Q&A: Inconsistency
Inconsistency
Question
More than once, the Rabbi has pointed out that an atheist cannot accept the fact that morality is binding and also not believe in God; otherwise he is inconsistent. The same applies to a person who accepts the reliability of his senses. But the claim that he is inconsistent is based on the (justified) assumption that binding morality requires some factor that gives it validity, and that the reliability of the senses requires calibration by some agent. In principle, the atheist could claim that he does not accept those assumptions—wrongly, to be sure—but given that he does not accept those assumptions, how can one argue that there is inconsistency in his system of beliefs?
Answer
Obviously that is what he claims. But he is mistaken. In some cases he is not aware and/or is not philosophically skilled, and in other cases he insists on it in order to preserve his atheist belief.
Discussion on Answer
I don’t understand the question. If you hold two contradictory principles, then you are inconsistent. The fact that in your view they are not contradictory only means that you are not aware of your inconsistency.
Does the Rabbi think this also applies to someone whose view is reasoned out regarding his position that morality is binding regardless of God, even if the Rabbi thinks he is mistaken?
For example, I—even though I believe in God—nevertheless hold that morality is binding regardless of God (and in fact cannot be binding merely because of God), as I discussed with the Rabbi in the past regarding this:
https://mikyab.net/responsa/The obligation to obey God or morality/
And as the Rabbi can see in that thread, although the Rabbi does not agree with this position of mine, my view is reasoned and I arrived at it after reflection. Therefore, even if I am mistaken as the Rabbi believes, does the Rabbi necessarily think that in fact, unconsciously, I too hold like the Rabbi that morality is binding only because it is the will of God?
And put differently: if an atheist were to hold my position regarding morality, does the Rabbi think about him as well that there is inconsistency in his position, or does the Rabbi think he is simply mistaken but there is no inconsistency in it, since he has a reasoned explanation (mistaken, in the Rabbi’s view) for why morality is binding despite his lack of belief in God?
[P.S. — I would be glad if the Rabbi could respond to my latest arguments in the above thread]