How can one permit a Torah-level prohibition (if I remember correctly, that is how you understand head covering, based on exchanges that took place here in the past around Rabbi Mashash’s ruling) because of the context of acting? Would we also permit affectionate touching because “it’s not really affectionate, because they’re acting”?
If we decide that the concept of “acting” disconnects a person from herself and creates some kind of substitute character, then there’s no end to it, no?

The question is whether the prohibition exists, not how severe it is. However severe it may be, if the prohibition does not exist in such a situation, then there is no prohibition. Affectionate touching is a good example that certainly does depend on context. And similarly, the prohibition of a man’s gear on a woman is permitted on Purim because of the context of play-acting.

Since the rationale for head covering is not all that clear (after all, if it is modesty, as people commonly say, then it ought to apply to unmarried women as well), on what basis would one permit it in a context of acting?
Who says a married woman is allowed to “step out of character” from being herself and behave like an unmarried woman?
Affectionate touching is context-dependent maybe when comparing touch in the course of sex with the touch of a gynecologist.
But even if an actor is “preoccupied with his work,” his very work is to behave with physical closeness and in a way that looks like emotional intimacy…..

In short, it’s hard for me to understand why these arguments are not a kind of “I don’t intend to violate a prohibition, only to engage in a ‘neutral’ activity,” even though the prohibition is being performed in its normal manner.

The example of men’s gear on Purim is interesting; I think it’s no accident that many later authorities tried to climb down from that tree, and of course in countries where there was no non-Jewish carnival it did not occur to anyone at all.
It has the same problematic aspect, a kind of creating a category of “labor not needed for its own sake” throughout the entire Torah.

I have nothing to add. I’ll just note that even if head covering is about modesty, there is room to distinguish married women from unmarried women. Even if one concludes that something is prohibited for unmarried women, the prohibition is much lighter. Beyond that, the distinction between married and unmarried women really is an invention with an unclear basis.

I’ll take the risk of repeating myself, but Torah is Torah, etc.:
Do you think one can say “preoccupied with his work” (I’m not sure whether you meant that concept, which you didn’t mention, or something similar) even if that “work” is being a porn actor?

It just seems very strange to me to take this concept of “being perceived as a character” far enough to permit Torah prohibitions.

It feels to me like one needs a more cautious mechanism for determinations like these. Even if the matter is doubtful, it is a Torah-level doubt.

This is not exactly a consideration of “preoccupied with his work,” especially since looking at a woman’s hair does not arouse any special improper thoughts (at least nowadays).