Q&A: Missile Sirens and the Categorical Imperative
Missile Sirens and the Categorical Imperative
Question
Hello,
In lesson no. 5 on faith / belief, you discussed Pascal’s wager at some length. Among other things, you spoke about the irrationality of being afraid during a missile siren (the probability is negligible), and yet you noted that one should follow the instructions, only that this need not be accompanied by a feeling of fear. You explained the need to follow the instructions by analogy to the justification for not evading taxes or for voting in elections—that although a single action has almost zero impact, by force of the “categorical imperative,” if everyone thought this way, then in the end the public impact would be great.
I want to ask about the analogy between these cases: with tax evasion or voting in elections, if everyone evaded taxes or did not vote, then the final result would be disastrous and would affect me directly. I lose. Since that is so, by force of the categorical imperative, because I do not want to reach that outcome, I definitely understand the need for the individual action. But if nobody enters a shelter, then indeed there is a high chance that someone will be hurt, but that result does not affect me directly. Seemingly, the analogy is not identical.
Of course, assuming that if someone is hurt then the general morale of the public will be lowered—I understand the analogy. But let me ignore that for a moment. Is there a justification beyond that?
Answer
No. That is the justification. Not only morale. It is an achievement for the enemy in war.
Discussion on Answer
Understood. Thank you.
You wrote that there is an obligation to go to a shelter because of the categorical imperative. Two questions came to mind:
A. Does the categorical imperative apply specifically when there are consequences for others? For example: if I am on a deserted island and there is a siren, and I know my actions do not affect others—must I run to a shelter?
B. Seemingly one could also invoke the categorical imperative regarding other things whose harm is tiny—if everyone crosses the street, certainly someone will be injured in an accident, and therefore do not cross the street, just as you would not want everyone to cross it (since one person would certainly be hurt).
I would be glad to know.
Thank you!
A. Definitely. See columns 120 and 122.
B. Correct, don’t cross the street. But on the other hand, if nobody crosses the street, we will all die of hunger and boredom. And besides, there are needs and interests.
Thank you for the reply.
A. As I understand from your words, the categorical imperative is basically a definition of a moral act and is not connected at all to whether my act affects others or not, and therefore even in a situation where I am isolated I am obligated to act morally. If so, as a Jew who sees himself as obligated only by the laws of the Torah and by Jewish law, and who maintains that the only morality is what Jewish law obligates (both strictly speaking and in order to fulfill one’s duty before Heaven), and what in my view was given from Heaven (leave aside now whether you agree or not), can Kant’s categorical imperative speak to me at all? Can it obligate me because it is a moral act? I hold by a different moral system. I would be glad for an explanation; the question here is mainly in order to understand the matter.
B. If there really are needs and interests because of which I am not necessarily supposed not to go out into the street, then a person who has a need and an interest is likewise not obligated to go to a shelter—he is currently studying Torah, taking a walk with his wife, watching a movie with friends.
I would be glad to understand!
A strange question. First, it is unrelated to the previous clarification. Second, you are asking me: if I am not obligated by morality, am I obligated by morality? That collection of words does not add up, for me, to anything meaningful.
I have written here several times in the past that the categorical imperative is a general guiding principle. If you see it as a mathematical rule, you are in for disappointment. It is not. There is common sense, and the application always makes use of it. This is true of every moral thesis, not only of the categorical imperative. For example, there is a commandment, also a moral one, to give charity to a poor person. But I have needs and interests. Do you know how to say exactly where the line is drawn?
A. At first I asked whether the categorical imperative applies to me even when I am alone, or whether it is because of the effect on others (I would not want others to steal, and therefore I must not steal so as not to affect others). I understood that this is not the understanding of the categorical imperative at all; rather, the categorical imperative tries to define what a moral act is. Since this is not connected to environmental or social influence (something that is also relevant to the man of Jewish law), but rather to the definition of a moral act—many argue that formulating some moral law is all well and good, but it is unnecessary for the man of Jewish law, who is guided by Jewish law. So I asked whether there is any room, for someone who sees Jewish law as the sole source of obligation, to present to him the argument from the categorical imperative that for that reason he must go down to a shelter (for from the standpoint of saving life there is none here).
B. As for needs and interests that conflict with a moral act—clearly sometimes we choose the interest, but a person who sees himself as moral / halakhic, in the case of charity will give the charity to the poor person despite having other interests. Unless the interests are more moral and more correct than giving the charity (“the poor of your city come first,” for example). Otherwise I do not see where there is room here to prefer interests over the moral / halakhic act.
Thank you.
I can only repeat what I said in the previous comment.
Actually there are more justifications, two sides of the same coin: 1. The categorical imperative. If this were a general law, that is a criterion that this very act is our duty. 2. Here there is harm in that someone may die. I myself also do not want that. We don’t look only at my own morale, which is the direct benefit to me personally.