Q&A: A Penitent
A Penitent
Question
In the last faith class there was a dialectical discussion about a completely righteous person and a penitent. It says that a penitent is preferable to a completely righteous person. First of all, it isn’t clear what “preferable” means, but even if we assume it means “better,” the Rabbi explained that the reason is because the penitent has the advantage of self-perfection, which the completely righteous person does not have. The question is whether this applies only during the period when the penitent is on his way to becoming completely righteous, so that he has the advantage of self-perfection then, and once he reaches the level of a completely righteous person he will be equal to a righteous person who is not a penitent. Or is he always on a higher level, even after he has already finished the journey and reached the level of a completely righteous person, because of the very process he went through, which the completely righteous person did not go through?
Of course, this is all a bit of hair-splitting fit for a housewarming, but I just wanted to sharpen the point. I’d be happy to hear the Rabbi’s answer. Thank you very much.
Answer
A person disqualifies with his own blemish. This question itself is indeed hair-splitting not worthy even of a housewarming. But my remarks there were not hair-splitting; they are the plain, straightforward meaning of the Talmudic statement, and they also make sense conceptually. As for your learned question, I suggest you think about it on your own, and I’m sure you’ll arrive at very profound insights.
Discussion on Answer
It does have practical implications. In any case, as with every other aspect, there’s no reason to assume that if I did something of value, it counts only at the moment of doing it. If the purpose of charity is to improve the poor person’s condition, does that mean that once he runs out of money there’s nothing to appreciate me for in my actions, or that they didn’t improve my spiritual condition? On the contrary: if anything, it is specifically states and outcomes that would be valued only for the moment they exist, whereas in processes their value is less tied to that specific moment.
It seems the Rabbi didn’t understand what I meant. I didn’t mean to belittle the Rabbi’s words at all. I really enjoy the classes and the Rabbi’s insights into the Talmud. I apologize if the Rabbi understood otherwise.
What I meant by “hair-splitting” is that it doesn’t really have much practical implication. But it’s obviously an interesting idea.
I’d be glad if the Rabbi would reconsider answering the question, or explain to me why it isn’t worthy. Thank you.