Another Look at the Hostage Deal (Column 666)
The public discussion about a hostage deal in the Swords of Iron war has gone through several stages and phases. At first it was set against an entry into Rafah, then against holding the Philadelphi Corridor, and more—never with a clear number of hostages to be returned, and certainly not how many of them are alive or dead. This is a one-sided debate conducted among ourselves, focused on what we are giving. No one talks about what we are supposed to receive, since Hamas is not really a party to this discussion. It seems they are not interested in a deal at all. Because the debate is so one-sided, it’s no wonder that every time the government is blamed for clinging to these reasons and thereby sabotaging the deal—after all, there is no other side to the debate. As Shimon Peres once said, this isn’t “give-and-take” but “give-and-give.”
Thus, on the face of it there is no hostage deal on the table at all, and the bitter arguments about it are only among us, while Hamas sits on the sidelines rubbing its hands with glee. These “deals” are at most fantasies and wishful thinking for some of us. We are busy clapping with one hand and wonder why no sound comes out. Still, I thought it worthwhile to present another look at such a deal. I have done so more than once already (see Columns 607, 608, 611, 627, and more). In recent weeks several questions again arrived in the Q&A (Responsa) about my view on a hostage deal (see for example here, here, here, here and here, and in the talkbacks to Column 664). Some pointed to contradictions (which never existed) in my words, and also raised arguments—usually not very convincing—in favor of a deal, as expected in the psychotic state we are currently in. Therefore I thought it worthwhile to add another current column on this topic.
Two Options—and No Third
One can argue about the importance of each parameter and its standing relative to returning the hostages (how many of them?), but that argument is pointless, since it seems there was never really a deal on the table. Therefore, there is also no indication that any of those parameters actually scuttled it. On the contrary, the Americans say that Israel actually agreed and moved toward them, and Hamas is the one that keeps torpedoing the deal—something that was, of course, obvious from the outset. Already in Column 611, written about two months after the October events, I wrote that in my opinion the public discourse on this subject is based on lies, mainly on the part of the government. It speaks of achieving several goals: restoring security to the Gaza envelope, eliminating Hamas, and returning the hostages. Its opponents demand returning the hostages (without stating it explicitly, they in effect demand this at any price; see also Column 664). They indeed espouse a foolish position, but at least they are consistent. By contrast, the government’s goals for the war are, of course, mutually contradictory. You cannot both win and also return the hostages. Since then it has become ever clearer—what was obvious from the outset—that we have only two alternatives before us: continue fighting to the end, or forgo fighting altogether—in effect, surrender:
- The option of continuing the fighting until the goals are maximally achieved (I don’t call it “total victory” because that phrase has already acquired a cynical connotation) obviously entails giving up on the vast majority of the hostages (and by now it is clear that most are dead).
- The second option entails giving up all the other goals in the hope of returning the hostages. This, of course, assumes—dubiously—that Hamas will agree under the sword of renewed fighting. The possibility of getting them all back seems to me a pipe dream even if we choose this option. Hamas, unlike us, is an intelligent organization; it will not give up the only card it has against us. Moreover, choosing this option entails forgoing fighting in the future as well, since without clear guarantees Hamas will not agree to any deal. As noted, there are intelligent and determined people on that side, unlike on ours. Beyond that, after we leave Gaza there is no chance the world will let us return—even aside from the question of guarantees (see a wonderfully graphic explanation here).
These are therefore the two options, and there is no third. Anyone who says otherwise is simply delusional or lying. That was clear to any reasonable person from the outset,[1] but today there is no one who doesn’t understand it. As noted, the families of the hostages understand this and therefore demand choosing the second option (a deal at any price), and I assume that at least today the government ministers also understand this but choose the first (the accusations that they have given up on the hostages are entirely correct; only that this is not a reproach but their considered choice). The talk we hear from them about both war and hostages (again, I’m not speaking about rescuing a hostage or a body here and there) is mutually agreed-upon deception, driven by street pressure and the discomfort of the hostage families.
The choice between these two options seems to me self-evident. We’ve seen that, as far as the hostages are concerned, there is no significant difference between the two options—at most, a slightly larger number of hostages might be returned in the second option, and even that is doubtful (to date we have not even demanded a proper list of who is alive and who is dead, so why wouldn’t they murder all of them before returning them?!). Reason dictates that we should at least try to achieve as much as possible of the war’s other two aims: eliminating Hamas and providing security to the Gaza envelope.
The Psychosis
As I have already written, the hysterical demonstrations for a hostage deal ensure that none of the goals will be achieved. If Sinwar sees that murdering hostages only improves his position, why would he agree to a deal and return living hostages?! The obvious conclusion he should draw is that he must refuse a deal and murder more and more hostages, thereby further tearing Israeli society apart and improving the terms he will receive for any deal—if he ever decides to make one. Every small child with a bit of common sense understands this, but it seems our media, generals, Brothers-in-Arms, and the families of the hostages (though in their case this is understandable) have completely lost it. They operate in wondrous symbiosis (even if not intentionally—this is clinical blindness) with Sinwar against the State of Israel and against their own interests.
All this shows that the issue touches raw nerves and arouses emotions (see, for example, this hateful column, one of many), and it is no wonder that the polemics about it resemble our usual debates: the hurling of unreasoned slogans, hatred, incitement, and false accusations. This exists on both sides, of course, but as I have already noted, my sense is that it is far stronger among those who support a deal and the protest organizations. There is wild incitement and direct accusations of murder against the ministers and the prime minister, without blinking. One day about a week ago I kept hearing in every news bulletin the words of Einav Zangauker, one of the main activists among the hostage families, calling on the government to stop the incitement against the hostages. I would like to say I was surprised to hear that from someone who engages day and night in wild incitement and is not imprisoned only because she is a hostage family member (see here for one of many examples), but I was not. As noted, the “discourse” has long since entered clinical realms.
Thus in recent weeks (especially since the murder of the six hostages) I have written that we are in the midst of a psychotic assault: a mass hostage psychosis. This is not a metaphor or a cynical remark. I mean a factual description. It is indeed a psychotic attack of the crowd. This psychosis causes people to take steps that will not advance even their own objectives; to ignore the insane prices at stake; to incite and accuse opponents of the deal of abandonment and indifference to the value of life and mutual responsibility (and of course to silence them); to refuse to hear or voice any counter-argument; and to do all this with absolute certainty, in full cooperation with journalists, generals, and commentators—precisely against the side that is not to blame. Part of this is accusing parts of the coalition of messianism (the fashionable pejorative of our time), even though, even if there is something of that there (and I’m not at all sure), one thing is clear to me: this moral-strategic debate about the deal has nothing whatsoever to do with messianism. It’s simply unrelated—but psychosis does not heed rational considerations.
The families have full justification. Their grief and distress—and that of their loved ones in Gaza—are insane, and this is a quite reasonable outcome of the despair into which they have fallen from the dead end. The false accusations are cries of despair and can be understood. But all this sits atop a political agenda (anti-Bibi and his coalition), and many exploit it well. As for those who encourage this psychosis—there is no place for leniency toward them.
And still, being psychotic does not mean that everything you say is nonsense. I would not want to fall into the opposite psychosis. Therefore I wanted to focus on one type of argument and examine it on its merits.
The Argument
One argument from opponents of a deal is that we must not prefer the lives of the hostages (certainly not bodies) over the lives of many who will be harmed in the future as a result of such a deal. In Column 608 I discussed this argument, explained its rationale, and explained why I personally do not agree with it. In my view, in a deal of hostages for imprisoned terrorists we should prefer the hostages. But the debate over this argument is hypothetical, as it completely ignores the other consequences of such a deal. I have already explained that there will be no deal (perhaps for a small number of hostages that won’t change the situation—and even that is unlikely) of hostages for terrorists; so why discuss it? There will be no deal that does not end the war and allow us to return to Gaza. I already noted that the talk about resuming fighting “if needed” is, at best, empty fantasy and, at worst, a gross lie and denial of reality. The two options presented above are the only ones and there is no other: a deal in exchange for total capitulation (if Hamas even agrees to return all the hostages—I assume not), or continued fighting and giving up on the hostages (that no longer depends on Hamas). The price of a hostage deal is at the very least a final cessation of fighting, surrendering entire regions in the north and south and the security of tens and hundreds of thousands of their residents, losing the ability to confront the Iranian proxy forces that are constantly growing on our borders, and a future clash with them under far less favorable conditions for us. Anyone who thinks it is reasonable to pay such a price for a few hostages (some of whom are bodies) lives in a moral and strategic world entirely different from mine (and I am trying to speak gently).
The Same Argument as an Analogy
A few days ago I saw a column by Dana Gennusar in Haaretz that presents an interesting analogy attempting to undercut that argument—namely, why it is right to prefer the lives of the hostages over future risk to other lives. As noted, the hypothetical argument that ignores the other prices actually required by such a deal I already treated in Column 608, where I explained why I in fact agree with it (a deal that required only releasing terrorists, even all of them, would in my eyes be worth the price). But here I wished to address this analogy precisely because of its force. At first glance it seems very persuasive—and the question is what we should do with such first impressions.
Because sometimes the articles are not accessible to non-subscribers, I will bring the passage in full:
| Execute Smokers, Shoot Extra Children, Cull Texting Drivers
After one of the protests outside the Knesset, in late spring or winter’s dusk, when “the rock of our existence” was still “Rafah, now!” and not the Philadelphi Corridor, I sat to rest on a bench, bedraggled from heat and despair, with a protest sign beside me, frayed from rain and use: “The picture of victory—return of the hostages.” A young Haredi man passed by, looked at the sign, and stopped: “I’m with you, but you lost me.” “Who is this ‘you’ that lost you?” I asked. “I’m Dana, nice to meet you, and who are you?” He is a law intern, and you could feel the delight in pilpul and debate, typical of young students and scholars. We walked together down the street, a young legal scholar and a tired social attorney. How can you prefer them, when the price is that many others will die? “You prefer to save people with faces and names over victims whose names are not yet known,” he flung at me, waving the utilitarian moral theory that supposedly justifies an objective accounting of utilities as the basis for deciding a moral dilemma. “But they are in danger now; they are victims of abandonment,” I replied, appalled. “When you see a person drowning, will you make calculations and speculations, or jump in to save him?” “And if you see a ship with 150 drowning, and another with 1,500 drowning, whom will you save?” he asked. “But the 1,500 are theoretical,” I said (not to be confused with 1,500 who already materialized because they were neglected in advance calculations), “and the state has tools to face the danger, even if terrorists are released and we withdraw from the Strip. Will you sacrifice real people, suffering hell at this very moment, for them?” I tried, but did not persuade. At that stage I realized that though we grew from the same soil, we are rooted in moral conceptions between which a geological rift has opened, and we stand on opposite sides upon tectonic plates moving away from each other. Symbolically, we parted ways at the junction opposite the Prime Minister’s Office. |
Up to here I actually agree with her approach, as explained in my aforementioned columns. But now she moves to the following analogy (please ignore the wild, characteristic incitement in the first paragraph):
| I address myself—not to the ruler of Philadelphi and his cold-hearted cronies who choose the strategy of preventive sacrifice for personal reasons (whether the sacrificed be the hostages, war dead, wounded protesters, equality, human rights, morality and justice, or the state), and not to the demonstrators at junctions under the flag of unity. The latter, their intentions are surely good, but they are too weak to see clearly the harm, and in practice they sacrifice the victim and stand with the abuser, for the sake of quiet and the appearance of a perfect family. I address, then, all those who support the strategy of sacrifice on moral grounds and ask for their support for other necessary applications of that strategy.
Sacrificing the hostages now to prevent harm to many in the future is like “culling” COVID patients during the pandemic so it won’t spread and kill many According to the Israel Cancer Association (2019), about 800 people die in Israel each year as a result of passive smoking. Since each smoker affects on average more than one person—the conclusion is that a fixed number of smokers must be executed each year, at least a few dozen. Many dangers lie in wait for humanity due to the rate of population growth, and in particular for the residents of crowded Israel. According to forecasts, by about 2040 Israel will rise from fourth place to first in population density among OECD countries, and this will cost lives. As a preventive strategy, already now we must permit and maintain only two children per family, at most. Those with more than two children should be asked to starve their extra children, or shoot them. This experimental culling policy is applied to wild boars, jackals, and the wretched dogs of the Gaza Strip that flood the south, and under its banner we accept with almost no objection the collateral damage to the children of Gaza—after all, who knows which of them will grow up to be a terrorist. We should, of course, also have actively culled COVID patients in advance to prevent the spread of the pandemic that endangered many. And in general, overcrowding in hospitals endangers lives, so we should avoid treating the elderly and the ill, on the basis of a comparative calculation of total life expectancies. Not to mention parents who drive their toddlers without seat belts, standing in the car next to an open window (I encountered two such cases just this past week), drivers who text while driving, those caught running a red light or ignoring a stop sign, and of course office-holders in food and beverage companies who stuff the public with sugar and carcinogenic food colorings. For all of these, the solution is preventive sacrifice. The “preventive sacrifice strategy” was famously attempted on 11/4/95, when one human being was sacrificed, ostensibly to prevent further killing of those called “victims of peace” (and in practice to hold on to the soil of Judea, Samaria, and Gaza forever), but unfortunately it seems an error fell in the utility calculation, and here we are today, living within death surrounding us on all sides. |
Her main claim in this latter part is that whoever accepts a “preventive sacrifice” strategy should also kill COVID patients, or parents who drive their children without belts, smokers, and texting drivers. In all these cases there are future casualties expected. True, in each individual case no one is necessarily harmed, but in large numbers this is the reasonable expectation. Seemingly this is just like releasing terrorists to free hostages.
Before you get angry and dismiss her as antisemitic or pro-Hamas, I suggest stopping for a moment and thinking—examining the argument and calmly forming a position as to whether it persuades or not. This is a very important skill that is lacking among us. Pause the gut and think coldly about arguments. For me this is relatively easy here, since, as noted, I actually agree with her conclusion and prefer the lives of the hostages even at the price of releasing all the terrorists we hold. But this analogy, which at first glance looks very persuasive and fits my stance, nevertheless left me uneasy. I felt there was a problem in it. My options were, of course, to mock it and dismiss it with straw as foolishness without giving reasons; or, alternatively, to take the opportunity for an exercise in cool thinking, detached from emotion. To do so, we must devote more thought to this analogy, examine what exactly bothers me in it (especially since the conclusion fits my position), and whether the problem isn’t in me. I remind you I am speaking only about the argument of hostages for terrorists and future murder; other considerations are not on the table in this hypothetical discussion.
A Note on Paradoxes and Intellectualism
Reading this argument, I can’t help but recall Columns 654–655, where I discussed intellectualism. Among other things, I described a dilemma between an argument that seems logical and a conclusion that is patently absurd (as usually happens in paradoxes). I explained there that intellectuals tend to prefer the argument over common sense. This is their advantage (openness to surprising conclusions), but in many cases, in just that, they also fail (departing from common sense). I quoted Orwell’s remark about the nonsense of intellectuals. My feeling here was similar. It’s completely clear she is talking nonsense, yet the argument and her analogies themselves sound very logical, no?
I explained there that in the face of a paradox we have three options: (1) adopt the argument and its conclusion (and reject common sense—be open to the fact that it sometimes misleads us); (2) find a flaw in the argument and reject the conclusion (that is, remain with common sense); (3) remain undecided (if we didn’t find a flaw in the argument but it is very clear to us that the conclusion is wrong). I also showed why it is not correct to say that the last two options express intellectual dishonesty. Since I have basic (if not absolute) trust in common sense and my intuitions, the first step I take with such paradoxes is to inspect the argument and see whether it contains flaws. That was also my feeling here. The conclusion actually seemed correct to me, but the argument (analogy) seemed very problematic. So it’s worth re-examining it.
Counter-Examples
In the responses to that column I found two examples of counter-analogies. Here is the first:
According to this approach, we could also move the border fence closer to Be’eri if Hamas sets it as a condition for releasing the hostages—because it’s only land; there are people suffering who were abandoned, and we will know how to prepare. Incidentally, calling sober realism and risk management “utilitarian morality” is not a very successful salad.
The observation—raised by several commenters—regarding her problematic use of the term “utilitarianism” has something to it (she would have done better to say “consequentialism”), but that is not our concern here. The commenter’s claim is that if we belittle future risks, then we should pay any present price to save any person in present danger.
The second example is this:
Each year we could save hundreds of people with expensive drugs not included in the national health basket. For budgetary reasons we don’t purchase them, knowing people will die. If Highway 90 (the Arava road) had been widened ten years ago, dozens of lives would certainly have been saved. It wasn’t done due to budget prioritization. These are relevant examples. The analogy of actively killing people—besides being childish—is not relevant to the thesis/argument you’re trying to make.
Here are examples of preferring present savings over future risks. The writer, of course, assumes that in these examples the columnist would agree (I’m not sure she would).
I will just note that these counter-examples don’t indicate a flaw in her argument; they only sharpen the fact that similar arguments lead to problematic conclusions. At most this is motivation to look for a flaw in the argument—or perhaps proof that such a flaw exists—but to reject it we must point to the flaw itself. Still, I think the smugness and dogmatism with which she writes—a manifestation of total confidence in her own righteousness—are truly absurd (though very typical of the Church of Haaretz writers and readers). The examples brought here, and many others—even if they don’t identify the flaw in the argument—prove that such a flaw is there. That suffices to show we are dealing with a monad (see Column 664) that echoes among members of the church the dogmas they presuppose as absolute truths (this is one of the roots of the psychosis mentioned above). When you are unable to see that there is another side, you are convinced your conclusion is correct, and then you very easily fail in presenting faulty arguments for it.
So What Is the Flaw in the Analogy?
The opposing examples we encountered hint that a “preventive sacrifice” argument is not absurd on its face (as the columnist assumes), but is also not absolute (as some of those she criticizes assume). It probably depends on the circumstances of each case we discuss. Therefore her analogy is indeed meaningful in showing proponents of preventive sacrifice that their seemingly persuasive argument—because of its arithmetic nature (comparing body counts between two options)—is not so clear-cut. She shows them that there are implications under which they, too, would not accept this consequentialist thesis that leads to a preventive-sacrifice approach. On the other hand, it’s clear there will be situations in which she herself would accept such a thesis (even with more extreme numbers—e.g., if it were one hostage versus releasing tens of thousands of terrorists. I didn’t see demonstrations like that for the release of Avera Mengistu; and likewise in the examples above).
I think the fundamental flaw in this analogy—beyond the question of the respective weights on the two sides of the equation—is that in all the examples she brought it is a matter of present murder in order to save lives in the future. But in our case regarding the hostages, we are speaking about indirect and uncertain killing. It is not a decision by us to murder the hostages, but rather a failure to act to save them. Their murderers will be Hamas. Moreover, with regard to the hostages it is quite possible that some will be saved by the IDF—by chance or by planned operations—as has happened so far. If so, our comparison is between two risks, both indirect, future, and uncertain: to the lives of the hostages or to the future lives lost due to releasing the terrorists. Here there is more room for numerical comparisons (how many lives we will pay if we make a deal and if we don’t). The term “preventive sacrifice” is actually more precise (assuming “sacrifice” here does not mean ritual slaughter but rather not saving). But the analogies she brings against that expression ignore this meaning and speak of murder, not sacrifice. That is demagoguery.
I will add: every combat operation of the IDF is a present sacrifice of soldiers for future aims—which, incidentally, will not necessarily cost us more human lives. Civilian normalcy is also a very relevant consideration. The Entebbe rescue, or the attempted rescue of Nachshon Wachsman, also ran counter to that (purely arithmetic) logic. True, in all those cases no specific soldier is sent to his death; all the soldiers take risks and some will likely lose their lives (see Column 530 and much more on the difference between an order to sacrifice life and an order to risk it). Still, the expected net benefit in human lives is not necessarily positive in all those cases—and yet such actions enjoy broad public support here.
Inconsistency
It is worth noting that the confusion she creates (apparently deliberately) between murder and sacrifice suffers from the same flaw she attributes to her opponents: consequentialism. If it makes no difference whether we kill with our own hands or merely “sacrifice” (=fail to save), what is that if not consequentialism? The view is that what matters is the number of souls lost, regardless of whether by act or omission. But if so, why does the consequentialism of her opponents seem to her more fundamentally problematic? I remind you that in Column 608 I invoked the well-known trolley problem that examines precisely this point (consequentialism, which views failure to prevent as murder, versus a deontological ethics of action that distinguishes between not preventing and killing).
Continuing this line: if the situation were that we had limited medical equipment and had to decide whom to save with it—smokers or texters versus others—I definitely think we should prefer the latter. Here it would be a matter of not preventing harm or not saving, not of murder. But from there to the conclusion that we must murder the texters or smokers—the distance is very great. Note: precisely because I am not a consequentialist.
A Note on Right and Left
In the background there is of course also the difference between right and left, which, in my opinion in this matter, is essential rather than a flaw—or a spurious correlation (see Columns 607, 608, 627, and more). I am willing to bet that the columnist votes for a party to the left of Yair Lapid. Why? Because the right sees the good of the collective as the fundamental parameter and is willing to sacrifice individuals for the collective; whereas the left places individuals at the center, and the collective is born only to serve them. The attitude toward the hostage deal is indeed linked to this dispute.[2]
So Why Do I Still Support the Hypothetical Deal Discussed Here?
Seemingly this is a comparison between uncertain, future, and non-concrete prices on both sides, and in such a situation the numerical consideration ostensibly opposes a hostage deal. Because, in my view, there remains a difference between a present, existing danger and the state’s duty to save its concrete citizens, on the one hand, and future risks whose scope depends in part on us, on the other. I explained this in Column 608.
But I am far from disparaging those who think otherwise, and I certainly understand that they have a considerable case. I think that even in this I am more sober than the columnist, even if I share her stance regarding the conclusion of this hypothetical argument. The picture is not black-and-white as it appears through psychotic eyes. The lesson for both sides is that this is not a matter of wicked fools versus righteous sages (each can choose his own pairing). It is therefore worthwhile to think substantively about the arguments for and against and to form a balanced position. Do not harness all our logic to our heart’s desires. Sometimes positive motivations and concern for human life can lead people to practical and intellectual behavior that is psychotic—and does none of that good.
[1] Before the war began (see Column 596) I raised the possibility of surrender in exchange for the return of all the hostages. That was on the assumption that we had no option of full, long fighting and conquering Gaza until Hamas is eliminated. Moreover, I raised this as a proposal—but it’s not at all clear that Hamas would have accepted it, since even now, when their situation is far worse, we have not seen them accept it.
Incidentally, in Column 602 you can see another of my prophecies from those days—that the public dispute from the period before the war has not abated and will likely return in full force, and even more so, later on.
[2] Though one can quibble that the citizens who will be harmed in the future are also individuals whom the state is supposed to protect.
Discussion
You wrote about Einav Zangauker that she ought to have been imprisoned for incitement. You linked to her statement that Netanyahu’s hands are stained with the blood of the hostages.
I had thought your position was that incitement is objectionable only when there is encouragement to commit an act, certainly not when there is merely an attempt at descriptive characterization.
Has your position changed? If not, how should these things be reconciled?
What’s more, you yourself said something similar in the past with regard to Netanyahu: “A person who usurps the rights of citizens should be fought against.” And surely there is no greater usurpation of citizens’ rights than acting to kill them (certainly from Einav Zangauker’s point of view).
https://mikyab.net/%D7%A9%D7%95%D7%AA/%d7%94%d7%a1%d7%aa%d7%94-%d7%9c%d7%94%d7%A8%D7%99%D7%92%D7%AA-%d7%93%D7%99%D7%A7%D7%98%D7%98%D7%95%D7%A8/
This is a matter of situation assessment, and neither you nor I have the data. The army and the government claim that the goals can be achieved. It also seems that way to little me, so long as we’re not just dithering around pointlessly (and unfortunately that is what they’re doing). There is also Eiland’s generals’ plan, which is now being discussed. Therefore, the burden of proof is on whoever criticizes this.
Beyond that, what you are saying is essentially to choose the option of surrender. That is indeed one of the options I presented, and I pointed out its drawbacks.
Be that as it may, I have no objection to someone holding a position different from mine, as long as he is not psychotic. It is certainly possible that I am wrong, and that is open to discussion. But with arguments, not hysterical shrieking and silencing.
I did not write that I support imprisoning her. I said that by the standards commonly applied, she should have been in prison were it not for her situation.
But beyond that, in my opinion her words do indeed create a very significant concern about violent consequences that are already occurring these days, even if we have not yet reached murder. So they definitely should have imprisoned her. For a great many inciting statements. Not one or two. Unfortunately, it would not be wise, because it would break the psychotic group around her and bring more harm
Bless you for the article.
But what is the justification for not being consequentialist?
That is, intuitively I very much understand the difference between murder through direct action and murder through passive inaction,
but logically I do not understand the difference. After all, if I know the outcome in both cases will be grim, shouldn’t I act?
More generally, even in halakhah I do not understand the distinction, but “a law given to Moses at Sinai” and a very strong intuition say there is a difference. Still, rationally, what is the meaning of this distinction?
There is no such law given to Moses at Sinai. These are reasonings of the sages. See column 608 and the trolley dilemma.
Not one or two
One of the better articles I’ve read this year on the whole issue of the hostage deal!!
From the article:
In the background here, of course, there is also the difference between right and left, which in my opinion in this issue is substantial and not a flaw, or a spurious correlation (see columns 607, 608, 627, and others on this). I’m willing to bet that the writer votes for a party to the left of Yair Lapid. Why? Because the right sees the good of the collective as the fundamental parameter and is willing to sacrifice individuals for the sake of the collective. The left, by contrast, puts individuals at the center, and the collective exists only in order to serve them. The attitude toward the hostage deal is definitely connected to this dispute.[2]
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Those who place the individual at the center and see the collective as something born to serve them ignore the fact that that same “collective” is also (according to the left’s view) made up of individuals who are at the center.
By his own view, what right does he have to expect the collective to stand at his disposal more than the reverse?
That is, apart from the fact that he sees himself at the center and everyone owes him something.
This seems to me like a kind of circular argument, or a case where one uses the term being defined in order to explain the term itself.
As I understand it, you are ignoring the fact that the deal Hamas is demanding includes not only a ceasefire but also withdrawal from all of Gaza.
You wrote that if there is a halt in the fighting, they will not really be able to return to it because of international pressure. By the same token, the fighting could also stop without a deal and without achieving the goals because of international pressure and a weapons embargo, and then we will have lost out on both counts. That is to say, this is not a dichotomous situation of either the hostages in our hands and surrender, or achieving the goals without the hostages; there is also the third path (😜) of not bringing back the hostages and not achieving the goals, which as you noted is how things look right now
Which goals exactly? At what costs? I think the army and the government have justly earned every drop of skepticism regarding their ability to bring about something resembling victory. In my view, the burden of proof is דווקא on whoever claims that *this* government and *this* army, in the current situation after 11 months of fighting, can achieve the goals. As you yourself say, they are just dithering around pointlessly.
So it makes sense that people who see two options – pointless dithering without hostages, or ending the war with hostages and redirecting forces to the north – think there is no dilemma here at all.
Of course, psychosis is never recommended.
It’s funny that today the right is identified with the good of the collective while the left is seen as focusing mainly on the individual, because until a few years ago it was exactly the opposite, since nothing is more concerned for the collective than socialism. What happened is that capitalism won by knockout, so what remains of those who were raised on leftist values if, on the central issue that is supposed to define their identity, they are Ayn Rand on steroids? The answer is hatred for anything connected to love of the people and the land, which today is most identified with “the right,” because Ben-Gurion today would be defined as a fascist.
In the end, it’s all sociology.
You are conflating the old modernist socialist left with the current postmodern liberal left.
I corrected it. Thanks.
That is exactly the point: there is really no connection between them apart from the sociological connection.
As usual, you belittle the other side and ignore all the other professional considerations. As someone who follows the war and the campaign in Gaza, from a military standpoint Hamas has already been destroyed in the sense that it no longer has much ability to carry out another October 7, especially since all the Philadelphi tunnels have been destroyed, so it will be very hard for it to rebuild itself. The only thing left is civilian control, and whether you like it or not, in order to collapse Hamas’s civilian control in Gaza, you need to offer them a governing alternative. At the moment it does not look like Israel is trying to create any alternative, which proves that this war is just foot-dragging so Bibi won’t be investigated. What’s more, you are blatantly ignoring the situation in the north: we have reached the psychotic situation (your favorite word 😅) in which we have a security zone inside Israel. And yes, I know it sounds exciting to fight both in the north and in the south, but what can you do, we are not the Russian army, we do not have enough soldiers and money, and the proof is that until now Israel has refrained from opening a campaign there because every sensible person understands there are not enough forces for it. (Maybe if the Haredim enlisted, then yes, but the government has no intention of doing that.) Another thing you ignore is the international situation. Understand that the European foreign ministers are working with Arab states to establish a Palestinian state through a unilateral move; moreover, the elections in the U.S. are approaching, and if Kamala is elected then the diplomatic situation will be even worse. In short, it seems that the one suffering from psychosis is you and your dreams of “total victory,” without understanding that we have already won, and what is happening now is simply so Bibiyahu won’t be investigated (I wouldn’t be surprised if he cancels elections because of the war, which somehow will continue until then)
Perhaps this sharpening of the point that consequentialism is not everything also teaches something about the difference between a direct murderer and one who kills indirectly. As is known, only the former is liable to execution by the court. The latter is of course also wicked and would be punished under the law of the king, but that is not because both are equally immoral, but because even one who kills indirectly is immoral enough to deserve severe punishment. But when examined at higher resolution, the direct murderer is more wicked. It could be that the Torah’s purpose was to provide a reference point for the most severe manifestation of the offense, and only that one incurs full biblical liability.
That is a consistent picture, but it lacks all logic. One who kills indirectly is exactly as wicked as a direct murderer. There is no moral difference between them whatsoever. And regarding the relation between halakhah and morality, I have already discussed it at length elsewhere.
As usual, you belittle the other side and ignore all the other professional considerations. As someone who follows the war and the campaign in Gaza, from a military standpoint Hamas has already been destroyed in the sense that it no longer has much ability to carry out another October 7, especially since all the Philadelphi tunnels have been destroyed, so it will be very hard for it to rebuild itself. The only thing left is civilian control, and whether you like it or not, in order to collapse Hamas’s civilian control in Gaza, you need to offer them a governing alternative. At the moment it does not look like Israel is trying to create any alternative, which proves that this war is just foot-dragging so Bibi won’t be investigated. What’s more, you are blatantly ignoring the situation in the north: we have reached the psychotic situation (your favorite word 😅) in which we have a security zone inside Israel. And yes, I know it sounds exciting to fight both in the north and in the south, but what can you do, we are not the Russian army, we do not have enough soldiers and money, and the proof is that until now Israel has refrained from opening a campaign there because every sensible person understands there are not enough forces for it. (Maybe if the Haredim enlisted, then yes, but the government has no intention of doing that.) Another thing you ignore is the international situation. Understand that the European foreign ministers are working with Arab states to establish a Palestinian state through a unilateral move; moreover, the elections in the U.S. are approaching, and if Kamala is elected then the diplomatic situation will be even worse. In short, it seems that the one suffering from psychosis is you and your dreams of “total victory,” without understanding that we have already won, and what is happening now is simply so Bibiyahu won’t be investigated (I wouldn’t be surprised if he cancels elections because of the war, which somehow will continue until then)
It is interesting to compare this to what was said: “The humility of Zechariah ben Avkulas destroyed our Temple,” etc. The sages held that one should kill through direct action, and Zechariah disagreed because he was humble and self-righteous.
Michi is abandoning hostages, Michi is a murderer, Michi should sit in prison for betraying the citizens of the state, Michi is playing with the lives of citizens for considerations of national arousal.
Do you realize that you are simply illustrating the psychosis? Try getting treatment.
I have now seen the hysterical message above. I really considered deleting it, but it seems to me that Natan is right and it is indeed better to leave it here for eternal disgrace, to illustrate my claim about the psychosis.
Most likely he’s just a troll chuckling under his mustache and is actually on the opposite side.
Hello Rabbi,
I had a bit of difficulty understanding the following passage in the article:
“…At most, this is motivation to look for a flaw in the argument, or perhaps proof that such a flaw is there, but in order to reject it we need to point to the flaw itself…”
Why, when I prove that there is a flaw in an argument without pointing to it directly, is that not enough to reject the argument?
In my view, proving that there is a flaw in an argument should suffice to reject / moderate the argument without having to point to the flaw itself. Similarly, many mathematical proofs prove theorems by contradiction. That is, a contradiction obtained from the non-acceptance of a claim proves the claim itself.
Why, in the case the rabbi was discussing, is that not enough?
I didn’t understand why there is necessarily a contradiction between toppling Hamas and freeing hostages. Suppose there were a button that, when pressed, destroys all Hamas terrorists and gunmen; at that very moment, the obstacle to rescuing the hostages would be removed.
In more practical terms – ostensibly, if Hamas fears that it is just about to be toppled, then it would be worthwhile for it to agree to a deal that includes releasing terrorists in order to avoid destruction. This of course contradicts achieving the goal of toppling Hamas 100%, but achieving both goals at 90% (both releasing 90% of the hostages and destroying 90% of Hamas) is also fine; it is not a frontal contradiction.
Of course, this will not happen as long as Hamas watches with pleasure the internal division over the issue of the deal (which is completely one-sided)
This is not a proof by contradiction. What is shown is that a similar argument leads to problematic conclusions. But from here one can proceed in two ways: 1. Also adopt those conclusions despite their problematic nature, that is, conclude that there is no flaw in the argument. 2. Conclude that there is a flaw and reject those conclusions as well as this one. Therefore this is not a proof but only an indication. You need to point to the flaw in order to choose route 2. See the column I referred you to about paradoxes.
Correct. But I have a better button: to destroy all Hamas terrorists and all enemies of Israel, also backward in time, and revive all the dead. In such a case all our problems would be solved retroactively as well. With buttons like that, you can do anything. The contradiction here is not logical but practical.
By the time Hamas reaches the stage where it understands it must surrender, all the hostages will already be dead. I explained this contradiction in column 611, which I referred you to. See there.
I have just seen the following “logical” argument:
https://news.walla.co.il/item/3691513
This opens a new branch in logic: psychotic logic.
One could offer every Hamas member who returns living hostages, including Sinwar, a one-way plane ticket to Qatar. That would give them an incentive to return living hostages.
ynet
https://www.ynet.co.il › … › Breaking News
Notices were distributed to Gaza residents: $250,000 in exchange for information on the location of the hostages
Two comments:
1. As shocking as it may be to put this in writing, perhaps the hostages can be seen as a kind of “involuntary pursuer,” since their very existence certainly endangers the lives of many soldiers and civilians, now and in the future. If there were no hostages, or if we knew for certain that all the hostages were dead (God forbid), that would allow us to fight at much greater intensity and save the lives of soldiers and civilians. I remind you that even in the columns you referred to, you said that you would not have agreed to the Shalit deal, but only to a deal in which we receive a reasonable number of hostages and release a reasonable number of terrorists (like the first hostage deal). In this column, for some reason, you say categorically that in exchange for the hostages you would be willing to release all the terrorists in our hands (we are talking about thousands if not tens of thousands, among them thousands of skilled murderers who murdered and burned and raped and who knows what else on October 7 and before it). By the way, you scarcely address the fact that releasing terrorists, beyond the great danger involved, is also a terrible injustice and a moral crime beyond compare.
2. Regarding the columnist’s argument: beyond all the correct things you wrote, there is a simple distinction between preventing terror and preventing death from other causes. Terror does not harm only a specific person and his family; it weakens our entire hold on this land. If 99% of traffic accidents ended only with people suffering anxiety, it seems everyone would agree there would be no point in investing much in preventing them. By contrast, many would agree that we should have gone to war against Hamas and destroyed it already when it fired the first rocket. This despite the fact that Iron Dome and safe rooms reduced the chance of being seriously harmed by a Hamas missile to almost nothing.
1. That is a mistake in halakhah. There is a clear distinction between the law of a pursuer and saving oneself at the cost of another’s life. A pursuer is someone who threatens me himself. If Reuven threatens me, I am not permitted to kill Shimon in order to save myself.
Moral injustice is not a consideration when human life is at stake.
Those thousands of murderers are not such a great danger. They have tens of thousands of skilled murderers even without them, and were it not for our blunder, the massacre of October 7 would not have happened. See column 608.
2. I really do not agree. One does not bring proof from fools.
You make a sharp distinction between the price of releasing terrorists and the price of stopping the war / withdrawal, etc., and in my opinion you did not adequately explain the meaning of this sharp distinction. From the perspective of the side that supports the deal at least, these are all arguments from the same consequentialist family, of preferring theoretical future dead people, whom there are tools to prevent, over hostages who will die immediately.
Maybe you are saving the explanation of the distinction for a future column, but it seems to me that the essence of the arguments against the deal lies here, including your own opposition to it.
I explained it fully, and I also referred to column 608.
Let us assume, God forbid, that the whole country is under Hamas missile fire, and Iron Dome intercepts almost all of them. Should we continue the existing situation and spare human lives (since millions of children not sleeping at night from fear is not a danger to life), or should we launch an operation in which soldiers will certainly be killed? Do you support the first option?
In my opinion, yes. The army’s role is to enable the state’s citizens to live normal lives.
Well, maybe those buttons aren’t all that imaginary…
So according to your view, the Shalit deal was a good deal even in light of 2023?
It was bad both in my view then and now. I have written this more than once, and I also described an argument I had about it with his parents (Noam and Aviva). Looking back does not change much, because October 7 was a result of our blunder and not of the Shalit deal.
It’s simply that the numbers are different and the circumstances are different (one soldier, who was abducted due to his own fault, whereas now these are dozens of civilian hostages abducted due to our fault).
The psychosis, of course, is the same psychosis that existed then too, but on steroids.
Hello Rabbi,
If I understood correctly, after Oct. 7 you argued that Hamas cannot be defeated, because as long as there remain living people in Gaza, those people will be willing to die in order to take revenge and kill. What has changed since then, that you now think there really is a way to defeat Hamas?
Second, in this post you claim that Hamas did not accept your proposal, immediately after Oct. 7, of everyone for everyone. I do not recall that such a thing was ever offered to Hamas, and even now I do not believe the leaders of the state would be willing to do such a thing now.
Thank you Rabbi
I do not recall writing such a thing. I estimated that the IDF and the government would not be willing to go to a long war until Hamas was destroyed. The claim you quote comes up often, but it is not mine. Even today it is not certain that Hamas can be eliminated, but it is possible to strike it mortally. The government and the IDF have shown greater resilience than I thought, although even now we are dithering around there and not really fighting.
I also did not write that anywhere. I wrote then that it would be proper to offer them that, and I still think it would have been proper. It is not certain they would have accepted, but it was worth trying. Today no longer, because we already have achievements and it is not right to give them up in such a deal. Today everyone on our side would gladly make such a deal. There is hardly a single Israeli who would oppose it. But Hamas would not agree. It requires them to be destroyed and to return the captives. Why would they agree?!
Thank you for the clear answer.
Two points I want to clarify further: if we are not really fighting, then what are we gaining from it? Do you think they were mortally damaged in this war?
And another general point: do you believe the problem can be solved through war, or will that only intensify the feelings there of revenge and killing, and killing will bring killing will bring killing, and it will be a recurring cycle as it has been until now?
The question is whether perhaps it is worth thinking outside the box and not being dragged after the feeling of revenge, because what we have done until now has not really helped us all that much; it seemed to me that this was what you proposed immediately after Oct. 7.
Thank you very much for everything
First, it really is a shame that we are not fighting more. That needs to be improved. Second, there are gains beyond the fighting that we would be required to give up in a deal: to withdraw from what is already in our hands, to stop the damage we are still inflicting, and to allow Hamas to return and rebuild its strength.
Anyone who thinks concessions will bring peace is living in cloud-cuckoo-land. Only force, and more force; and meanwhile it seems we will have to live by our sword. Until there is someone to talk to.
It is always worthwhile to think outside the box. But not everything outside the box is correct. Outside the box there are also thoughts that 2+3=-17. What I proposed then I explained in the previous message.
It seems to me that the analysis lacks reference to a partial deal. A deal in which some of the hostages are returned in exchange for terrorists and a temporary ceasefire. I would not have believed this was possible – but it happened, and apparently the interest in doing it again still exists. How do you explain the deal that took place?
I did not address a partial deal because I have nothing general to say about it. Though I have written more than once that a partial deal is indeed factually possible.
Without realizing it, you yourself belong to the church that opposes releasing hostages and opposes ending the war, even though there is no sufficiently good reason to continue it; all the rational arguments people present to you are not enough in your eyes. All this even though, in retrospect, almost every prediction or assumption of yours was refuted by reality.
I saw this clearly when you wrote about the call to release hostages and end the war – mass psychosis / the hostage carnival / surrender to emotion, just like all the “rationalists on the right” (right, of course, in double quotation marks). Before the second hostage deal and during it, there were many opinion pieces by “rationalists” opposing it and classifying everyone else as emotionalists – already at the time I wrote to you that in fact releasing hostages is the rational thing, and opposition stems from unjustified emotionalism (irrational fear of terror) or from a desire to settle Gaza (admittedly a minority), not from rational considerations.
You made an explicit prediction that after the second hostage deal it would be impossible to return to fighting – and this was completely refuted; and even so, you are not reexamining your basic assumptions. You had a basic assumption that Hamas would not return all the hostages – but that too was refuted when Hamas announced it was willing to return all of them in exchange for ending the war – and Netanyahu addressed the proposal in a video and said he would not accept it because he does not surrender to terror. And yes, I know you will say that “total victory” takes precedence over returning the hostages.
And finally, this government says of itself that it is “full-on right-wing,” and yet after more than a year and a half of fighting they still have not declared the collapse of Hamas… so at first they excused it by saying “Gallant is a mole,” then “the Chief of Staff is not aggressive enough,” then “Biden is preventing us,” and now Ronen Bar is to blame for the fighting not progressing, and yesterday I saw MK Amit Halevi (Likud) blaming the Attorney General (I promise) for why they are not winning in Gaza. Given that Israel “changed the Middle East” (in Netanyahu’s own words), maybe total victory in Gaza is simply an illusion being sold to the public at the expense of releasing the hostages? (Of course, another explanation could be that the people in the government are simply nonentities…)
As for total victory, toppling Hamas is not a goal worth fighting for – and that is usually what is meant when people speak about total victory. After all, most of Hamas’s military capabilities were already lost a year ago; Hamas is not a threat to Israel as it was on 7.10, and Hamas’s governing capabilities will not disappear unless someone else is found to rule there as long as there are Palestinians there. And even if hypothetically everyone with “Hamas” written on his forehead were exiled to Indonesia, another terrorist organization would simply take control (just for general knowledge, *before* 7.10 there were more than 10 terrorist factions in the Strip; Hamas was simply the largest), so all the intensive work of IDF soldiers is not worth the benefit. Israeli military rule would indeed significantly reduce terror, but it would have its own costs – I assume that is the government’s ultimate intention – and there needs to be public discussion about those costs, and certainly the 7.10 government cannot decide such a thing.
In short, you too belong to one of the churches, and instead of presenting a serious discussion and serious arguments against a deal / ending the war, you classify people as a church / mass psychosis and various other nice expressions…
P.S. And all this without even discussing the morality of the fighting, with the war crimes that are occasionally revealed even to the Israeli public, and without discussing the fact that we have destroyed 2.5% of the population (according to the more lenient estimates)…
I would be happy to be an honorary member of any church that is unwilling to accept me. But regarding your claims themselves, not one of them holds water (church?). Just a reminder: holding a position does not mean you are in a church. The question is whether you take counterarguments into account or not, that is, whether you have weighed them as well.
At present, all the reasons seem to support continuing the war. It alone brought us Edan Alexander, with not much connection to Trump, despite the dogmas of the pro-deal church. They turned to Trump only because of fear of threats to expand the war, but the pro-deal church cries out in one voice that it was all only thanks to Trump, and everyone thanks only him (shameful). If there is anyone who contributed to the return of the hostages, it is the government and the army; and if there is anyone who repeatedly thwarts the possibility of doing so, it is the hostages’ families and their church. Exactly the same goes for the recycled claims that only deals brought back hostages. Bullshit. Only war brought that about. Deals are made in its wake. But the church does not really take common sense into account. It has articles of faith…
The pro-deal church repeats again and again that it will be possible to renew the war and destroy Hamas even after an agreement. History proves that this is not true, and so does common sense. No one will enter into an all-out war to topple Hamas because Hamas has armed itself with a few more rockets or dug a few tunnels. Even today the world and your church are not willing to let us do it, when we have every reason and justification. If there is a chance to destroy Hamas, it is only now, when we have already done more than half the way, and the war is in full swing despite the protests of the world. In my opinion this is exactly the time to continue for another year, another two years, at full force and finish them off. Maybe I am wrong and we will not succeed, but in my opinion this is a very sober assessment and not church-like at all. By contrast, your emphatic and baseless opposition does seem to me somewhat church-like.
Regarding the claim that my assessments were refuted, let me say in advance that it is certainly possible that my assessments of reality were refuted, but that is not evidence of church-like thinking. A person can be wrong. What matters for this purpose is only whether he took all the considerations into account to the best of his judgment. It seems to me that this is a simple distinction, but it is hard to see it when one is so biased.
Although it is legitimate to err, it seems to me that דווקא here I was not mistaken. My opposition to deals was stated only with respect to a deal that involved ending the war and leaving Hamas in place. Interim deals in which we gain some hostages are certainly a possibility. I have no problem with them whatsoever.
Despite the above, I also do not recall any prediction of mine as you quote it. I do not think there was such a prediction, but I would be happy to receive a link. I did indeed argue that a comprehensive deal would not allow a return to war, and I also estimated that even במסגרת a comprehensive deal we would not receive all the hostages. I still hold this view, though if we continue the war with greater intensity there is perhaps some chance that Hamas will despair and surrender. Perhaps.
Hamas has never announced that it is willing to return all the hostages in exchange for ending the war. These are wishful fantasies on the part of you and your church of emotionalists, which turns wishes into facts. It announced that without ending the war the hostages would not be returned. But it has other conditions too (that the war not be resumed, and that they remain in the territory). And all this even if one takes its statements seriously, as the emotionalists from your church tend to do.
The question of whether the government is okay or not is a different question and irrelevant to the matter at hand. Here we are discussing only the church-like character of the sides and of myself. I am very far from being a supporter of this scum government.
The argument that Hamas has already been toppled is also repeated again and again and does not hold water. Hamas was never a military threat to Israel. Therefore, even if we killed tens of thousands of its people, that is not relevant. Toppling Hamas means that it does not rule Gaza and does not have weapons (rockets, etc.) and tunnels. That is a goal that in my estimation can definitely be achieved, but of course I have no information and I am willing to hear other opinions. Your argument about this is irrelevant, as stated.
By the way, the proposals now being raised, the voices coming from Arab states, speak of Hamas leaving the territory, a peace agreement with the Palestinians with mutual recognition, and their demilitarization. In my view that is a wonderful agreement, and if it is really possible and the government will not agree to it (and probably it will not), I will join your church (but as a rational observer from the sidelines). There is no need to say that these proposals are of course arising only thanks to the government’s persistence in continuing to fight.
The argument that hangs on the number of uninvolved casualties is also a ridiculous church-like example. The only relevant question is whether the legitimate goals of the war can be achieved at a lower price. And that is a comparative question, not an absolute quantitative one. But go talk to priests in the church. They are incapable of understanding this.
In short, in the end it seems you only wanted to illustrate what I wrote in the column, and for that I can only thank you. But beyond the compliments my arguments receive from you, from your point of view I again call on you to leave the church.
I think you're missing the argument of many of those who support a deal, namely the claim that the first option you presented
– “the option of continuing the fighting until the goals are achieved as fully as possible (I don’t call it ‘total victory’ because the phrase has already acquired a cynical connotation), of course entails giving up on an overwhelming majority of the hostages (most of whom, it is already clear, are dead).” – simply does not exist. Or more precisely – that the fighting has already achieved everything it could achieve, and from here on we are moving into stagnation and unnecessary suffering, so it is better to end the war and bring home as many hostages as possible.
This is even more significant with respect to the possibility of fighting on two fronts – Hamas has so far suffered heavy losses (even if not decisive ones), whereas Hezbollah has effectively taken over the northern border de facto (in the sense that it sets the agenda for everyone who lives and will live there). The claim is that Israel is not prepared to conduct the prolonged war required in the north without diverting forces from the south, and therefore ending the war in the south is in any case an Israeli interest in order to free itself up for the north. So the claim is the opposite of yours, according to which: “The price of a hostage deal is at the very least a final cessation of the fighting, giving up entire stretches of land in the north and south and the security of the tens and hundreds of thousands of their residents, losing the ability to deal with the Iranian proxy forces constantly building up on our borders, and a future confrontation with them under conditions far less favorable to us.”
Of course, one can dispute this claim militarily or strategically, but I think the dichotomy you draw between bringing back the hostages and crushing defeat, or continuing the fighting and victory (partial? maximal?) is mistaken. One could just as well draw a dichotomy between bringing back hostages and giving up the southern front, or continuing the fighting and giving up the northern front.