The requirement of a reason to recite the commandments between a person and his fellow man
Hello Rabbi,
It is well known that the rule that they do not require a reason for repayment is known. But recently I thought that perhaps this rule only applies to the commandments between a person and a place, but in the commandments between a person and his fellow man, it is actually permissible and necessary to require a reason for repayment. For example, regarding the prohibition of interest, the verses that command this are:
"If you lend money to my people, you shall not be to them as a debtor, nor shall you be to them as a debtor, nor shall you be to them as a debtor."
"And if your brother strikes you, and his hand is with you, and you hold him fast, then he shall live and dwell with you. You shall not take from him your wife, and you shall multiply, and you shall fear your God; and your brother's life shall be with you. You shall not give him your money, as your wife; and when you multiply, you shall not give him your food . "
It seems clear that the reason behind the prohibition of interest is to help the poor (i.e., it is a commandment between a person and a person, not between a person and a place). It is possible that the economic reality at the time was that giving loans without interest was commonplace (at least for the people of his city). And indeed, from a quick Google search I saw that the level of interest during the days of the Pharaohs in ancient Egypt was very low (lower than the zero interest rate that exists in the economy today). Therefore, when a poor person asks for a loan, the Torah commands not to exploit his plight by extorting interest (since, out of his poverty, he will be forced to agree to a loan under any conditions). The prohibition of interest will not harm the poor in such a reality. But nowadays, it seems that our interpretation of the prohibition of interest leads to a reality that is blatantly contrary to the Torah's direction in this matter (helping the poor). The prohibition of interest itself harms the poor (because people prefer to invest their money in a yield-bearing channel). Isn't there room to restrict the prohibition of interest only to interest that is beyond what is accepted in the market? So it follows that in a reality where it is accepted to lend without interest to the people of your city (or where the interest is zero anyway), the prohibition stands as it is today, but in today's reality where interest is accepted in the economy, the prohibition only begins if I take excessive interest from the poor while taking advantage of his situation, but if I lend at the interest rate accepted in the economy, it is seemingly okay (otherwise, you would be found to be harming the poor). Of course There are halachic tricks like the transaction permit that seemingly limit the discussion, but it seems to me that even without it, the Torah did not intend to harm the poor with this prohibition. And the same is true for the other commandments between man and man, for if we do not exercise a little interpretive freedom (requiring a reason for reading), we sometimes find ourselves going against the trend of the Torah out of excessive conservatism. Regarding the commandments between man and place, there we really do not have enough understanding to require a reason for reading.
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- The claim that they did not demand a reason for reading does not mean that it is impossible to understand the meaning of the verses, nor even that the Torah does not reveal their meaning. On the contrary, in my article on the fifth root, I showed that the Maimonides' approach is that they did not demand even if the reason is expressed in the verses (as the opinion of the T.K. against Rabbi Yehuda and the R.S.). The debate is only about whether to use a purposive consideration of reason in interpreting the mitzvah. Therefore, your claim that we see from the Torah that the purpose of the prohibition of interest is to help the poor is irrelevant to the discussion. At most, you have proven that this is the reason, but the debate is about whether to use it in the halachic interpretation of the prohibition.
- The distinction between a commandment that is not between a person and a person and a place is problematic. The Gemara (Sanhedrin 21 and parallels) explicitly applies this to the prohibition of taking a pledge (you shall not tear a widow's garment), which is a prohibition between a person and his neighbor. Although it is difficult to argue that this is the essence of the argument, since according to the Rabbis who demand a reason for reading, they also understand that the purpose of the prohibition is to prevent harm to a widow and therefore it is a prohibition between a person and his neighbor, but the Rabbis disagree with him on this point. But it seems to me that it cannot be said without reason, since according to this, the Rabbis do not have a category of prohibitions between a person and his neighbor at all, and what do we do with the Talmud's answer that distinguishes them from other laws (which obligate one to appease one's neighbor)?
- Regardless of what you say, we constantly demand a reason for reading in all types of mitzvot. And in yeshivot we are already accustomed to distinguishing between a reason requirement and a boundary setting, a distinction that is very difficult to refine (if at all). In any case, there are quite a few examples of a reason requirement for reading.
- You distinguish between the distinction between intellectual-sound commandments and the distinction between commandments between a person and his fellow man and the place. Although there is a correlation, it seems to me that they cannot be identified. There are commandments between a person and the place that are intellectual (such as the prohibition of "Z" and belief in God), and there are those between a person and his fellow man that are sound (such as usury, which is generally viewed as an immoral prohibition. Prof. Chaim Soloveitchik has already emphasized this in his well-known book on usury).
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