Do you think that a person suspected of a crime is identical to an ordinary citizen? For example, isn’t it appropriate to dismiss him and so on, like someone who has been indicted, just for the sake of example.

Wouldn’t it have been better to write it that way right from the start?
In my opinion, a suspect is like any other person. A person against whom an indictment has been filed—there is room to restrict him in roles for which the allegations against him are relevant. If the suspect admits to the acts, or if it is clear that there is something wrong with them and the whole investigation is only to determine whether it crosses the criminal threshold, then there is also room to restrict him in certain roles.

In cases where in ordinary life I wouldn’t change my attitude or behavior toward the person, then clearly I also have no reason to do so through a legal restriction. But in cases where in ordinary life I would change my attitude toward a person on the basis of suspicion alone—for example, suspicion of theft when there is a persistent rumor about him, or when an investigation is being conducted against him, or when I saw a video of the theft and the person there looks pretty similar to that individual—then privately I would relate to him differently, in order to reduce my expected risk. So in a public system, are we giving up reducing expected risk because of what? Because in your view it contradicts the value of the presumption of innocence, and we as a public should accept the loss? Or because as a matter of public policy we also have to weigh the loss to that suspect in cases where he is not guilty, and thus the expected harm (when taking into account both the harms that can be caused if that suspect really is guilty and continues on his way, and the harms caused to the suspect if he is not guilty) is negative? I wasn’t able to formulate the question clearly, and I hope that despite the length it will still be understandable.

By that logic, you could also ask to punish him on the basis of suspicion. There is natural justice apart from expected-value considerations. In addition, this also prevents false accusations.

As for natural justice, why does it require us to ignore probabilities?? There ought to be a continuum: the stronger the suspicion (vague suspicion, an investigation opened, incriminating video, indictment, conviction), the stronger the restrictions. As for punishment, obviously there is a difference between infringing vested rights such as property rights and freedom of movement, and disqualifying someone from public positions, like chief tax assessor.

You could make exactly the same argument about punishment. I don’t see any difference. Why indeed don’t we act on a continuum? Because intuitively it isn’t just. Because there will be false accusations. Because there is a threshold of guilt below which there is no reason to do anything. See my column on belief as a wager.

This one?
Belief and Wagering: Two Types of Decision-Making Under Conditions of Uncertainty (Column 661)

אמונה והימור: שני סוגי קבלת החלטות בתנאי אי ודאות (טור 661)

Yes