The problem with the arbitrariness of will

A. The avoidance of the fallacy is that ethical facts (characteristics of the idea of ​​the good) are charged facts and not neutral like physical facts. The fact that the chair next to me is yellow says nothing except a description of a fact. In analytical ethics, this is said to be a descriptive (descriptive) sentence. In contrast, the statement It is forbidden to murder does not describe a neutral fact but an ethical fact. An ethical fact is charged with a charge that motivates action (do) or deters action (don't). Therefore, the statement It is forbidden to murder is prescriptive and not descriptive. Therefore, anyone who wonders: I know that it is forbidden to murder and it is still not clear to me why not to murder, simply does not really understand the sentence "It is forbidden to murder." Anyone who understands it does not ask such a question (because he understands that it is a prescriptive sentence whose practical conclusion is part of it itself). B. Leibowitz, as a positivist, was not willing to accept claims that lacked empirical justification as binding claims. Any such claim was perceived by him as arbitrary. Therefore, when he came to justify a moral or religious principle, the only justification was "so." However, in my opinion, his positivist limitations prevented him from understanding that the "so" he was referring to was not so in an arbitrary sense, but rather so in the sense of being self-evident and not requiring justification (prescriptive). See here: https://mikyab.net/%D7%9B%D7%AA%D7%91%D7%99%D7%9D/%D7%9E%D7%90%D7%9E%D7%A8%D7%99%D7%9D/%D7%A9%D7%A8%D7%99%D7%A8%D7%95%D7%AA%D7%99%D7%95%D7%AA- %D7%94%D7%A8%D7%A6%D7%95%D7%9F-%D7%91%D7%9E%D7%A9%D7%A0%D7%AA%D7%95-%D7 %A9%D7%9C-%D7%9C%D7%99%D7%91%D7%95%D7%91%D7%99%D7%A5-%D7%A4%D7%95%D7%96/ C. I didn't understand.