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Q&A: Is it necessary to reject the binding force of physics in order to argue that there is free choice?

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This is an English translation (via GPT-5.4). Read the original Hebrew version.

Is it necessary to reject the binding force of physics in order to argue that there is free choice?

Question

Hello Rabbi!
I wanted to ask: in this lecture https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jtXD_qOQ9E4, the Rabbi argued for free choice.
As I understood it, the Rabbi presented it like this:
On the one hand there is the principle of causality, a general rule, which comes from information from outside, not from evidence.
Opposed to it is the principle of randomness, which the Rabbi rejected entirely.
And on the third side, choice.
Which stems from some kind of context, but the choice is absolute.
On the conscious plane I choose, and therefore that moves an electron.
So choice contradicts the principle of causality, not physics.
And the movement of the electron does not contradict the principle of causality, but it does contradict the principle of physics.
And the contradiction is at a local point while the general principle is preserved, and therefore I believe in free choice. [There is still physics and causality, and there is an exception in the form of free choice].

The Rabbi argued that in an absolute sense, if I choose on the conscious plane, then there must not be physical causality for the electron. Because if there is physical causality, then that is the source of my action and not my choice, which has no cause. 
My question is: could it be that the principle of physical causality is still preserved, but alongside it there is also my choice, which really is the cause?
That is, our basic assumption is causality. And alongside it, a basic assumption of choice whose source is itself. Maybe one could draw a picture in which every causal process has some aspect of choice causing it.

For example, if a stone falls, it falls because of the principle of causality, but perhaps there is also a free choice whose source is itself {perhaps divine choice} that caused the principle of causality to apply.
By the same token, I perform action x, which follows from the principle of causality in the full sense of the word, but the more absolute cause, or the one prior in an a priori sense, which is the source of causality applying here in this particular way, is my choice.

Maybe even more than that: when I say that my actions can be predicted, am I necessarily saying that I did not choose them? Perhaps it really is choice that prevails here.
That is, does a completely deterministic world necessarily contradict the claim that I truly choose what to do?

A few problems with what I am saying:
A. What is the basis of the claim? Answer: that everywhere I see the principle of causality, and that I also have a grounded intuition that every act of mine also involves free choice. And also a more problematic claim, that God simply should not be bound by principles, but rather chooses them freely.
B. How does the contradiction work? Answer: a bit like Kant’s antinomy, of whether the world is finite or infinite: on the one hand, from the side of my thought it is infinite, and on the other hand, from the side of physics it is finite. So too, from the side of physics, and perhaps also the spiritual world, the world is deterministic. And from a deeper layer, the root of things is choice.
C. What is the meaning of my choice if I know what I will choose? {Not that I must choose it, because I do not have to, since the principle of choice overrides the principle of causality}.
Maybe one can answer this a bit by asking the opposite question: what is the significance of my knowing what I will choose, if I really did choose it? That is, the central point is that I want it, and therefore I bear responsibility for it, and in addition, I really did choose it, and not that I had to because of the principle of causality, since as I noted, it may be that what prevails is the principle of choice over the principle of causality.

What I am trying to gain is room for the possibility that I can explain the whole world perfectly in physical terms, and still claim that all this physical occurrence is a manifestation of the conscious occurrence of my choice, and of my life and emotions.

In your opinion, is this a possible explanation? Can you point out holes in it? Many thanks, and sorry for the mess!

Answer

I did not understand the claim. If your intention is to describe two stages, the first involving choice and the second deterministic, how is that different from my description? And if they both operate simultaneously, then I did not understand.

Discussion on Answer

Yuval Mordechai (2023-08-15)

You said that there is a layer of choice, which is self-caused, and then it causes something physical in a way that cannot be predicted physically, and in that way it contradicts the physical order.
In my description I tried to give a more comprehensive explanation that would also fully include the physical order.

Or in short: according to you, if the choice can be predicted using physics / a mental order, then it is not choice.
And I tried to present it as two intuitions, choice and causality, and to argue that the fact that it can be predicted does not mean that I am not choosing it, and that everything that follows from a causal chain has a factor of choice that is self-caused.

I do not know whether my explanation is any good; that is mainly what I was trying to ask.

Michi (2023-08-15)

I did not understand. It sounds to me like a contradiction in terms.

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