Q&A: Free Choice
Free Choice
Question
Hello, Honorable Rabbi,
Questions related to the issue of choice, which I assume are connected to one another:
- When the determinist claims that he has no choice — I understand that there is a certain contradiction here. If I understand correctly, by saying that he is compelled to make even this claim, he is basically showing that he has no real “judgment.” That sounds reasonable and intuitive to me. But my question is: what is the difference between “judgment” and free choice? Are these concepts identical? Does the fact that the determinist makes a certain claim about reality mean that he has choice? Can he choose not to claim what he claims? Does the fact that he has choice give him the option of understanding reality incorrectly, contrary to the truths about reality? What I think I can infer from the contradiction in the determinist’s statement is that he indeed must have some objective source for his knowledge, and therefore he believes that what he says is really true even though he is compelled to say it. That is, it is clear to him that he has some dimension outside the system that can say “this is true” or “this is not true” — but is it logically necessary to say also that he is not compelled to make the claim he makes? Could it not be what I said: that perhaps he is compelled to say everything, but still has an objective dimension within him that identifies that what he says is true?
- Following the previous question: is the conclusion from this contradiction that he has free choice? Or only that choice is possible? Because I’m not sure I understand, from this example, where choice enters the picture. That is, if we understand that there is a contradiction in what he says, then what exactly is the alternative? What do we mean when we say that he had a choice here? Between which two options could he have chosen here? What argument would libertarians make here?
- A question about the “cause” of choice — an objection not related to the scientific questions of brain research: every action I do, I explain by means of reasons. Even if I say that I am a creature that acts for the sake of future goals that I want, since I am a human being, the very fact that I “want” such-and-such a future outcome is what brought about my act. I will always have considerations in my head, and the consideration in whose favor the scales ultimately tipped is what will bring about my act. For example, if I am a person who wants to be happy — then at every point of hesitation in my life, whatever seems to me more likely to fulfill that original desire to be happy will determine my action. In other words, there has to be some primary desire according to which I manage my considerations, seeing what fulfills it more or less. For example, if I smoke and want to stop — and I fail — then apparently at that moment I “decided” that continuing to smoke would make me happier than stopping, and so I continued smoking. In other words, before the act there will always be a desire, and when it is the strongest among the various desires it will determine my act. So where exactly does my choice come in here? In determining the order of priority among desires? But if so, what is the “interest” of my choice? What motivates it? Why would I choose one thing rather than another if my choice is free of interests and not caused by any considerations? How would I choose one way or the other? And what meaning does my action have if I had no reason at all to do it? That is, what would even be the value difference between doing good and evil if my choice came from “nowhere”? In other words, I don’t fully understand how choice can be completely “free,” because then what motivates it and gives me a reason to choose one thing over the other? And if, on the other hand, I assume there is some initial desire such as “to be happy” or “to be good” that runs everything, then once again I’m back to saying there is some cause that governs my “choice,” and then it is not entirely free.
I hope the questions are understandable.
Thank you very much, and happy New Year
Answer
1-2. I’m not sure I understood. Let me begin by saying that, to the best of my understanding, choice deals with values, whereas judgment is its parallel in the realm of facts. The determinist, according to his own view, claims that everything is forced on him, meaning he has no possibility of thinking otherwise. Therefore, in principle, he should not believe anything he thinks. But specifically regarding choice, there would seem to be a “whichever way you look at it” argument here: if he is compelled, then determinism is true; and if he is not compelled, then his conclusion that determinism is true again leads to determinism. But there is a bug in that argument, because on the side where he is not compelled, it is not reasonable that his conclusion would be that he has no choice, because that contradicts the assumption that makes such a conclusion possible in the first place (that he is not compelled in his conclusions). So in fact, in the issue of choice too, there are the same two possibilities: 1. Either he is compelled, and then his claim is correct (but not because that is what he thinks, since his thoughts have no significance — they are forced on him). 2. Or he is not compelled, and then his deterministic conclusion is mistaken. Bottom line: the fact that he thinks he is compelled carries no weight and has no meaning in the discussion.
3. There is a fundamental mistake here. Indeed, desire determines the act, but desire itself is the result of free choice. There are no causes for desire, because if there were, it would not be free. The value of the act stems from whether or not it fits the correct values. See this point in the fourth booklet, part 3.
Discussion on Answer
Following up on my questions about 1+2): I found another answer of yours on the site where you phrase it this way: “By contrast, if determinism is not true, then none of these things is forced upon you; rather, you make your decisions yourself. 2+2=4 is true because you understand that it is true. It is dark outside now because you decided that it is dark now. And so on. Everything is the result of your decision.” I didn’t fully understand that. Because it doesn’t seem to me that I “decide” or “choose” that 2+2=4 or that it is dark outside. I seem pretty much “compelled” to think that way. I don’t believe I can tell myself, “Okay, actually now it’s light outside.” On the other hand, I do feel “free” in that I trust my conclusions, because I “know” that I am indeed right. So I’m trying to understand what exactly is meant here by “judgment” and by “choice,” because it doesn’t seem like this is really a choice between A and B.
1-2. I didn’t understand the difficulty. What compels him is his brain. The determinists’ claim is that circumstances and brain structure dictate values (and therefore also factual judgment). That is external to his will, but not external to him himself.
3. Desire operates ex nihilo, out of nothing (without a cause, but for the sake of a purpose). A person decides to do the good because it is good. But the fact that it is good does not constitute a compelling cause for his decision; rather, it is a consideration that he decides to follow. You are looking for causes that compel desire and assuming that without causes there is no understanding. But that is not true. Desire operates without causes, and therefore there is no point in looking for causes for why I want something (and again, this is not about considerations, but about causes in the compelling sense).
You can think that this is not correct, but it is clear to you that it is correct. There is no contradiction. Being compelled means that you cannot think otherwise, but only when this is imposed by your brain and not by your recognition of the truth. The fact that you recognize something as true is not a mechanism of compulsion for our purposes, since it does not contradict free will. Deterministic compulsion comes from my brain structure and not from reality itself. In that sense, I certainly can think that it is light outside now and that my eyes are misleading me. Or that 2+2=7 and my mind is misleading me. But I do not think so because I have decided that this is not deception but truth itself. That is a free decision. Reality is not compulsion for our purposes.
A moral decision likewise does not determine what a good value is. What is good is a given (like reality), and the decision is whether to act according to the good value.
Thank you for the reply. Forgive me for the trouble, Rabbi, but it’s important to me to clarify the issue.
1-2) So if I understand correctly — according to you, I can cast doubt on any knowledge I have about reality, including my thoughts, and therefore by not doing that I show that I “choose” to trust them rather than doubt them.
3) “But only when this is imposed by your brain and not by your recognition of the truth” — first of all, I didn’t fully understand what the Rabbi meant by that sentence. If it is “imposed” on me by my recognition of the truth, isn’t that compulsion?
“Likewise, a moral decision does not determine what a good value is. What is good is a given (like reality), and the decision is whether to act according to the good value.” That sounds understandable overall. But I’d be glad if the Rabbi could point out the mistake in my analysis:
Thank you for the reply. Forgive me for the trouble, Rabbi, but it’s important to me to clarify the issue.
1-2) So if I understand correctly — according to you, I can cast doubt on any knowledge I have about reality, including my thoughts, and therefore by not doing that I show that I “choose” to trust them rather than doubt them.
3) “But only when this is imposed by your brain and not by your recognition of the truth” — first of all, I didn’t fully understand what the Rabbi meant by that sentence. If it is “imposed” on me by my recognition of the truth, isn’t that compulsion?
“Likewise, a moral decision does not determine what a good value is. What is good is a given (like reality), and the decision is whether to act according to the good value.” That sounds understandable overall. But I’d be glad if the Rabbi could point out the mistake in my analysis:
Human beings want to act according to what they believe “fits them.” It feels natural to them. If a person is characterized by the fact that his role is to do good in the world, then that is basically who I am. And therefore, by virtue of my desire to identify with my “true self,” I must act accordingly. In other words, every action is derived from what I see as fitting for me as a human being to do. After all, I would not want to behave in a way that contradicts my nature. My desire for actions is always “mine,” and I never behave in a way I do not “want”; and even when I give in to eating, I simply wanted to eat and saw that as the “good” for me at that moment. And if I decided to refrain from eating, that is because at that moment the “good,” or this fit with what I really want as a human being, was expressed in refraining from eating. And from here it seems that in every decision it is simply a weighing of considerations: what do I actually want (what really fits me and supposedly “serves my interests” as a person who wants to act according to his nature, even if these are positive interests, but they are always the person’s own will and not something detached from him), and then acting accordingly — in effect more “calculation” than choice. If so, at what stage here did I actually “choose”? Did I choose which value to regard as the one that “fits me”? But is that not just a matter of “calculation” and checking what suits me and then doing it? Simply a matter of understanding my personality, what I really want to achieve, and then the action follows from that? And even that “what I want to achieve” is ultimately derived from my personality type — the desire to be good, for example. I do not invent that desire; it is, let us say, who I am, and I simply bring it into effect. So where in this whole story does my choice find expression? And how is it free of interests and “desires” that motivate it?
Thank you, and sorry for the trouble
And a real-life example for clarification:
I see that there is a need to help through volunteering. Since I see myself as a person identified with doing good, that is “natural,” or at least I have come to believe that this is the case (and that is what matters regarding choice or lack of choice — who I think I am, and not necessarily who I really am). As a result, I tell myself that not volunteering is in fact not “right” for me, because then I am not really acting according to my desire. It is like eating chocolate when I am trying to diet. And so my basic assumption is that I ought to volunteer, and therefore I will go do it. But even in this example, everything is derived from how I see my nature and from the desire not to act in a way that contradicts it. So where, then, did I “choose”?
You’ve mixed things together here. I’ll answer briefly.
Regarding your last message: you chose to see the situation that way and to act according to what you see. You could have seen it differently or acted differently.
Indeed, I said that if it is imposed by the truth, that is not compulsion. That is a result of your judgment and not its cause. Think of a situation before you that is open to two interpretations (factual ones), A or B. For example, two scientific theories that can explain it. You weigh it in your mind and decide that interpretation A is correct. From your point of view, that is now the truth, but one cannot say that it was imposed on you. You decided that this is the truth.
If I understood correctly, in your last section you are raising the problem of weakness of will. I will address that in some future post (it is hard to elaborate here). The main points are laid out in my book The Science of Freedom.
Thank you very much. I’d like to raise another example here and try to understand from you what is wrong with it.
If, for example, A’s close friend died and this is hard for him, and therefore he denies it even though factually this is wrong. From this we learn that there is some psychological reason why A prefers (even if unconsciously) to deny this factual truth. His denial basically just shows us that this is what he wants and that this is what benefits him right now. If it were clear to him that what was better for him was to accept this fact, then he would accept it, because he has no interest in suffering for no reason and living in an illusion unless he gets some benefit from it. So in the end, isn’t it just a factual question of what really benefits him? So where does “choice” enter here? And I assume that in moral questions it is similar.
I’ll answer again what I already wrote: the choice is whether to deny or not. There are people for whom denial would be better, but they decide to overcome that and not deny.
I think we’ve exhausted this.
So if I understand correctly, according to you a person can act against what is good for him. And according to what you’re saying, acting according to my desire is not defined as doing what I see as good for me. Am I understanding you correctly?
How is it even possible for a person to choose what he does not see as good for him? After all, a person cannot step outside himself and make decisions other than מתוך the desire that the decision fit him… so doesn’t it follow from this that by definition he thinks what he decides is “good” for him?
Rabbi, I didn’t understand you. What does it mean that it is forced on him to believe, and therefore it makes sense that he should not believe? If it is forced on him to believe, he has no choice but to believe.
Of course he can act against what is good for him. But that is not the point. A person can act however he wants, and therefore he is the one who decides how to act. My desire is not identical with what is good for me (see the column on altruistic actions).
T,
If I know that something is being forced on me, then I won’t believe it. If someone hypnotizes me to believe that you are Napoleon but tells me that he hypnotized me, then I won’t believe that you are Napoleon. If he is a determinist, then he knows that his beliefs were forced on him.
But again, why would someone “want” to choose good over evil, for example, unless it is ingrained in him that good is preferable to evil — and in that case that already constitutes a cause for the choice. A person who loves life will not commit suicide — even though that option exists. But it exists only hypothetically; in practice a person will never do it if his life is good, unless he has gone mad. So where is the choice here? It is obvious to the person that life serves what he wants, and therefore there is no chance that he will choose the opposite. And as in this case, so in every case: a person acts according to what at that moment seems to him to serve his beliefs and what is “natural” to him as a person (even if it is good and moral).
I explained this. There’s no point repeating it again and again. If you don’t agree, then you don’t.
All right. Thanks anyway.
Rabbi, if after you hypnotize me I can change my mind, then that is not real hypnosis and not equivalent to determinism. For the determinist, even after he understands that it was forced on him to be a determinist, he still has deterministic intuitions, and it still seems to him like the truth. There is no reason to be contrarian and suddenly believe the opposite, because that is not what his intuition tells him. And in general, why should he think that a person with choice has a better chance of finding the truth than a person without choice? After all, a person with choice can also believe a falsehood. I don’t see how this is relevant.
You are not changing your mind; rather, you understand that what you think is not correct. Exactly as the determinist is supposed to do. As stated, I explained the whole move above, and I see no point in repeating it again.
First of all, thank you very much for the reply.
1+2) I didn’t fully understand the answer; correct me if I’m wrong: either he is compelled, but then he couldn’t know that, because no thought could lead him to it; or he is not compelled (and then he would also assume that he is not compelled), and it is on this insight that he can rely.
But I still didn’t understand the answer. My question is what exactly is meant by “not compelled.” I understand that there must be some thing outside the system in order for one to be able to say something about it, whether true or false. But I still haven’t fully understood whether that is “choice,” because again — what were the options? I would be glad to understand the mechanism that would describe the process of choice in this case, because although intuitively the concept of “not compelled” sounds fitting to me, I still don’t fully understand where the “choice” of one thing or another enters the picture.
3) “There are no causes for desire, because if there were, it would not be free.” I think I agree with that, but on the other hand I still can’t understand how desire operates then. Where does it come from? How do I decide to go one way or another if I have no “interest”? And I don’t mean in the technical sense of causality, of what physically caused my desire, but how a tendency toward one thing rather than another can arise in me out of “nothing.” And if I say: I look at two options and one seems more moral to me, and I decided to choose it — then I am actually assuming that I have a desire to choose the moral option out of the two. And if I have no inclination to choose something moral over something immoral — then how would I ever reach any decision at all? That is, on the one hand I understand that in order for there to be “freedom,” one has to be free of influences; but on the other hand I don’t understand how I can ever come to a decision if within me there is no inclination in any direction — because then what guides me?
Thank you very much