic ruling, not for forming an opinion. And besides, we do not derive rules from generalizations. I didn’t understand what wasn’t clear before.
By the way, the fact that there were sages who thought that way is quite obvious. That’s also how it is today.
I understand.
But the examples I presented still aren’t clear to me.
I understand that we do not derive rules from generalizations for practical Jewish law, but the fact that the Talmud says in a collective way that the Jewish law follows Rabbi Yosei against his colleagues, and likewise the second example I brought from “like tannaim,” shows me that the sages of the Talmud themselves (some of them at any rate) do attribute some importance, even if only slight, to the authority of the person making the claim.
Not that this contradicts your words; I just want to understand whether I’m mistaken, or whether this really is the approach of some of the Sages of blessed memory.