On idolatry for its own sake

Hello Oren. A good question that bothered me (and Nadav Shnerb) quite a bit. See Nadav Shnerb's article on this in Academ (it's called, I think, "Reflections on Idolatry"). In my opinion, there is acceptance of God from the urge, but the acceptance is still serious, meaning that he is truly committed. Yesterday I wrote about this in response to one of the questions (I don't remember who exactly now). Maybe this happens when he believes in the existence of the idol but would not worship it if it were not for the urge. That is, in the meaning of the work, he truly believes (thinks it is serious), but the decision to actually work (be committed) is because of the urge. —————————————————————————————— Asks: Perhaps we can equate this to the idea of: "Out of nothing for its own sake, comes for its own sake." That is, at first he does not work for the sake of the fact and is also aware of the prohibition of the fact – Station 1. Then he begins to work for the sake of the fact "not for the sake of it", that is, out of a side interest without acceptance in God, while understanding that it is nonsense (and then he is exempt) – Station 2. After that, he begins to understand that there is something in it but still works out of interest (not for the sake of it) – Station 3. And finally he begins to work for the sake of it and accepts in God (then he is supposedly forced by opinions, but he put himself in a situation of forced as you wrote in another answer, and therefore he should be obligated) – Station 4. According to this definition, in order for a person to be obligated in the fact, he must pass through the four stations above in this order. If he was born into station 2, or 3, or 4, and remains in this area (station 2 or 3 or 4), he is exempt. Even if he moves from station 1 directly to 3 or 4, he is exempt (forced by opinions). For the transition from station 1 to 2, one is obligated by opinions but Not on seriousness, and the transition from 2 or 3 to 4 is committed on seriousness and not on opinions. In addition, there is an initial condition for the commitment, and that is that you be aware of the prohibition on working for others (as I wrote in Station 1), meaning that someone who starts as a secularist or atheist in Station 1 also cannot commit. Only someone who starts as a religious person in Station 1 can commit. What do you think about this model? —————————————————————————————— Rabbi: I think it is possible but not necessary. What I proposed is a possible model, and it does not distill all the stations in your words. A person works for it even though he knows that there is a Jewish God, but he thinks that there is indeed a real God in the foreign God as well (sharing). He does this out of an instinct, but he accepts him in God out of this instinct. —————————————————————————————— Asks: I think it should be added to your suggestion that that person recognizes two entities. One is God, the Almighty. And the other, let's say, is Baal. That person understands that God is superior to Baal, and that God must be obeyed in the event of a conflict with Baal's command, and yet, chooses to obey Baal even in a conflict with God's command out of instinct. Otherwise, if that person recognizes Baal as an equal entity to God, he is seemingly a heretic in his views. —————————————————————————————— Rabbi: In general, my words are your words. —————————————————————————————— Israel: Isn't it possible to say that the punishment is not because of the guilt but out of a desire to eradicate idolaters? That sounds bad, but many punishment laws in the Torah don't always sound 100 percent tailored to the guilt. —————————————————————————————— Rabbi: Peace be upon you, Israel.
In principle, this is possible, but then we would have to punish every person who commits a sin (even without acceptance by God). This is also not written in the Rambam. And Anad urges us to say that in cases where there is no acceptance by God, it is simply not a sin and therefore there is no law and the evil from your near ones is banished.
In general, it seems to me that according to Chazal, punishments are usually a sanction for guilt, unless it is explicitly stated otherwise (such as a rebellious son, or in the issue of a misdemeanor and a slander against animals).
As for the general penal laws in the Torah, I think the situation is actually the opposite of what you wrote. Usually, very clear evidence of guilt is required, and without it there is exemption. Therefore, a warning is needed (which was only given to distinguish between accidental and intentional, i.e. to verify guilt) and a warning must be received, and there is a discussion about whether a friend needs a warning. All of this indicates that guilt is a necessary condition for punishment. Someone who is involved and is accidental and does not intend to, etc., are exempt.