Hello. I would like to continue asking in the same context:
Is it possible to argue that an action I performed was done both because of the religious command and because of the moral one? True, theoretically each of the two conditions would suffice, but in practice it would seem impossible that I performed the action because of both of them unless I did not regard each one of the commands as sufficient, no?

I already answered that. If each of them is sufficient, then it is indeed both a moral action and a religious one. By the way, it is not necessarily true that you cannot say you acted because of both. If two people simultaneously shoot a bullet into so-and-so’s head, they both killed him, even though each one is sufficient. The Talmud too has passages that assume this (for the sake of Passover and for the sake of a peace-offering; coercion and consent with modest women and promiscuous women, and the like).

How does it make sense that they both killed him? If so, then one could also say that the apple fell from the tree both because of the laws of nature and because I prayed for it.

Think about it yourself. What would you say in the situation I described? Didn’t they both kill him? So who did?
Indeed, one can say that the apple falls from the tree for both of those reasons (I have written several times about global and local compatibility between different and parallel planes of reference). Only in that particular case, where things depend on choice, this is not possible. I could have chosen either way, to pray or not to pray, even though the circumstances are now given and the laws of nature are deterministic.