An Optimistic View of the Situation (Column 739)
This column is first and foremost a public service for the “Haaretz” readers among us: a few perspectives you’re unlikely to encounter in Hamas’s Hebrew house organ—and even less so in its English translations. Since this little propaganda sheet punches far above the weight of its readership and drags along many other media outlets (aptly nicknamed the panic/poison channels), there’s reason to share these viewpoints with the wider public too. A little good taste before what may be one of the most depressing Rosh Hashanahs we’ve known. Let me stress: I’m not here to sugarcoat reality or claim that our situation is good, but I do want to present a few optimistic angles that are easy for all of us to miss.
A Pessimistic View of Our Situation
We keep hearing about global isolation, investors pulling out of Israel, our terrible economic situation and the economic risks of continuing the war; about international boycotts; the loss of our standing in the world; academic, tourism, sports, and arts ostracism; rising antisemitism; and other alarming angles. There’s truth in all of this, of course (I’m not delusional—one hopes). And I haven’t even mentioned the despair about our chances of victory; talk of an endless messianic war; claims that Hamas cannot be defeated; assertions that the hostages’ fate is sealed unless we surrender (and of course that it’s not sealed if we do); accusations of deliberate starvation and genocide for which we’re all supposedly guilty (ask Einav Tsangaoker), and more. Still, in honor of the approaching Rosh Hashanah, here are a few other perspectives on the very same situation—perspectives that, naturally, don’t find a place on the primary channels (in both senses), meaning those whose names are divisible by 7. I’ll focus here on the economic angle and our international standing, if only because I’ve written about the rest more than once.
A Different Look at the Economy
Yesterday I read two columns by Shmuel Slavin, former Director General of the Finance Ministry and currently head of Sela Capital. In his first column (dated August 20), he responds to an article by Karnit Flug and Jacob Frenkel, two former governors of the Bank of Israel—senior economists whose professional stature is unquestioned. Flug and Frenkel explain that the economic cost of continuing the war in Gaza will be dire. Slavin shows that the sudden need for economic calculus arises, curiously, only when events don’t fit your agenda (the economic costs of the disengagement, for example, were hardly considered). There’s also total disregard for the countervailing aspects (the clear economic benefits of victory in Gaza and the subduing of Hamas, Hezbollah, and Iran). You’ll also see there that the few general data points they do present are inflated and inaccurate. He points to economic “analysis” without data or arguments—in effect, professional trappings as a mask for political claims. Tell me something new.
Slavin himself doesn’t present much data either (there are a few at the end), but his focus there is mainly a critique of Flug and Frenkel. If you want data that support his optimism, you’ll find some in his second column (dated September 19). After an opening that again highlights the bad faith in additional economists’ assessments of our situation, he brings several interesting figures. Here is a quote from part of what he says:
Israel’s foreign currency reserves (the Bank of Israel’s reserves) are over $225 billion—the highest since the state’s founding and third in the world relative to GDP. People write that we’re becoming a “pariah state,” and that this is seeping into high-tech, but these scary forecasts began before the judicial reform and before the war—while high-tech accounts for about 20% of Israel’s GDP and about 53% of total exports, roughly $150 billion per year, among the highest export-to-GDP ratios in the world. In practice, in 2024 venture investment in high-tech was higher than in 2023, and 2025 is shaping up to be even higher. There was also a record in exits totaling $13.4 billion, and in 2025 M&A volume is the highest ever—like “Wiz,” sold for $32 billion, and “CyberArk,” sold for $25 billion. In addition, “Nvidia”—a company worth over $4 trillion—wants to build a huge campus in the north of the country, a massive vote of confidence in the State of Israel, in its resilience, wisdom, and high-tech industry. Likewise, Israel’s risk premium (CDS) has fallen and is at its lowest level since the start of the war. The doomsayers also predicted a dramatic rise in unemployment due to the war, but not only did that not happen—it actually fell to its lowest level ever, effectively one of the lowest in the world. In addition, war expenditures indeed crossed the 300 billion shekel threshold—a very large expense—but a reasonable estimate is that the cost of continuing will not exceed 50 billion shekels. Will a 20% addition collapse the economy? Where did these doomsayers learn elementary arithmetic? Not to mention that the state managed to raise tax revenues by 14% since the war began.
Demographically, Israel is also the strongest and most robust among developed countries—three children per woman on average, compared to an average of 1.6 in OECD countries. Regarding debt-to-GDP: the OECD average is 84%, while in the U.S. it’s 120%, in France over 120%, in Italy 140%, and in Japan over 250%—in Israel, after a hard and long war and a large deficit, we’re approaching 70%. So where is the panic the “experts” are spreading?
The economy will grow this year around 3%, with expectations for about 5% growth in 2026. How much GDP growth would you be willing to forgo to eliminate Iran’s nuclear program—1%? 2%? Presumably much more. And that is exactly the central issue that brings short-term economic harm on the one hand, and enormous strategic advantages in the long term on the other. In fact, the geostrategic threats to Israel have dropped by four levels: Iran defeated and licking its wounds; Hezbollah defeated and destroyed; the Shiite axis in Syria dismantled; and Hamas’s military wing destroyed. This is the “geostrategic dividend” that explains why the Tel Aviv Stock Exchange has risen by an astonishing 96% since October 7.
Foreign investors are competing with Israelis over who will buy more. This collective brain is putting its best money on the table out of faith and optimism in Israel’s economic future. The dollar, which reflects market nerves or optimism about the economy’s future, fell from a peak of 4.06 shekels to 3.34 shekels—in other words, the shekel strengthened by 18%.
As for the defense industries, the German chancellor Merz raised his country’s defense spending to 5% of GDP, of which 3.5% of GDP will go to defense procurement—each percentage point is about €45 billion—and some of that will flow to our defense industries. The European Union launched an €800 billion program for rearmament and another plan to increase defense spending by €3.5 trillion over a decade—and some of that will surely flow to our excellent and advanced defense industries; by some forecasts, about half a trillion euros over a decade. This, of course, creates enormous employment for engineers and technicians and helps increase foreign currency reserves.
Some of these forecasts are, of course, self-reinforcing. When experts and Israeli journalists say what they say about Israel’s economy or the justice of the war, it’s very easy for the whole world to join this Greek chorus. And yet, reality has stubborn, irritating qualities. Sometimes it refuses to bend to our wishes and desires and has a life of its own.
Needless to say, I’m not an economist and can’t adjudicate who’s right. One thing is clear to me: political influence colors economic, moral, and military opinions—and some of those you won’t encounter on Israel’s main media stages. So here I’m trying to offer a modest optimistic correction.
Now to our international standing. There, supposedly, it’s a disaster by all accounts. And yet, if you look again you can see optimistic angles there too—not just darkness.
Our International Standing
The general feeling is that things are terrible: a surge of antisemitism worldwide (which, oddly, also saves us, since it undermines the alternative for the doomsayers seeking a better place); investment withdrawals; boycott and international isolation; recognition of a Palestinian state; support for Hamas and its ridiculous “starvation” campaign; loss of ties with moderate Arab states; and so on.
Precisely on the day Britain recognized a Palestinian state (which, incidentally, I don’t think is terrible—if done correctly), and a day before the UN General Assembly was set to recognize a Palestinian state, I came across figures that somehow escaped me—and I suspect many of you as well. It turns out that in Britain and France, which are leading the move to recognize a Palestinian state, this is a governmental move completely disconnected from public opinion. We’re talking about a prime minister (Britain) and a president (France) in deep distress who have lost public support and are trying populist steps that, on the face of it, entangle them even further.
In Britain, an upstart party called Reform UK, led by Nigel Farage, threatens to sweep the British parliament. It’s riding an unprecedented wave of support from people who oppose Britain’s immigration policy and the possibility of migrants taking over Western countries—and, to our surprise, who also oppose recognizing a Palestinian state. Among other things, Farage supports Israel and its war, opposes recognition of a Palestinian state, and opposes arms and economic boycotts of Israel. He, like many others, sees Israel as the spearhead of the Western fight against Islamist takeover and terror.
Farage has previously shocked Britain’s media bubble by pushing through Brexit against all predictions (it seems their media forecasts track, unsurprisingly, with their own milieu—about like ours. Cf. “the people are with us”). He’s now projected to succeed again. His party, currently holding 5 seats out of 650 (!), is polling at roughly 300 seats. Something like 6,000%. Respectable, no? (Granted, some of this is due to the electoral system. The rise in raw votes isn’t that large, but by the same token his current position wasn’t as dire as the seat count suggests.)
We talked about data, so here are a few. An article on Ynet reports on a Telegraph poll showing that about 90% (!!!) of Britons oppose recognizing a Palestinian state at this time (until Hamas surrenders and returns the hostages). So what underlies Prime Minister Starmer’s decision to recognize it? Apparently a mix of antisemitism and political distress (as above). Yet it doesn’t look like a particularly wise move for him. It doesn’t seem likely to increase his popularity—except among Muslim immigrants:
According to the poll, about 40% of Britons think recognition should be conditioned on Hamas agreeing to a ceasefire and releasing hostages. 17% of Britons oppose recognition under any circumstances, and 52% believe the planned recognition “rewards terrorists” because it “gives them what they want.”
James Johnson, co-founder of JL Partners, argues that the data point to a “disconnect” between the public and the prime minister. He emphasized that among former Labour voters who have shifted to Nigel Farage’s Reform UK—hugely popular in the polls—the share supporting Starmer’s recognition drops to 8%.
In his words, “The median view of the British public is that recognition must come with conditions—namely, a mutually agreed ceasefire and the release of the hostages.”
For Starmer’s partner in this move, France, the situation isn’t essentially different. A poll published there shows that about 71% (!!!) of French citizens oppose recognizing a Palestinian state, for the same reasons. So why are Macron and Starmer doing this? Their political distress is well known, and perhaps that’s the reason. But it doesn’t look like this step will save either of them. On the face of it, it’s a move most voters oppose. It’s a silent majority that you don’t see in the squares (in Britain, you do by now), but the ballot box has some irritating habits of its own.
What This Means: An Optimistic View
The conclusion is that people in the West aren’t as stupid as we’re told. Many still retain common sense and the healthy survival instinct that evolution—may it live and be well—instilled in us. These days it’s becoming clear that despite the hostility of various institutions toward Israel and its policies—academic, cultural, sporting, tourism, economic, commercial, labor unions, and so on—a large part of the public isn’t really buying it. Media noise doesn’t necessarily reflect the true balance of forces. On the contrary: to a great extent, Israel is increasingly seen as standing at the front line of the fight to save the West, its culture, and its values. It seems that the feelings of many in Western countries are far from what their institutions reflect. They see Islamist terror—and the immigration that brings it into their countries—as a major threat, and the coalition of those forces with WOKE culture as a threat to Western values and even its very existence. From this, many understand that Israel is the one holding the line. Their governments and institutions are bought with Qatari, Chinese, and Russian money and easily yield to the loud propaganda of pro-Palestinians—but a large part of the public isn’t there.
That doesn’t mean there’s no danger or that our situation is good. Far from it. Especially among the young, the students, academics, and others who haven’t reached intellectual maturity. But the average person on the street is less prone to follow elite, delusional fashions—and there we still have considerable support. George Orwell told us long ago that there are ideas so absurd only intellectuals could believe and voice them. True, there’s a danger that things will worsen, since those same youngsters may reach leadership positions in the future, making our situation harder. On the other hand, some argue that at least some of them will grow up (it happens from time to time—so long as you don’t stay in academia). In this sense, our international standing isn’t as bad as “Haaretz” and its satellites portray. There is deterioration in institutional attitudes toward us and in street antisemitism, but decibels don’t necessarily reflect real numbers.
Alongside the deterioration we keep hearing about, there’s also a counter-trend: public sympathy for Israel is growing, because Israel is perceived as fighting for Western values, against radical Islam and against progressive WOKE culture—the coalition that threatens us all. Even if we lose sympathy among elites and leadership, we gain it among a frustrated public that keeps expressing its lack of trust in its detached leadership.
After Biden, America’s “Zionist” president, was exposed in all his shame, Trump’s rise was seen as a miracle that happened to Bibi (?). His support for Israel doesn’t count at Shoken/ Kaplan, since it helps Bibi—and as far as they’re concerned, let Israel be destroyed so long as it falls with Bibi. It’s already been noted that this “miracle” isn’t so miraculous. His rise reflects American public protest and frustration at the unholy alliance between Islam and WOKE—and the Left in general. The same is happening now in Britain and France, and in many other places. Back home, I’ve written more than once that despite very decisive polls in Israel, I think there’s a decent chance Bibi will be the next prime minister here too (unfortunately). The “facts” presented to us are agenda-laden.
This is a struggle between the broader public—many of whom still possess natural survival instincts—and elites trying to override those instincts. Intellectuals are characterized by the ability to detach from intuition and examine things rationally. But as Orwell said, sometimes they ignore common sense in the process. They ignore the fact that intuition is a form of reason, not emotion; there’s no duel here between two opposing rivals.
I don’t know where this global process is headed, and I certainly don’t want to paint too rosy a picture. But it is important to understand that our situation has two sides, and that the portrayals we get from mainstream media are biased and one-sided. The public voices and presence of these elites don’t necessarily reflect their true power. I’ve already noted that vast sums are being invested to shift public opinion in these directions, not only by wealthy progressives but mainly by states and organizations seeking to undermine the West by various means. Qatar, Iran, Russia, and China are the leading actors. They invest huge sums to buy people, academic institutions, research centers, media outlets, and the like, to influence public opinion and fray the social fabric of Western countries (see here an entire issue devoted to this—no, it doesn’t appear on the channel divisible by 7). They succeed partly, but shifting entire publics is more complex than buying elites. The question is whether the awakening will come before the crisis gathers, or after the train has left the station.
On Reports and Opinions
The detached, defensive Left’s way is to accuse the entire world of detachment, racism, extremism, and to distort facts for its needs. They talk about Bibi’s poison machine (which certainly exists), but it pales beside theirs. In their world (and in the media that reaches all of us) every right-wing leader is painted as a racist, homophobe, antisemite, and of course extremist. That’s the Left’s defensive tool. There are indeed racist phenomena on the Right, but these are natural (if unfortunate) reactions to the Left’s progressive drift to the opposite extreme. Sadly, these are often our supporters abroad, but they’re a natural counter-reaction to the coalition between the progressive Left and Islam. That’s what we’ve got, and to my mind, however much I recoil from racist expressions, they are not on par with left-wing antisemitic expressions that work toward Israel’s annihilation. Between these two extremes, I choose the former.
For example, you’ll see Charlie Kirk being accused of antisemitism—no less (!). I highly recommend watching a video I just saw where he explains why he and his wife, Christians, keep Shabbat. And there are, of course, countless pro-Jewish and pro-Israel statements. I assume someone somewhere found a problematic (or not) remark from his past and turned it into his life’s motto. Likewise, Farage is accused of racism, extremism, Islamophobia, and the like—as expected. This despite Farage’s insistence on opposing calls for a religious war against Islam and opposing racist expressions (like those that surfaced at the huge demonstration a few weeks ago in Britain against Islamic immigration and also in support of Israel). It won’t help him, of course—just like with Orbán (as we “know,” Hungary has long since become a brutal dictatorship without civil rights), Trump (the “antisemite” who, oddly, supports us very consistently), and others.
For some reason, the Right worldwide—usually pro-Israel—is accused of racism (sometimes justly, but always out of proportion). But the Left—usually anti-Israel—is far more racist and antisemitic. If you factor in the blatant racism and antisemitism of leftist movements that support terror and oppose Jews and Israel’s right to exist, it’s hard to see Farage or Trump as racists or antisemites. To the “credit” of the antisemitic Left, theirs isn’t only talk but deeds—consistent, systematic, and extreme, not sporadic. It’s not just antisemitism, but support for murdering Jews and annihilating their state—and, above all, opposition to their right to defend themselves. They deploy boycotts, lies, and manipulations fueled by massive funding that steers them. Thus the progressive Left operates as a branch of antisemitic Islam—without that stopping it from repeatedly accusing the Right of antisemitism. Poison machine, did I say?!
One of the common tools in this battle is distorting the picture; biased reporting; painting a bleak scene with no light at the end of the tunnel; sowing despair and defeatism; and riding on the plight of the hostages’ families (and on the hostages’ lives) to advance all of the above. The main thing is that the extremist/racist/antisemite of the week (Bibi, Farage, Trump, Charlie Kirk, etc.) falls. Disinformation—and sowing strife and discord among population groups—are weapons in every respect, and the enemies of the West and Israel use them in a very consistent and systematic manner.
Some of these portrayals aren’t the product of a deliberate conspiracy. Those people live in a bubble, and their bubble really does look the way they describe: within it prevail despair, skewed values, defeatist winds, and a bleak, depressing worldview. They truly believe that continuing the war will bring disaster; that we must surrender to Hamas; that Bibi wants to slaughter the hostages; that Smotrich wants to settle on the moon. Anyone who reads “Haaretz” simply cannot avoid living inside such a warped picture. They’re genuinely convinced. Moreover, remember that these elites typically interact extensively with foreign actors, so they are influenced by them, want to curry favor, and are dependent on them (for budgets and status). Time and again we read about artists and high-tech figures rebelling against institutions that boycott them and trying to persuade them that they’re the “good Israelis,” not like me or Bibi. Gadi Taub has already described the correct distinction between the “mobile” and the “rooted,” which underlies this ugly phenomenon.
Their assessment of reality is fed by those same sources—and that’s how we should relate to it. The data we have are biased and partial, but we insist on denying any datum that doesn’t suit our agenda (that’s the “poison machine,” after all). You saw several examples above. Even polls are increasingly hard to trust, since the wording of questions dictates the answer and its interpretation (“Are you in favor of returning the hostages?” Yes, of course. Hence on the evening news: a majority supports returning the hostages. Earth-shattering news!!!). Likewise, one hears assertions uttered in deep conviction that “the people are with us,” only because a few thousand demonstrators around you chanted the talking points you got from “Haaretz,” and because several mainstream outlets decided these were “masses demonstrating across the country.” I saw with my own eyes on a “Day of Rage” (a common Palestinian phrase) how a troupe of zombie-like sleepwalkers blocked me on the Ayalon for half an hour. There were maybe thirty or forty demonstrators marching, in their boundless chutzpah, on the roadway with megaphones and flags, while on the radio I heard how “masses are flooding the Ayalon and every junction.” When every ten demonstrators get a live, open-line news segment, no wonder they’re convinced the people are with them and that Bibi will collapse in the next elections—since everyone around them doesn’t support him (perhaps they do, but don’t dare say so).
Thus law firms, universities, the Histadrut, and other private and public institutions find nothing wrong with political calls and strikes dressed up as a national emergency, while brazenly ignoring the fact that at least some of their employees disagree with these calls and strikes. Who cares about the “racists”?! They don’t get even a sliver of space in “Haaretz.” We enlightened ones know the absolute truth. When you’re on the side of absolute justice, the other doesn’t exist. But that’s a detached feeling. They themselves crash in every election, because living a lie comes back to bite first and foremost those who live it. It helps in the short term but harms greatly in the long run. As our Sages said: a lie does not stand.
Obviously the picture is complex, and I too know there are serious problems in the economy and in our diplomatic standing—and of course in the war and its conduct. But I’m fairly convinced there’s another side to the coin. The picture isn’t black and white, and here I wanted to sketch a bit of that. For example, I’m far from convinced Bibi won’t be elected (again, unfortunately), that our international standing is collapsing, or that our economy is beyond repair.
One of the more laughable examples of this bubble phenomenon is the naïve claim that we won’t recover from not bringing the hostages home. Again and again, people who understand that the “religion of the hostages” is a detached delusion and that there’s no sense in cutting a deal tell me that the social rupture won’t heal unless we bring everyone back. Just as we’ll “never” recover economically from the war; “never” regain our international standing; and so on. In response to all of this, I’ll quote what my son Yosef—may he be preserved—likes to say: we recovered from Pharaoh’s decrees; from the destruction of the First and Second Temples; from millennia of exile; from the Spanish Expulsion; from the slaughter of millions of Jews in the Holocaust and beyond—so it’s quite likely we’ll recover from the loss of twenty hostages too, painful as that will be. And that’s even assuming, absurdly, that government policy is actually distancing their return—and assuming, no less absurdly, that there is in fact a deal on the table that would bring them back. It would be a very sad loss, but I have no doubt we’ll recover from it as well. Moreover, I’m sure that even if everyone came home today, it wouldn’t change anything in the Shoken/Kaplan crowd’s attitude toward Bibi, Likud, and the channel divisible by 7. The crisis would be exactly the same. The only difference would be the grief of twenty families and their circles. I by no means belittle that—but we’ve endured far greater disasters (I remind you: 1,200 of our people were butchered two years ago). I suggest ignoring these pathetic declarations and, for a change, trying to think rationally.
It turns out everything depends on the “facts” presented to you, on the interpretations embedded within them, and no less on your milieu. Who you see around you is your world picture. If on TV you see a wave of boycotts and cancellations; recognition of a Palestinian state; violent harassment of Jews; condemnations of Israel, and more—you’re convinced that this is the situation. And it is indeed one important facet. But often you don’t bother to look around and ask whether it’s the whole picture. So, as a public service, I present this column.
A Final Note
Things are so bad that I find myself somewhat grateful to the “line” sect for their hysterical war against progressivism. They grasped the depth of the problem, even if in my view they greatly exaggerated its scope and implications. Not everything you dislike is a plot by the Elders of Progress; not everything that aligns with progressive views is automatically bad. Still, there does seem to be a deep trend here whose ramifications are fundamental, even in the long run. Even the link between progressivism and antisemitism (since, as we all know, everything revolves around attitudes toward us, who carry the universe on our backs) no longer looks absurd these days. So there you have it—I’ve even fulfilled my pre-Rosh Hashanah repentance duties.
Thus ends my unifying manifesto for Rosh Hashanah. Our strength is in our unity. Shanah Tovah.
Discussion
And also to regret your belief in free will and your denial of the seriousness of IDF conversions, to permit electricity on Shabbat and forbid eating potatoes 🙂
This is the first article of yours that I finish with a smile
Making people happy is not a transgression…
Blessed are you, and may you and all the people of Israel have a good and sweet year
You assert that it is clear to you that there are political influences on the opinions of Karnit Flug and Jacob Frenkel, two former Governors of the Bank of Israel and renowned economists who are experts in macroeconomics and monetary policy, and you do so on the basis of an opposing opinion by Shmuel Slavin, a public-service manager and consultant with a background in economics, who has accumulated practical and managerial experience but has no research standing whatsoever or relevant expertise in the field under discussion (without even mentioning that he ran twice in Likud primaries, which makes him a rather shaky basis for a claim of politicization on the part of Frenkel and Flug).
The claim that "90% of Britons oppose recognition" is misleading and inaccurate.
"Almost half of Britons (44%) support the UK recognising a Palestinian state, while 18% oppose."
(YouGov, 18 September 2025)
https://yougov.co.uk/politics/articles/53016-britons-support-recognising-palestinian-statehood-by-44-to-18
The claim that "71% of French citizens oppose recognition" is misleading and inaccurate. In fact, 53% expressed support for Macron’s current move.
https://www.bfmtv.com/international/moyen-orient/palestine/sondage-bfmtv-les-francais-divises-sur-la-reconnaissance-de-l-etat-de-palestine_AN-202509200058.html
Your other claims are similarly superficial.
The only thing weaker than politics is the money of the private sector.
And if the private sector chooses to invest in Israel,
then apparently security matters more than the claims of Flug or Frenkel.
And in the end, economics, from the moment it involves future security issues and unknown changes,
becomes almost equal between the great Flug and Frenkel and the layman taxi driver.
I hope I will be allowed to continue in my superficiality.
Slavin brought numerical data. But that must not be accepted because he was a Likud candidate. Fascinating. If your remarks had been before me when I wrote the column, I would have cited them as evidence for my point.
By contrast, Flug and Frenkel bring no numbers, but what they say should be accepted because they are experts. And this is an argument against my remarks, in which I said that they are indeed experts, but probably biased. Is this yet more evidence for my point? Or perhaps just a deficiency in reading comprehension?
Then you bring a British and a French poll against the polls I mentioned. Why does that change anything? I wrote explicitly that my claim is that it is worth knowing this angle too, not that it is necessarily the correct one.
By the way, even a result of 44% or 53% support, in the polls you mention, is not terribly impressive, and certainly does not fit the picture we are being given, according to which we have been left all alone. Especially since in the British case this is a poll from a governmental site as opposed to a journalistic poll (albeit by the Telegraph, which leans right). One may well wonder which of them is more biased. I couldn’t check the French one because of my superficiality in French, but as I said, that doesn’t really matter.
As for the rest of my remarks, there my arguments have already been completely silenced. Faced with such a crushing and profound argument (= the opposite of superficial), I found no answer.
The problem is not with Slavin’s data but with using a politically involved person with no relevant expertise to bring evidence for the political bias of the leading experts in Israel in the field, such as Frenkel and Flug, together with many additional experts like Omer Moav, Yossi Spiegel, and Itai Ater. It is more or less like bringing proof that a ruling by Rabbi Shlomo Zalman Auerbach and Rabbi Ovadia is biased because Rabbi Yona Metzger brought quotations against them from responsa literature.
I suggest you think carefully about what exactly you are claiming before accusing others of deficient reading comprehension.
The polls I brought are relevant because they present data radically different from yours, on which you relied in order to draw sweeping and far-reaching conclusions about support for Israel in the world. If you are looking to pick only the cherries that taste good to you, then it would be best simply to quote Channel 14, where everything is even more wonderful.
One last note: the independent polling institute YouGov has no connection whatsoever to the British government. You could have discovered this fact using the following equipment: a computer or mobile phone, an active internet connection, and the sophisticated search tool Google.
Many thanks for the update regarding the poll. But unfortunately, aside from that, your reading comprehension has not improved, unfortunately. Well, I tried.
There are many substantive arguments against what you wrote. Some of them were made by the commenter "Nu Nu".
I would like to focus on the style of writing, because in my opinion (my personal opinion only), it teaches us something.
I have read hundreds of your columns. When you have good and true arguments, you focus on them. The bluntness and the contempt are indeed there, but they are not the main point of the article.
In this case, if you remove all the jokes and the scorn, you are left with a few thin arguments that there is *a lot* of room to argue about. Some of them are certainly correct, but they are not some kind of 180-degree reversal of what experts on the subject are claiming.
You rightly complain about black despair, but here you are giving us the mirror image of black despair.
I will write here only 3 points on the substance:
1. Our international situation has worsened significantly. This is something that cannot be disputed. True, we are not alone in the world, but in most of the significant countries in the world, half the people are basically against us (that is almost the case even in the United States). In the other half there is more sympathy for us, and that is nice and heartening, but the situation is really not all that good.
2. Regarding the economic situation, it is not that we will collapse tomorrow, but any reasonable person looking at the graphs understands that if there is no dramatic change, we are at a dead end. There is no serious person who can explain how the economic future here will be reasonable, given such a high birthrate in the Haredi public and its level of involvement in the economy. Of course, maybe there will be miracles. Maybe the Haredi public will change. Maybe we will find a gold mine in the sea. But of course, from a clear-eyed perspective, the situation is very troubling.
3. A small and not very significant point that bothered me: our demographic growth is not a good thing. True, population decline is also not a good thing, but an average of 3 children per woman is also not a good thing (in the long term). Certainly not in a small country like ours. And certainly, certainly not when the distribution of that growth is that the Haredi population is pushing up the average…
Slavin brings partial data, interprets it superficially, and completely ignores the more important data that reflect the economic situation. For example, per-capita growth (quite low figures, and that is despite the government artificially increasing GDP per capita), the deficit. Slavin speaks of demographic growth as an economic blessing, so beyond the fact that this is also a superficial statement in general (because not every demographic increase necessarily leads to growth), it is simply appalling cynicism when it comes to demographic growth in Israel. Here we are talking about parasitic populations with a Bangladesh-level education system. Demographic growth in Israel is an existential threat.
More of his nonsense, briefly: the dollar fell compared to the whole world, and yet its value relative to the shekel is still higher than it was under the change government, even though the dollar weakened (thanks to Trump’s populist conduct) compared to the whole world and is at a low point.
He is also being demagogic about the handsome return of the Israeli stock market. First, compared to the global stock market, the Israeli market’s return is fairly average (I can send a graph if that is relevant). The American stock market is very weak this year, so comparison to the American market creates the illusion that the situation here is exceptionally good. Beyond that, the Israeli stock market displayed rather poor performance in 2023; to look at it through the narrow prism of a single year and not compare what its condition was in the preceding years (including correction) is also a bit dim-witted.
He also ignores the fact that the gap between the interest Israel pays on 10-year bonds and the parallel bond of the United States government grew from 68 basis points in the January 2020 issuance to 135 basis points in the February 2025 issuance. That is, the State of Israel is currently paying much higher interest than in the past. These payments come at the expense of money that we could have directed to education, health, and welfare.
The data he brings on high-tech are also partial and misleading. For example, the number of start-ups being launched has decreased significantly, as can be seen here, for example:
https://youtu.be/2RhUdyfzsZA?si=FApB8fV6kaxhv2ZI
And here:
https://www.ynet.co.il/economy/article/rjq11myujll
I’m not exaggerating, but this brings tears of joy to my eyes and releases stress for me. Thank you.
We are under so much stress and gloom; if only as much as possible of the good you wrote would come true and we all merit to see the good in everyday life. How painful it is to be a Jew and an Israeli in our own land.
Thank you to the rabbi for these words. I did not expect to receive positive encouragement דווקא from the rabbi’s direction. What can we do—there are surprises in life.
I haven’t read economic nonsense like this in a very long time.
In short: https://m.facebook.com/story.php?story_fbid=10239713022669166&id=1400792089
Hello.
Regarding “So it is quite likely that we will recover even from the loss of twenty hostages, *with* all the sorrow over that happening.”
It seems this is a typo, and the writer meant “with” but accidentally wrote “if.”
An opportunity to correct it.
May it indeed be a better and happier year for all of us
Hi! The argument here is complex, because it touches on economic and international data that contain many nuances, and the picture is not black-and-white the way both sides present it. I will analyze the main points from Michi Abraham’s column (which is based mainly on the remarks of Shmuel Slavin) versus the criticisms of commenters like "Nu Nu," and explain why I think the truth lies in the middle—with a slight edge to Michi’s optimistic side, but with important reservations. I will use up-to-date data (as of September 2025) to ground this, because reality is dynamic.
1. The economic situation: optimistic, but not entirely rosy
Michi (through Slavin) emphasizes positive points such as high foreign-currency reserves (over $225 billion), growth in high-tech (higher fundraising in 2024 than in 2023, a record of $13.4 billion in exits), unemployment falling to record lows, a relatively low debt-to-GDP ratio (around 70%), expected growth of 3% in 2025 and 5% in 2026, a rise in the Tel Aviv Stock Exchange (96% since October 2023), the dollar dropping from 4.06 to 3.34 shekels, and strong demographics (3 children per woman versus 1.6 in the OECD). He argues that the pessimism (such as that of Karnit Flug and Jacob Frenkel) is exaggerated and misleading, because it ignores the long-term strategic benefit of the war (such as eliminating threats from Iran, Hezbollah, and Hamas).
Commenters like "Nu Nu" argue that Slavin (who is not a macroeconomics expert like Flug/Frenkel and has a political background in Likud) brings partial data and misleads, and they point to problems such as low per-capita growth, a high deficit, rising bond interest (from 68 basis points in 2020 to 135 in 2025), a slowdown in high-tech (fewer new start-ups, a 7–9.5% decline in employment in 2023–2024), and the demographic threat (growth in "parasitic" populations such as Haredim with poor education).
Who is right here? Michi is more right in emphasizing the strengths—the data are real and based on official reports such as that of the Israel Innovation Authority (2025): high-tech constitutes 20% of GDP and 53% of exports, with record exits (including Wiz, sold to Google for $32 billion, and CyberArk for $25 billion). Foreign-currency reserves are indeed at a peak, CDS (risk premium) has fallen to low levels since the start of the war, and general unemployment is low (around 3–4%, among the lowest in the world). Growth is expected to recover, and demographics are a long-term advantage if used correctly (more young labor force).
But the commenters are right that the picture is partial: there is a slowdown in high-tech (employment frozen at around 403,000 workers, 11.5% of the workforce), fewer start-ups, and the war has cost more than 300 billion shekels with a growing deficit. Demographic growth (mainly Haredi) is a challenge if it is not accompanied by integration into the labor market—per-capita growth is relatively low (around 1–2% in 2025), and interest on debt is higher. Slavin indeed does not present a full picture, and the criticism of Flug/Frenkel is partly valid but does not negate their expertise.
In short: the economy is relatively strong for a time of crisis, but changes are needed (such as demographic reforms) to avoid a dead end. Michi is right in the general optimism, but exaggerates in ignoring the risks.
2. Analysis of the polls: what do they really say?
To understand who is right, one has to look at the difference between the polls Michi cites and those of "Nu Nu," and especially at the context of the questions asked in them. Polls can appear contradictory if the questions are phrased differently, because the public responds differently to general questions versus specific questions.
Michi’s polls
Michi relies on polls that ask about immediate recognition of a Palestinian state without conditions (such as the release of hostages or the defeat of Hamas). The data he brings:
Britain: a poll by The Telegraph in cooperation with JL Partners (20/9/2025) shows that 90% of Britons oppose recognizing a Palestinian state at this time, that is, without conditions such as the release of hostages and the defeat of Hamas. 52% of respondents said recognition "rewards terrorists" because it gives Hamas what it wants. 40% support recognition, but only on condition that Hamas agree to a ceasefire and release hostages.
France: a poll by IFOP in cooperation with CRIF (September 2025) shows that 71% of the French oppose recognizing a Palestinian state before the release of hostages and the defeat of Hamas, and 78% oppose immediate recognition without conditions.
These polls show that the public in those countries is not prepared to support Palestinian recognition as a unilateral step, because it sees this as support for Hamas as long as the war continues. This strengthens Michi’s claim that there is public support for Israel as one fighting terrorism.
The polls of "Nu Nu"
"Nu Nu" brings polls that ask more general questions about support for recognition of a Palestinian state, without specific reference to conditions or to the current war:
Britain: a YouGov poll (18/9/2025) shows that 44% of Britons support recognition of a Palestinian state in general, 18% oppose it, and 37% are unsure. But when broken down by groups, one sees that supporters of the Reform UK party (conservatives, like Nigel Farage) oppose it by 75%, whereas Labour supporters (the ruling party) support it by 60%. This shows political division, and also that support for recognition is not uniform.
France: a BFMTV poll (20/9/2025) shows that 53% of the French support recognition of a Palestinian state, but here too there is division: 83% of left-wing supporters are in favor, whereas 78% of right-wing supporters are opposed. That is, support depends greatly on political outlook.
"Nu Nu’s" polls are correct, but they are less relevant to Michi’s claim, because they do not directly address the current war or conditions such as the release of hostages. General questions about "recognition of a Palestinian state" do not capture public opinion on the concrete steps Macron and Starmer are promoting, which are tied to the current situation.
Michi is right in presenting an optimistic angle that balances the pessimism in the media—the data show economic and international resilience, and politicization exists (on both sides). But the commenters are right that the data are partial, and the challenges (demographics, slowdown in high-tech, deficit) are real.
When one needs to say more power to you, then one says more power to you. And one who concedes in part—may he be from Yeruham (in part?)
You are missing the point. It does not matter whether the state of the economy is good or bad. The issue is that we are not prepared to go like sheep to the slaughter (or to sacrifice the lives of Jewish soldiers) for the sake of the economy. Therefore there is no point for me in listening to people like you once I have become convinced that they are not interested in the good of my people but in their own private comfortable lives. So why should I relate to what you say at all? How are you different from an Arab who tries to persuade me that it is worthwhile to live under Arab rule?
Journalism that’s divisible by 7.🥰🥰
More power to you. Now all that remains is to write a positive column about the Haredi sector so the answer will be complete 🙂