On the attitude towards canonical texts

שו"ת › On the attitude towards canonical texts

שאל לפני 9 שנים

Hello,
I don't know whether you have extra time or not, so I'll ask for a short way and a slightly longer way.
I would be happy to know about the following topic.
The Tomitim, a shortened version of Cohen 124 or 125, I don't remember exactly, says that although "there is no doubt" that the Shulchan and the Rema did not intend everything that the P'i' after them in their words, "Everything is from God, upon whom be wisdom, etc., etc.," and there is room for the T'i, even though they are not the writer's intention.
Are there additional sources such as this on the Mishnah 3 or the Maimonides or others… on which they also made a distinction and a distinction, which to put it mildly does not seem to be what they intended…
Do we find that anyone knew that the Rambam in the Epistles retracted or contradicted his words in a certain way and yet contradicted his words not according to what he himself said, saying, "I interpret the book and I am not interested in what he (himself) wrote in the Epistle" or something like that (I heard from someone that there is one in the PMG who retracted it in the Epistle, and yet they refer to what is written in the book because they accept the book and not the man).
And in a slightly longer way, in the halakhic discussion, wherever there is "accept it" (as the Kasam Hala Memariam says), there will be an immediate need for an "expansive" interpretation, because since you are committed to the text and have questions (whether from an explanation or internal contradictions or contradictions from ancient sources), since you cannot erase the text and you do not speak with the author himself, you are forced to settle in new ways, not to say from origins…
And this is the explanation in the words of the Tomi who first said that one should not say "Kil" against the Shula and the Rema, and immediately went on to write that everything is from God, and the wise man on them, because the moment he determined that one accepts the Shula and the Rema and does not reject them, even because of their contradictions and inconsistencies, but rather chooses to accept them and thereby undertakes to say "Thi" in their context, the question arises as to what the meaning of the discussion about them is, did they really think about everything that is "Thi" in them? And since the Tomi boldly says that certainly not, he is forced to insert God, the Holy One, into the halakhic discussion… I saw in the comments there that the Hatas also says this about the Shula. I wanted such sources on ancient books such as the Mishnah 33 and Rambam.
According to what I have explained, such a phenomenon is found only in books that are canonical codifications (I hope I wrote that correctly) such as Rambam and Shulchan Aruch, and less so in interpretive books, where those who do not seem to be in favor of the issue will reject it because of another opinion that seems more correct, and there will be no need to reconcile the opinion that seems incorrect.
In any case, please open your mouth about it.

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מיכי צוות ענה לפני 9 שנים

peace. I don't know of any sources that write this. But I also don't understand why it's important. And if the Tomi or anyone else said something, does that mean it's true? Does anyone have a communication with God who revealed this secret to them? I think this is indeed the assumption in traditional learning (and so I wrote in my article on hermeneutics, which in the meantime I have retracted from the extremes in the things there), and of course this is mainly in relation to canonical texts. In closing, I would just like to say that just because we have accepted something does not mean that it cannot be deviated from. Like all rules of halakha, this rule also has exceptions when necessary (one cannot make generalizations even where an exception is stated). When there is something that is clearly not true, there is no reason to accept it even if we have accepted the authority of the text. We accepted its authority as long as we were not forced not to accept it. Beyond the fact that the rules in halacha are not perceived as mandatory, that is, as something frozen and automatically binding, one should pay attention to another point. The Rabbis once wrote that the Sages say that everyone who makes a distinction over the cup has male sons. Our eyes see that there are those who did not merit it (the Chazo). Does this mean that he did not make a distinction over the cup (both assuming that the Sages meant it seriously and assuming that they could have known it at all)? He explains that this is one consideration out of several. For example, in the sin of vows, a person's sons die. What will happen to a person who makes a distinction over the cup and is not careful with his vows? Will he have sons or not? In my article on validity, I explained that this is the case with every generalization, including natural laws. Such a law is completely correct, but in parallel with it, other laws operate that are also completely correct. In reality, all the laws operate, and the result is what comes out of all of them. And if we return to the discussion, there is the authority of the Talmud, but there is also the authority of truth. And both of these rules are completely binding. And sometimes when they conflict, you have to make tough decisions and give up one of them. Sometimes we give up the truth and sometimes the authority, depending on the consequences and the magnitude of the mistake, etc.

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