חדש באתר: NotebookLM עם כל תכני הרב מיכאל אברהם. דומה למיכי בוט.

Pinchas' Zeal

שו"תPinchas' Zeal
שאל לפני 9 שנים

Hello, Your Honor,
Today, while studying Tractate Horiot (page 10:) I came across a Mimra according to which "a transgression for its own sake is greater than a mitzvah that is not for its own sake." The Mimra was spoken in the context of Pinchas' murder of Zimri, and indeed it qualified "a transgression for its own sake is as great as a mitzvah that is not for its own sake." Despite this, "a transgression for its own sake" remains in its greatness.
At that moment, I couldn't help but remember the despicable case of Yishai Schlissel, who stabbed six people participating in the Pride Parade in Jerusalem, about two years ago.
Therefore, I asked – is there a fundamental difference between Pinchas's act of zeal and Schlissel's, a difference so fundamental that it should have caused Schlissel, who studied this gemara (or saw Pinchas's act himself) and saw it as imposing an obligation on him to prevent what, from his point of view, is injustice, even for clearly unkosher motives, to retract it and stay with the book?
In other words – given that Pinchas received divine recognition for his actions, what was supposed to instruct Shalisel not to do so? Is this just "Dina Demalchuta," or is there something deeper here that he missed? (It seems to me that "thou shalt not murder" does not apply here since Pinchas himself committed murder).
Thank you in advance.


לגלות עוד מהאתר הרב מיכאל אברהם

Subscribe to get the latest posts sent to your email.

השאר תגובה

0 Answers
מיכי צוות ענה לפני 9 שנים
Hello. A mitzvah is a mitzvah and must be performed regardless of its consequences (except in very exceptional cases). But here it is a transgression, and therefore it must be judged and decided whether to perform it or not based on its consequences. Therefore, Pinchas's act is worthy of praise and Schlissel's act is severely condemned (he did no good to anyone, but only harmed). Beyond that, Pinchas intentionally harmed the criminal (I assume) who did his actions when the people were obligated to the commandments. In contrast, Schlissel accidentally harmed the criminal or actually raped (he actually harmed someone who was not a criminal at all), since homosexuals today do not understand that this is a prohibition (they are secular). Beyond that, the people today are in a different situation, since most of them are not obligated to the law. On this occasion, I will mention what some recent scholars write that a crime for its own sake depends on the intention of the perpetrator (the Netziv and the Rai, etc.). I do not accept this. Take away Yael's act (which is cited as an example in a parallel issue in Nazir). The act was justified because of its consequences (Sisra was the enemy's general), and therefore it is not reasonable in my opinion that if Yael felt that she was doing the act out of lust, it would be forbidden. The need to kill Sisra still exists, and the people of Israel were not required to give up just because Yael was not right. This is a consequence of the concept that a crime for its own sake is examined according to the results I cited above.

לגלות עוד מהאתר הרב מיכאל אברהם

Subscribe to get the latest posts sent to your email.

השאר תגובה

Back to top button
הירשם לעדכונים על תגובות חדשות בדף זה