Q&A: Vegetarianism and Jewish Law
Vegetarianism and Jewish Law
Question
Hello Rabbi,
I’ve seen a few times that you wrote about vegetarianism. The gist of the answers I saw was about the suffering that animals go through. I want to address the point of eating them itself.
What is the moral justification for this? Why, in your view, are we not obligated to refrain from killing them for the sake of our desire to eat? a0
Another question: let us assume that morality really does forbid this. And let us assume that the Torah tells us to kill animals for food. Can one infer that the Torah took the moral consideration into account and nevertheless commanded the eating, or from a Torah/legal standpoint are we required to eat, while morally one should not eat, and the Torah (more precisely: the Holy One, blessed be He) leaves it open, so that it may be that the Holy One, blessed be He, wants us to follow the moral consideration? In short: when does the Torah have the final say (despite morality), and when does it merely rule as a legal authority, after which the person (and the intention of the Holy One, blessed be He) is to take the moral step? a0
Thank you!
Answer
Eating them itself is permitted by the Torah, and therefore it cannot be forbidden. I agree that someone who does not eat them is on a higher level.
Regarding the clash with morality, I have distinguished several times between an incidental clash and an essential one. There are commands whose clash with morality is essential, such as the obligation of a priest to separate from his wife who was raped. Here there is an inherent clash with morality. In such a situation, if the Torah said to separate, it is reasonable to assume that it took the moral aspect into account. One can argue about interpretation (whether and how this emerges from the Torah, but here I am dealing only with principles). But saving a life and the Sabbath is an incidental clash. Observing the Sabbath does not inherently involve risk to life, and preserving life does not inherently involve desecrating the Sabbath. There one should seek a resolution. And in the context of Jewish law and morality, sometimes there is no resolution, and one must live with both together: two aspects, Jewish law and morality, whose practical implications are contradictory. This is not a principled contradiction, and one can live with it (and make practical decisions as in any value conflict).
In such a situation, I would certainly minimize the eating of animals as much as possible, and reduce the Torah’s command to the smallest interpretive minimum possible. Aside from sacrifices, it seems to me that all the rest can be reduced.
Discussion on Answer
And therefore? I didn’t understand. Give an example of a practical implication.
The implication is that the priest would not separate, since on the moral plane that would be immoral. And the Torah’s whole instruction to separate is only on the religious plane alone.
The Torah’s instruction is to separate. And since the contradiction is essential and not incidental, it is reasonable that the Torah took both aspects into account.
In your view, is the Torah not on the religious plane? The instruction too is only in that aspect, and not in the overall accounting of both planes (religious and moral)?
Gal, if when the Torah commanded them to separate it was only on the religious plane (which the moral plane overrides), why did it command it at all?
If God were to command you to do something immoral, would you refuse and explain to Him that He is commanding you only on the religious plane and therefore you are exempt from carrying out His instructions? That limits Him מאוד. I assume that even to you this sounds ridiculous, and that is exactly the case with the priest’s wife.
My question is on the essential level. Maybe it said to separate on the religious plane, but morality remains, and it may be that God wants us to give precedence to morality, while what is written in the Torah is only on the religious plane.