Q&A: Morality?
Morality?
Question
A situation:
In some military system, one of the subordinates thinks that the right thing in a certain specific case is not to obey an order. The commander at the very top, with his broader perspective, sees that if the other subordinates see that there is a subordinate who dares to disobey an order, this will seep into the system, and in his view one thing will lead to another and human lives will be in danger. He wants to teach a lesson and show what happens when someone does not obey a commander’s order, and decides to kill him. In his view, when everyone sees this, they will understand that you do not mess with him. His ultimate argument is protecting the lives of the state’s citizens in the end.
Is it justified in such a situation to take the life of a subordinate, on the near-certain assumption according to the generals that if he is not killed, others will learn to disobey orders—there will be no discipline—and the lives of the state’s citizens will be endangered?
Answer
A very hypothetical question, since in a realistic situation it is impossible to measure the probabilities in such a case. You are talking about a situation in which it is impossible to warn him that I will kill him if he does not obey, and where it is clear to me that there will be great harm from his actions. It also has to be that the harm is certain and direct, and not just a general consideration that people will learn to obey in the future and that there will be discipline. That is not enough to kill. If all these far-fetched conditions are met, my answer is as follows:
As a rule, one does not kill a person in order to save the lives of others (“who is to say that their blood is redder?”). Here, however, we are dealing with a soldier who is acting against victory in war and doing so through a transgression. This is a kind of betrayal, and it seems that he has the status of a pursuer. A pursuer is killed even if he is pursuing unintentionally or by mistake.
Discussion on Answer
Someone who dodges the draft is not a pursuer but someone who causes damage through omission. The result is not death, and certainly not certain death. In the case of the soldier in the hypothetical situation described here, we are talking about directly causing certain death.
In Jewish law, a distinction is made between the responsibility of a craftsman, an expert, or a guardian, and the responsibility of an ordinary person. When an ordinary person causes damage indirectly, the expert and the guardian are considered as if they caused the damage directly. If I deposited a cow with a guardian and he did not lock the door, that is indirect damage, but because he is a guardian and I relied on him, it is considered direct damage (“the negligent one is a damager,” in Maimonides’ phrase). The same can be seen in the responsibility of a money changer for an error.
A soldier is a professional—that is his role—and therefore his error by omission is considered like a direct act.
How can someone passive have the status of a pursuer? By that logic, someone who dodges the draft is also acting against victory and doing so through a transgression, and that is a kind of betrayal, so he too would be a pursuer (even if under duress or by mistake)? That sounds strange to me.