Question

I read a long time ago in The Science of Freedom about the logical-determinist argument (or whatever it’s called):
1. There is a proposition (for example, “Tomorrow it will rain”).
2. This proposition already has a truth value in the present, either true or false.
3. If it is true, then the event described in it will necessarily occur in the future, and if not, then necessarily not.
Since the proposition is already true or false in the present, and only our knowledge is limited, determinism must follow.
People usually attack the argument from the direction that cases which have not yet occurred have no truth value. I remember that you didn’t agree with that, and to me too it sounds illogical.
Sorry for the audacity, but the book isn’t within reach right now and I can’t remember what the Rabbi answered about this.
Maybe this will also be useful to those who, tragically, will never get their hands on the book.
Thank you very much!
 
 
4. If it is false, then the event will not occur.