If I may “jump in” and ask a follow-up to the answer.

If the Torah, or parts of it, are not authentic, why are they binding? Because Shaphan and Josiah, or Ezra and his colleagues, transmitted it that way, so they are the authority? If so, is part of the Torah itself actually rabbinic?

As for reasonable interpretation: do you need to be authorized in order to interpret? If yes, then who are we to claim that the authorized interpretation is unreasonable? If not, then who are we to claim that any given person’s interpretation is unreasonable?

As for Kabbalah, I understand that you think it does not come from an authorized institution. Is the consensus regarding it not enough? A few individuals disputed its authenticity, but most of the Orthodox world accepts it. And if they are right, then it is also attributed to the Tannaim, so there is authority there. More generally, it sounds like you are not opposed to Kabbalah; it is just “voluntary”—meaning for whoever wants to be extra stringent. But there are esoteric ideas there that do not fit your worldview at all, so where exactly is the “voluntary” part?

Thank you very much.

You don’t know what is authentic and what isn’t. The question only arises after you have reached the conclusion about some verse that it is not authentic. Until you discover that, there is a presumption that what we have is the Torah given at Sinai. And even if it is later, if it came from a prophet then it is still the word of God. Even if the editing was later, it is still editing sources that came from above.
As for interpretation, an authorized institution (the Sanhedrin) has authority to interpret. When there is no authorized interpretation, everyone can interpret for himself.
I didn’t understand the question. If there is something there that doesn’t fit my view, why should I obligate myself to it? This is not a question of extra piety, but of whether you accept it or not.

Thank you very much.

According to what you are saying, is the holiness of the Torah and the Hebrew Bible equal? Also in the halakhic sense—for example, derivations and homilies that teach laws from books of the Hebrew Bible?

As for Kabbalah, if it doesn’t fit your worldview, but it comes from an authoritative source (Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai and the Tannaim, or at least parts of it, without getting into the discussion of the Ramchal and the Zohar specifically), then you need to accept it—where is the boundary?

I don’t know what practical difference that would make. If there is a derivation from the Hebrew Bible, it is fully binding. There is just a rule that matters of Torah law are not derived from the Prophets and Writings. And also, a prophet is not permitted from now on to introduce anything new, since the Torah determines the laws. But these are technical rules that are not connected to our discussion.

Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai is not a source of authority. The Talmud is a source of authority. If someone found a manuscript of Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai or of Rabbi Akiva, that would not be binding.

A derivation from the Hebrew Bible is binding, but not like one from the Torah. For example, in Kiddushin 30b it is derived that a father’s obligation to marry off his son comes from a verse in Jeremiah, and to teach him a trade from a verse in Ecclesiastes. It is indeed binding—the Mishnah stated it—but it is not included in the count of the commandments; it is apparently a rabbinic commandment with support from a prophetic verse. That has practical consequences regarding the severity of the commandment, whether a positive commandment overrides a prohibition, etc. After all, it is not written in the Torah, a prophet may not introduce anything new, and nevertheless it was accepted as an obligation on the father.

Another example: customs of the prophets that took root, such as the custom of beating the willow branches—are these a Torah-level obligation because they came from above through the prophets, or only rabbinic because they were accepted in the Mishnah and Talmud, or something in between (or just some pagan custom that should be ignored)?

And regarding Kabbalah, did the same reason—that it was accepted in most Jewish communities—which granted authority to the Talmud also grant authority to Kabbalistic teaching?

Obviously there is a difference in force. That is one of the technical differences I mentioned. So what?
Kabbalah was not accepted like the Talmud. There is no agreement, certainly not on a specific text. It also was not transmitted on a broad front like the Talmud.

I understand. The word of God is in the Torah, the Prophets, and the Talmud. The force is not equal. But you can’t say there is no practical difference because there is a difference in force.

As for Kabbalah, why does it need to be a text? The Oral Torah had force even before it was written down. And regarding agreement—what do you mean? The fact that there are different interpretations and views is no different from what happened and still happens with the Torah and the Oral Torah. Kabbalistic teaching was accepted by most of the Jewish people, aside from Maimonides and a few other isolated figures who ignored it (and the Dor Daim, who hadn’t heard of it). Most of the medieval authorities seem to follow Kabbalistic paths to a fair extent, especially Nachmanides and his school. After the book of the Zohar was “revealed,” it was accepted by a broad consensus, and aside from a few opponents who were pretty much silenced (and the Yaavetz, who commented on parts of it), the book was accepted by a large majority of the Jewish people. I’ll quote what you wrote above: “No one is supposed to judge whether something is divine or not, and the question of authenticity is not a condition for obligation.” Why shouldn’t we say the same thing about Kabbalah as well?

“Following the ways of Kabbalah” is an amorphous concept. And you yourself brought quite a few exceptions. Therefore it is not binding. In addition, Kabbalah contains factual assumptions, and facts have no authority.

How do we know that someone is a recognized halakhic authority, with all the conflicting opinions in the Talmud? It seems that the Sages, as well as the medieval authorities and later halakhic authorities, continued the tradition of ruling from the days of the Sages onward, where bringing proofs and arguments and public acceptance was the method. This brings me back to my point that Rabbi Ovadia in his younger years issued rulings that contradicted those of his earlier authority, the Ben Ish Hai, and was almost beaten for it, while his popularity in later years caused his rulings to become like law given to Moses at Sinai. Couldn’t things like that have happened in the days of the Sages too, when popularity ultimately became authority? Also, why did the Sages differ so much in their views? If this is law given to Moses, how could they have drifted so far from the source?

In response/question to Rabbi Michael:
There have always been exceptions—there were also Sadducees and Boethusians, and also Karaites. Don’t we follow the majority, and the majority accepted Kabbalah (unfortunately)?
Why is Kabbalah a factual assumption, unlike the Oral Torah, which in your view is a source of authority and the assumption that it is factual doesn’t bother you?

Yoni, you lost me. What is the connection between this collection of questions and the discussion, and between them themselves?
There are interpretive disputes even about things that are law given to Moses at Sinai. I have pointed this out more than once when discussing dynamic tradition. See the series of columns 622 and onward.
Anything can happen. And still, the public accepted the Talmud upon itself. It is possible that even acceptance of the Torah was only because of fear of the Holy One, blessed be He.

Israel, the Oral Torah is also not binding. There is a text that was accepted, and that is binding: the Talmud. The matter is exhausted.

Thank you very much, Rabbi Michael.