In response to P. Harari's article: What if Judaism did not have a major influence on the human race?

Yuval Noah Harari does not disappoint. So much nonsense, demagogy, presuppositions and unfounded assumptions, in one article. It's nonsense that is even more concentrated than in his books. He is probably looking for sensations, and to that end he uses meaningless word games that unskilled people sometimes follow blindly. Postmodern arguments that empty every concept of content by going to extremes, and in fact do not notice that in doing so they themselves are also emptied of content. First, I will direct you to several review articles on Harari's books, links to which appear here on the site (two by Persico in my words, and another by Nadav Shnerb in the comment below). This article suffers from a common fallacy throughout the study of the history of ideas. In fact, the whole thing is nothing more than one continuous fallacy. It is very difficult to define and therefore also to point out a connection between ideas and the relationships of influence between them. I can point to any case of influence, like the relationship between Newton's mother and his mechanics, or between Judaism and Einstein's physics. According to him, nothing has an influence on anything, because the concept of influence is empty and undefined. After all, according to him, even Christianity and Islam, who spread the Bible, had no more influence than those who printed and bound it or invented printing. They only brought the Bible to all sorts of places, but they decided to adopt it. So why is there influence here? It's like Newton's mother, isn't it? The same goes for the printer or the inventor of ink. If those who wrote and conceived the Bible (=all Jews, to the best of my knowledge) are not considered to have influenced those who apply it and the culture that adopted it as a founding text – then I don't know what influence is. You can see the other side of this fallacy in the following example. After I published my first book, Two Carts, I received quite a few responses along the lines of: Well, everything is already in Rabbi Kook, Rabbi Tzadok, Rabbi Nachman, Maharal, Ramchal, etc. Each such claim has something in it, and yet this is the other side of the same fallacy. There are different influences on my words, of course (as on everyone), but an idea belongs to the one who conceived and formulated it. Even if you later find it encapsulated in another book or article, the birth of the idea in the history of ideas is with the one who conceived and formulated it, who put it in the universal human toolbox. This fallacy is the other side of Harari's fallacy, since here too the basis of the fallacy is the inability to point out the relationships of influence between ideas. If we empty the concepts of influence of any content in a postmodern argument of this type by Harari (going to the extreme), it has no meaning at all. According to him, it is impossible to talk about influences without reference to Judaism specifically, but in general. This fallacy is very typical of postmodern emptiness, and it expresses the typical lack of awareness of its speakers that they are cutting down the branch on which they themselves are sitting. Beyond that, he repeats here a fundamental misunderstanding of the concepts of morality. As a materialist, he identifies morality with thoughtful and altruistic behavior, and points out that it also exists in animals. As I explained in my fourth notebook, this is a very fundamental philosophical misunderstanding (which is very typical of Harari). Morality is behavior that derives from a commitment to a categorical imperative. No monkey is committed to such an imperative. A ram that behaves very nicely to its friends is not moral, just as a computer that does not harm other computers is not moral, and a stone that does not crush the chair on which it is placed is not moral. And it seems to me that this moral idea is a fairly distinctly Jewish product (even if not entirely exclusive. Kant was the one who finally achieved it, although it was actually found quite clearly before him as well. See my first comment). It is a pity that Harari himself did not learn this Jewish lesson. Likewise, a computer has no intelligence, just as integers that flow according to very complicated equations or a bird that navigates in a very complex way has no intelligence. The reason for this is that intelligence is distilled from reflection. Only an entity that thinks and considers in its mind and makes decisions in a non-deterministic manner is endowed with intelligence. Harari himself believes that humans are not like that (he is a materialist and a determinist), so perhaps he cannot be required to make demands on logic and philosophical understanding. He writes what he is conditioned to write. But why should I care about these things? It goes without saying that it is impossible to talk about significant ideas, good or bad (such as the denial of racism) in Harari's materialistic worldview. According to him, ideas are neither right nor wrong. They are inherent in us and as such are not subject to judgment. Some people are built in a racist way, so they are racist, and others are built differently. A contradictory statement like this actually borders on ridiculous: There is no doubt that the Jewish people are a special people with a fascinating history (although it must be admitted that this statement is true for most peoples); That is, we are a "special people" in the same way that every other people is special. In this sense, the term "special" is of course emptied of its essential content. Every person or stone is special because the collection of qualities of each such person is never found in any other individual. So what? Although logic is mainly taught at Givat Ram (in mathematics), I think he could also excel at it at Mount Scopus (in the philosophy department). The man lacks basic concepts and his thinking is deeply flawed. —————————————————————————————— Asks: Beautiful. You didn't disappoint either. thanks. You enlightened my eyes. But I would like to ask you for your opinion on a few more points. Let's really start with this issue of 'genocide' in Judaism. How do you see things? What about babies, women, and children, and innocent people in general? I have my side on this issue, but I would love to know what you think about this issue. (I am referring to the commandment: No soul shall live, except the life of Amalek and the seven of the Gentiles, and all the rest of the twelve tribes) —————————————————————————————— Rabbi: I don't have too much to say about that. First, the Torah strictly prohibits murder, both for Jews (you shall not murder) and for Gentiles (you shall not shed human blood). Therefore, when it commands the destruction of these peoples, I assume that it is not just for nothing, but that it has a good reason for it. It is common to bring a parable to a Jew who lived during the Holocaust. Does it sound unreasonable if he wished that all Germans from infants to old people would be destroyed? So we who are on the outside can relate to this more academically, but that does not mean that it is not justified. For example, if those peoples are lost cases since they educate all their friends to murder and severe prohibitions, then we are talking about a gang of murderers, present or future. Therefore, in such a situation, there could be logic in the command to destroy them all. Like a wayward son who is condemned to his end (when he has no hope). Beyond that, the sages knew throughout the generations to sublimate these commandments, and I assume that if it becomes relevant and they realize that it is truly a terrible crime, they will find a way to change the law and abolish it. As Maimonides did for the Amalekites (that there is an obligation to call them to peace, and to kill only warriors, etc.), and as an eye for an eye, etc. In such a situation, the Torah's teaching takes on a general ethical meaning (that it was appropriate to kill, just as it was appropriate to put out an eye), but not a practical one. I didn't write about all the problems in his article, because the paper was full and they couldn't. I'll just add here that his claims about the difference between Jews and Gentiles are also incorrect, or at least inaccurate. First, we are talking about Gentiles who themselves are not acting correctly, because Gentiles are moral and humane and have obligations towards them as towards a Jew (according to the Meiri). So why should they freely murder us and we be as careful about murdering them as we would murder a Jew? Especially according to Harari's theory that there is no difference between animals and humans, so why should he make claims against us when he claims against the whole world that it prefers humans over animals. Furthermore, the fact that there is an additional severity for murdering a Jew is not discrimination at all, since there is a Torah prohibition, albeit a different one, also for murdering a Gentile. So what is the problem? There is a severe prohibition on murdering any person, Jew or Gentile, but if it is a Jew, the prohibition is even more severe. This is not a lenient prohibition on murdering a Gentile, but a severity for murdering a Jew. And isn't it customary in various countries to give preferential rights to their citizens? As long as fundamental rights (human rights, as opposed to civil rights) are not violated, there is no obligation for total equality, and no one does this. Everyone prefers their family and their people over others, and rightly so. Now we must discuss whether reducing the prohibition on murder is a violation of a human right. In my opinion, absolutely not, since the prohibition on murder applies to every person, and this is the basic right of every person. Beyond that, imposing the death penalty for murder is not a fundamental human right (we do not have the right to have someone kill us if we murder them. We have the right not to be murdered, and this right is truly given equally to every person). —————————————————————————————— Asks: Speaking of which, I'll ask, why do you think the Torah reduces the punishment for rape so much to the point of a ridiculous financial fine? —————————————————————————————— Rabbi: Again, this is a punishment for the halakhic prohibition. But the act of rape is very immoral, and on the moral level there can be a completely different treatment (in the Jewish Law, beatings and punishments that are not lawful). —————————————————————————————— Asks: thanks. But this time I don't understand. The halakhic prohibition (if I accept this distinction) is 'there shall be no holy thing in you' or 'nothing', etc., for which there are already penalties (which he will certainly receive in this case as well, if not from the KLB). When we talk about rape, we are talking about a special penalty, which the Torah imposes on the actual rape – that is, non-consensual relations – that is, politeness – one person to another – and not on violating the laws of holiness. And here such a light penalty seems extremely forgiving. —————————————————————————————— Rabbi: What's the matter?! For the prohibition of a nida, one receives a punishment in itself. And if it is not a nida, then there is no rape law? And the same applies to the prohibition of not being holy, since it exists even without rape. Therefore, it is clear that we are not talking about these prohibitions. This is a fine for the act. Incidentally, this fine also exists in the case of a tempter, and therefore it is clear that the fine is not for rape either. There is no punishment for rape at all. Furthermore, the Maimonides explains that the fine of 50 shekels is paid for the pleasure of lying down (see the Hebrew: Ne'ara Betula Ref. 2. This is an innovation of course, since this is a fine that is supposed to be punitive and not blood money for something). In other words, this fine is not even a punishment, and what it is defined as a fine is probably because there is no personal assessment of the value of the pleasure of lying down. Beyond that, there are payments of sorrow, shame, and disgrace (and in seduction there is no sorrow). Only here is there a difference between rape and seduction. In any case, all of these are compensations and pleasure payments, not punishment. There is no punishment at all for such an act, since the offense here is a moral offense, as I wrote. This can be likened to financial damage. Here too, commentators wonder about the scope of his warning, since the Torah only mentions the payment obligations, the compensation. But there too, it is clear that there is a moral prohibition, and payment is not a punishment for it. —————————————————————————————— Asks: What you write is very interesting. Can you provide evidence for it? But the real question is, why? Why is there really no punishment? Would you also say that in murder, it is not (the death penalty) a punishment for the moral crime? —————————————————————————————— Rabbi: Indeed, in my opinion, even in murder the punishment is for the halakhic offense. The punishment for the moral issue is entering the Kippur. Therefore, in murdering a gentile there is no punishment because there is no halakhic offense of not murdering (but only shedding human blood, which is not punishable by death), but only a moral offense. —————————————————————————————— Pine: Further to this question, in your last answer you wrote about the murder of a Gentile, which has a halakhic prohibition of "he who sheds the blood of man, by man shall his blood be shed" (beyond the moral prohibition). The question is why is there no punishment alongside this halakhic offense, especially since the punishment is explicitly detailed in the verse itself (by man shall his blood be shed)? —————————————————————————————— Rabbi: I don't know. Maybe because it's a moral offense and the Torah doesn't include punishment for such offenses. It's up to the courts to punish those who are not in accordance with the law. —————————————————————————————— Pine: But there is also a halakhic offense here (correct me if I'm wrong), which comes from the verse – He who sheds the blood of man, by man his blood shall be shed. That is, there is a halakhic prohibition imposed on all humans to refrain from shedding blood (one of the 7 commandments of the sons of Noah), and furthermore, the Torah permitted the shedding of the blood of the alleged shedder. —————————————————————————————— Rabbi: What I suggested is that this offense is moral and not fully halakhic (although the halakhic law included it in the prohibition against killing a Gentile, as a kind of coercion for the virtue of Sodom), like the other commandments of the sons of Noah. —————————————————————————————— A': In my humble opinion, communication is not only done through human speech. We communicate through body language, dogs communicate through me wagging my tail, and certain animals communicate by secreting odorous substances. Therefore, even a monkey can obey all kinds of categorical commands, even if he doesn't know how to explain them to you. He and his friends understand each other, and that's enough for them. Man is more developed, as I wrote in my own words ( http://www.bhol.co.il/forums/topic.asp?topic_id=3120416&whichpage=2#R_15 ), and therefore he also develops morality to a higher level. But morality does not belong to Jews as it does not belong to man. Of course, I see a big problem with disrespecting man, since when they want to, they know very well how to claim that they are very enlightened, and only when it comes to people whose opinions they disagree with – then suddenly man becomes a primitive and poor creature, like a monkey at most. But morality itself is the property of God, not man. Only its use is man's property, although man's property also ultimately belongs to God. —————————————————————————————— Rabbi: I didn't understand the argument. The problem is not one of understanding but of free will. I expanded on this in the fourth of the five notebooks that appear on the site. See there, part three. Even if the monkey understands everything (this is a philosophical question about what understanding is and whether monkeys have it), it probably doesn't have free will, meaning it doesn't decide. Someone who doesn't decide cannot be moral even if he understands everything. A moral act is only an act that I decided to do. A stone that falls and hits an enemy who is chasing me is not doing a moral act. Not because it doesn't understand (even a stone with awareness wouldn't be moral in such a situation), but because it didn't "decide" to do the act. Therefore, the difference between a human and a monkey is not quantitative but rather substantive and categorical. Obeying a categorical command is a decision and not automatic obedience to a command. Therefore, when a dog obeys its master's command, it is not obedience, since it is not the result of its decision. That is its nature. Of course, there is an assumption here that animals do not have free will, and if you disagree with that, then the picture changes. But that is my assumption. On the sidelines, I also tend to think that a monkey does not have intelligence, since intelligence is the result of exercising judgment from a decision. An automatic calculation like that of a computer does not indicate the intelligence of the operator, but of the one who programmed it. The movement of water is done according to very complicated equations (Navier-Stokes), which no one knows how to solve in cases beyond the simplest. And water solves them at any moment (because the solution is a description of the movement of water). Does water have intelligence? To the same extent, water cannot be moral. Here too, the assumption is that water does not have free will, and you can of course disagree with that too. I do not understand the talk about "morality as someone's property." —————————————————————————————— A': I really think that animals have free will. It is true that a tiger does not have a choice whether to devour a deer or not. But it does have a choice how to behave with its fellow tigers. In the same way, a person does not have a choice whether to chat with a bull (even if technically he is able to, mentally he is not able to). But he certainly has a choice whether to chat with his friend in the middle of studying or working. To a certain extent, water may also have some kind of thinking. But that is in any case a different story, and requires philosophical thought about the nature of matter. The same goes for intelligence – a monkey has intelligence in what concerns the decisions it implements. And it certainly has such decisions, at its level and in its context. What I wrote about "morality as property" perhaps referred more to the paragraph quoted in Aszkach, in which it was explained that a person is no more moral than a monkey. To this I replied that it is true in terms of "who has moral insight", and not in terms of "who has high moral insight" —————————————————————————————— Rabbi: So, our debate is about facts and not about substance. —————————————————————————————— Pine: If animals are similar in a certain sense to water, as you said above, what is the meaning of a moral attitude toward them (beyond the halakhic sense of the Tzvach)? Apparently, according to your words, avoiding harm to a monkey is similar to being careful when stepping on stones so as not to hurt them. —————————————————————————————— Rabbi: I don't think so. The animal suffers and therefore there is a moral obligation to prevent it from suffering. Water does not suffer. The obligation to prevent suffering is not because of the value of the animal but rather the very fact that it suffers.
In other words, contrary to your assumption in the question, there is a difference between the individuals who are obligated to behave morally and can be judged as moral or not, which here are only those with free will, and the individuals (or beings) for whom there is a moral obligation. Here, these can also be animals.
This kind of difference also exists in the law regarding minors. They are not obligated by the commandments, but the commandments that apply between one person and another also apply to them. —————————————————————————————— Pine: When you claim that animals suffer, is there also an implicit assumption that they have some kind of consciousness that would experience this suffering? Otherwise, what is the meaning of animal suffering at all? —————————————————————————————— Rabbi: Indeed. This is the meaning of suffering. Suffering that is not felt is not suffering. In cases of pain and the like, it seems on the surface that they are truly suffering, and therefore this is my impression (that animals do indeed suffer), but of course it is always possible to interpret these as just accidental convulsions. —————————————————————————————— Just one: The rape answer is a bit lacking.
The payment of the fine is only an addition to the grief, damage, and shame of Shabbat and healing.
So the payment for the rape, its small part, is the fine. —————————————————————————————— Rabbi: Even if this were true, what difference does it make? But this is not true for the case. After all, all of these payments are not punishments (fines) but rather payments of damages (except for the Maimonides' method, which is not clear on this). Therefore, only the fine is a punishment for rape. —————————————————————————————— Just one: Peace be upon you
It is explicitly stated that 5 things are required-
How much do you think should be paid for sorrow and shame?
I think you will reach an amount that will make a person need to sell everything they have to pay this amount.
And in return he will have to sell himself into slavery.
And this is a prison in the old world.
It's not clear to me which is better, today's punishments or the ones from the past. —————————————————————————————— Rabbi: I don't know what was unclear in my words. None of these are punishments, and therefore it is irrelevant whether or not there is such a difference. These are compensation payments. Only the fine is a punishment. If it is very difficult for a person to compensate someone for damage, then he is exempt from punishment? There is no such thing as a minor offense here.