The times of our Rabbanu Tam and the use of the rules of doubt

There is disagreement between the Rishonim and the Poskim on this, and what can my opinion add to yours on this matter? The majority of the public does not practice according to the RTA, and if you do not have your own position, you can certainly be satisfied with that. —————————————————————————————— Asker (another):
If he remains in doubt, he will be forced to be stricter because of doubt about the Torah (at least in the works of the Torah at the end of Shabbat). I think the question is whether we must fear the method of Rabbenu Tam because there is apparently a doubt about the Torah, or whether we can be lenient from the outset, as the method of the Ge'onim is, and if so, why? —————————————————————————————— Rabbi: When you have your own position, you must act according to it. When you do not have a position and there is a disagreement among the poskim/rishonim, you are in a state of doubt. There are several rules in the laws of spikut, only one of which is doubt from the Torah to the grave and rabbinic to the grave. For example, in the case of a person who takes away from his author the evidence on which he is speaking, they will divide him, all the more so. In the prohibitions of Sho'at, it is better to follow the custom, etc. Here there is a clear custom of the majority of the public, and those who fear the R's are a small minority. Therefore, it is possible to follow the custom as if the halakhah had been ruled upon and in any case you are not in doubt and the rule of doubt from the Torah to the grave does not apply. It seems to me that the rule of doubt from the Torah to the grave is the last rule to apply (only when all other rules are not applicable). This is why we do not always adhere to every system that appears in the Poskim/Rishonim (as the Briskirs believe), and when there is a clear custom, we follow it. The custom is considered a ruling that one of the systems has chosen, and in any case we are not in doubt. This is the concept of error in judgment that the Gemara in the Sanhedrin explains as one who goes against "sugain da'elma" (=what is customary to do, and it is considered as if the Halacha has been ruled thus). The Gemara there does not distinguish between when one does this with a kollah or a chumara (although in the law of the memonut, of course, there is no such thing as a kollah or a chumara). Of course, it is permissible to be stricter according to another opinion (and as for being lenient according to another opinion, I am debating whether it is permissible, and perhaps he will be considered to be following this and that voice, which is evil), and perhaps it is even appropriate. But there is no obligation. —————————————————————————————— Asks: Apparently, according to what you said, regarding the blue thread, we should have followed the Sugiyin Da'alma, and yet there you said that one should exercise "doubt from the Torah to the matter," and not "follow the custom." What is it that you hate? —————————————————————————————— Rabbi: The custom is called a nonsense custom. There is no halakhic system that exempts from the use of azure, but there are those who have decided that it is a Zionist practice and therefore exempt themselves from the mitzvah. The methods that are considered are reasoned methods and not nonsense. The doubt is a factual doubt (is it azure), and I do not know of any good reasons that claim that it is not azure.
What's more, as I wrote, if I have a position, I have to follow it. The whole discussion is only when I don't have a position, and then perhaps the law of sufficiency should be invoked. —————————————————————————————— horizon: You wrote that there is no halakhic method that exempts from wearing azure, but it is explicitly written that white does not inhibit azure, and azure does not follow white, 16 when there is doubt whether it is truly azure. —————————————————————————————— Rabbi: This is a common mistake. The fact that the blue does not inhibit the white does not mean that the blue is voluntary. Neither do the hand tefillin inhibit the head tefillin (in the same mishnah in the offerings). Are the head tefillin also not obligatory? When two things do not inhibit each other, this means that if you did not do one, you still fulfilled the obligation of the other. But the first in itself can be a complete obligation. Therefore
When you cast a tzitzit of only white, you nullified the act of a blue-green color, but it did not delay the white that existed. If there is doubt as to whether it is a blue-green color, the normal laws of spikot apply.
See details in my article here. —————————————————————————————— horizon: But that is exactly the point. Since the blue does not hinder the white, and there is doubt about the correctness of the blue, there is no obligation here and that is precisely why this halacha exists. After all, it is impossible to obligate a person with a mitzvah that he cannot fulfill, and according to the laws of doubt, he is not obligated at all because as soon as there is doubt about a mitzvah, there is no obligation to fulfill it. The parable/example from tefillin is a distortion of the matter because we have no doubt about what tefillin are or whether the head separates the hand, etc. The correct example/parable is to ask whether there is an obligation to put on tefillin of the rabbinate. And the Gra's answer is also acceptable here. 16 When there is more than one method of the blue, and unlike tefillin, it is impossible to fulfill all the possibilities. —————————————————————————————— Rabbi: Hello Ofek.
I explained things, and I will come back again.
First, we must examine the situation when there is definitely azure. In such a situation, the fact that the azure does not inhibit the white certainly does not mean that the azure is voluntary. Agreed? That is why I brought the "distorted" example of tefillin. I would be happy if you could explain to the poor in mind like me what is distorted here (apart from the interpretation you gave to my words).
So when there is doubt about a blue sky, it must be performed with the same certainty as any other mitzvah. It has nothing to do with the question of delaying the white. This is a doubt about a regular positive mitzvah. Whatever you say about a positive doubt (and I mentioned that the latter differed on this, but according to the vast majority of them, one should also be strict about a positive doubt) you should say here as well.
The existence of several methods for Techelet is also irrelevant. The connections and bindings, even if they are incorrect, do not hinder almost any method. So what is the point of this, Landon Didan?
The example of Rashi's tefillin is not relevant here, since you could equally well ask about Rashi's tefillin. But what? It is clear that the accepted custom does not consider this a doubt, but rather that there is a ruling by Rashi, and the question is only whether to be stricter by Rashi. This is not a question in ordinary spikot laws. —————————————————————————————— horizon: Thanks for the additional explanation, but you didn't bring anything new that I didn't understand from the previous points. First, as is known, doubt from the Torah is a serious matter. There is doubt that it is a tzeitze, and the moment a person wears a tzeitze with a tzeitze that is doubtful, he enters the law of doubt that cancels certainty through the existence of doubt, or in other words, wearing a tzeitze that is not tzeitze causes the certain to be canceled by the existence of doubt. Therefore, in this case and others like it, doubt should not be maintained at the expense of certainty, and as mentioned, since there is no proof that it is a tzeitze, it should not be worn and the reason is clear. Regarding what you wrote regarding tefillin, "that the accepted custom does not consider it a doubt, but rather there is a ruling as a Rashi, and the question is only whether to tighten as a Rashi…" This is completely incorrect. There are many poskim, from the Arizal to Rabbi Ovadia zt"l, who state that it is not a doubt, but an obligation. So as you wrote, there is no ordinary doubt in this, but not in the way you intended, and again, it is not an acceptable metaphor. —————————————————————————————— Rabbi: I didn't understand what you said. Even if the Tekhel is not real, it did not cancel the commandment of tzitzit. And regarding tefillin, I disagree. But as I commented on your statement, I could also ask about Rashi's tefillin.
One way or another, this entire discussion has absolutely nothing to do with the question of the delay, and that's what I was talking about.