A Look at the Hostage Deal (Column 607)

In recent days I was asked several times for my opinion on the hostage exchange deal, and now it is already underway. I wrote briefly that I tend to oppose it for several reasons, but I hesitated whether to write a full column and elaborate because of the sensitivity of the situation and the pessimism I would convey. In particular, it felt unpleasant to say “I told you so,” but now that I’ve decided to write, I’m at least doing so before the end of the pause and not after everything. There is an element of risk in my assessments, and they can still be refuted in light of what will happen in the coming days and weeks.

I decided to write nonetheless, because it’s important to present these points due to their relevance and importance, especially against the background of Column 605, which dealt with the relationship between morality and emotion. I already mentioned there that attitudes toward the hostage deal are saturated with emotion, and the debates around it are indeed connected to the morality–emotion question.

Rabbi Shilat’s Remarks

This morning I listened to a talk by Rabbi Shilat on the deal, and I thought I had much to comment on there as well. Bottom line: Rabbi Shilat supports the deal. He rejects the objection based on the rule of “more than their worth” (yeter al k’dei demeihen), since that rule addresses kidnapping for ransom. That is not our current situation. True, he himself notes that even in our case there are “costs” (albeit not in monetary terms), and therefore the spirit of that halachic rule can certainly be relevant here as well. I did not find in his words an explicit explanation of why, in the end, he does not see this as a deal of “more than their worth.”

My impression is that the crux lies in what he says next: there is agreement across the political and military leadership and an overwhelming majority in the public in favor of this deal, and there is also great unity in a society that was very divided before the war. His claim is that where there is such agreement and unity, there will surely be heavenly assistance (siyata d’shmaya) regarding the potential costs of the deal. I understood this to be his explanation for why this is not a case of “more than their worth.”

In this talk Rabbi Shilat apparently retracted an earlier position, since in a previous publication I read that he opposed a deal that would release women and children while leaving the men behind, because that would ensure those men would not be released at all. Of course, that is precisely the nature of the current deal, which he now supports in his talk. Apparently, public agreement and unity are decisive for him, even if the deal itself doesn’t seem correct to him and even if the redemption here could be “more than their worth” in his eyes. He presumably assumes that God will ensure this is not “more than their worth”—that is, He will save us from the expected costs—because of the agreement and unity. This brings me to my main comment on his remarks, which touches on the relationship between theological conceptions and reality.

On Theology and Reality

First, a note on his theological claim. There was also very broad agreement on the Shalit deal (perhaps slightly less than today’s agreement. Incidentally, I opposed the Shalit deal but support the current deal). Back then there were only a few who objected (in practice, not all those who are now revealed to have “opposed” it but were not heard then), mostly some rabbis who were, of course, portrayed as a fanatic far right, indifferent to moral costs and to the state’s commitment to its soldiers and citizens—or at least willing to sacrifice them for ideology. Today the tune regarding the Shalit deal has changed, of course, but as I noted in Column 605, despite the differences between then and now (to be discussed below), the discourse today proceeds in exactly the same way. Back then too, the military and political leadership presented a united front for the deal, and dissenting voices were barely heard. So it is today. The public unity displayed then was no less than the unity Rabbi Shilat speaks of now. And yet, despite all this, I must say that the results of that deal (which reach all the way to the recent Simchat Torah and beyond) do not attest to any particularly notable heavenly assistance. So where did that unity and leadership consensus go? Why did they not produce heavenly assistance and mitigate the costs then? In short, the factual claim seems to me really unfounded and not grounded in facts.

It is important to understand that Rabbi Shilat did not say that public agreement is binding halachically, religiously, or democratically (there are quite a few claims these days that a democratic government must do what the public wants—strangely, this always comes up when it suits the speaker’s agenda). He made a factual claim: that because of unity and agreement, there will be heavenly assistance, and therefore we need not worry about the harsh outcomes expected from this deal. I will not go into detail here regarding my view that denies divine intervention in the conduct of the world (incidentally, this too is a factual claim, not a normative one), due to which the entire argument seems to me baseless on its face. Moreover, as I have written more than once, it is not right to run our real lives on the basis of theological views, no matter how solid. The Torah’s way itself is to act in a realpolitik manner, and I have already noted that this is where both the religious-Zionist camp and their ultra-Orthodox extremists who oppose them err. The golden path in our tradition is not to make decisions based on theology and metaphysics, but based on logical, realistic considerations as perceived by our human eyes—regardless of whether our theological assumptions are correct or not.[1] In any case, I think Rabbi Shilat’s claim is problematic even without adopting my broader theological positions—that is, even on his own terms.

I will preface by saying that the theological debate about divine intervention in the world proceeds very much like what we see with Rabbi Shilat. The stance that God runs the world is based on rabbinic statements and verses, and people tend to ignore the fact that in reality itself, one does not really see this. They even regard adherence to facts as heresy. In theological discussions on that issue, I have written more than once that one must beware of relying on theological conceptions and/or rabbinic dicta when forming conclusions about facts. Reality has a cruel, stubborn nature; it tends to rudely ignore our wishes and views. I must say that we too have a childish tendency that leads us to ignore that indifference and cling to those dicta as if they were verified facts about the world. Even if I am a Jew who believes wholeheartedly and is committed to halacha and Talmud, I am still committed to facts. At most, we must seek explanations for those rabbinic statements and verses; we cannot and should not force them onto reality.

Why shouldn’t we rely on Torah and Hazal for factual conclusions? First, it is quite possible that Hazal erred in their outlooks and perceptions of reality (in practice this certainly happened more than once). I have often written that there is no obligation to adopt the theological conceptions of Hazal and the Talmud, as opposed to their halachic rulings, which are binding on all who are faithful to halacha. As for the Torah, that is harder to say, since God presumably does not err. But even if one thinks the Sages did not err—or even cannot err—and even if the source is in the Torah itself, which certainly does not err, it remains possible that we are not interpreting them correctly or not applying their words properly to today’s reality. Therefore, the supreme arbiter regarding reality is observation of reality itself. Dogmatic rationalism à la Aristotle, which ignores facts and observations and prefers a priori assumptions that seem logical, has taken severe blows throughout history. In modern times we learned that science is a better way to know reality, especially where it does not conform to our a priori premises. Therefore, in the final analysis, it is recommended to draw factual conclusions by rational and observational means. This applies at least where those tools yield such conclusions. In the Ran’s language at the beginning of Sukkah: “One cannot deny that which is sensed.” Only if the question remains open from the standpoint of observational tools might one resort to traditional sources.

What I said about the general question of divine intervention may also be said about Rabbi Shilat’s specific factual claim. He derives from rabbinic dicta, theological conceptions, and perhaps from his heart’s desires, factual conclusions and forecasts for the future and makes fateful decisions accordingly—even though, as I have just noted, we have now learned that those assumptions did not really pass the empirical test (cf. Gilad Shalit and the Simchat Torah atrocities). Moreover, their failure to pass the empirical test is chillingly manifest in events unfolding right now, and yet many of us tend to ignore this and analyze those very events using the same failed tools.

This is a very dangerous and wrong methodology—regardless of our attitude to Hazal’s conceptions. Factual conclusions should be based primarily on reality and our observations thereof (i.e., experience). As we have seen, this is true for at least three reasons: 1) Perhaps Hazal erred. 2) Perhaps we are not interpreting reality correctly or not applying their words correctly to reality. 3) There is a normative, meta-halachic principle that decisions in reality should not be based on theological and metaphysical considerations (even if the Sages did not err and even if we interpret and apply their words correctly).

Now I can move to the substantive discussion.

The Law of Redeeming Captives: On Quotations and Their Meaning

Everyone engaged in this discussion peppers it with learned quotations from Hazal and Maimonides. Supporters of the deal explain that redeeming captives is the greatest of all mitzvot. Opponents no less adamantly quote the rule that one does not redeem captives for more than their worth. This teaches you that the gates of interpretation and quotation have not been locked; everyone does with them as he pleases. Both quotations are, of course, correct, and the principles they state are certainly true. Precisely for that reason, everyone also understands that there is no need for them (since no one fails to grasp this on his own—especially those for whom halacha matters as much as last year’s snow): redeeming captives is indeed important, and paying a high price is obviously dangerous and may be a grave mistake. And yet all the God-fearing on all sides—like Bibi, Gallant, and Yoad (Yoav) Tzur—are very meticulous in mitzvot, as we know, and thus cannot express themselves properly without anchoring their stance in an authoritative halachic source.

As a diagnostic thought experiment, I suggest each person ask himself what his position would be if there were no such halachic sources. Would anything change? For Bibi and Ronen Tzur (the PR man for the hostage families, who, I understand, also led the campaign for the Shalit deal), I’m sure not—and for rabbis and religious people, I have no doubt not either. This is plainly tendentious recruitment of sources. Suppose I concluded that I support or oppose the deal—would any of these quotations change that? Of course not. So why confuse us with these quotations? What do they add to the discussion? Moreover, the controversies do not concern those two principles, which everyone agrees upon. The debate is where the price line of “their worth” lies. On this, the quotations are of no help whatsoever. Still, I will comment a bit on those sources, only to make clearer why they are irrelevant to the discussion.

The Law of Redeeming Captives and Its Application: The Greatest Mitzvah in the Torah

Let us begin with the “greatest mitzvah in the Torah”: redeeming captives. Indeed, there is such language in the poskim, as in Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh De’ah, at the beginning of §252:

1. Redeeming captives takes precedence over providing for the poor and clothing them, and there is no mitzvah greater than redeeming captives.

2. One who averts his eyes from redeeming captives transgresses “Do not harden your heart” (Deut. 15:7), “Do not shut your hand” (Deut. 15:7), “Do not stand idly by your fellow’s blood” (Lev. 19:16), “He shall not rule over him with rigor in your sight” (Lev. 25:53), and neglects the mitzvot of “You shall surely open your hand” (Deut. 15:8), “Your brother shall live with you” (Lev. 25:36), “Love your fellow as yourself” (Lev. 19:18), “Rescue those taken to death” (Prov. 24:11), and many similar matters.

3. Every moment one delays redeeming captives, where it is possible to act sooner, it is as though one sheds blood.

Clearly, the expressions here do not state a precise halachic claim. The author aims to exalt this duty and spur us to engage in it. A grab-bag of catch-all clauses like these does not transform it into “the most important mitzvah in the Torah.” It reminds me of something I cited in the name of Rabbi Medan: he knows twenty-two explanations for why we read the Scroll of Ruth on Shavuot, but only one explanation for why we read Esther on Purim. When one resorts to such collections of catch-alls, it means the statement lacks real basis. In this regard, consider all the prohibitions and “cursed-be’s” that the Chafetz Chaim compiled. Because he wanted to renew the halachic framework of the prohibitions of slander and gossip, it was important to him—like a peddler with a long list—to enumerate all the related prohibitions and commandments to strengthen and exalt that renewed framework.

It is well known that Hazal list several mitzvot each of which is “equivalent to the entire Torah,” which of course raises a small mathematical problem (see Rabbi Wolbe’s pamphlet The Equivalent Mitzvot). The answer is not found in pilpul, nor even in the expected move that each is equal to the whole Torah only in a certain respect (different for each). The simplest answer is that none of them is truly equivalent to the entire Torah; the Sages wanted to exalt them and spur us to engage in them, and this is the rhetorical tool they chose. There are metaphorical expressions—“deserving death,” “forfeits his life” (for instance, one who gives his life for a mitzvah not among the three cardinal ones, per Maimonides), or “equal to the entire Torah”—that sometimes must be read figuratively and illustratively rather than literally.

The Law of Redeeming Captives and Its Application: “More Than Their Worth”

The next halacha there presents our rule:

4. One does not redeem captives for more than their [market] value, for the sake of social order, so that enemies will not hand themselves over to abduct them. But a person may redeem himself for any amount he wishes. Likewise, for a Torah scholar—or even if he is not yet a scholar but is sharp and may become a great man—one redeems him for large sums. (Whether one’s wife is considered like others or not—see Tur, Even HaEzer §78).

Note that a wealthy person may redeem himself at any price. And likewise for a Torah scholar or great person. Is anyone proposing we apply that in our case?

Now a few comments on this rule. First, as Rabbi Shilat correctly notes, the mishnah addresses a wholly different scenario. There, kidnappers aim to collect ransom and profit. That is not our situation. You might say the “spirit” of the rule remains relevant even if the price is not in money. That is true—but not because of some spirit, rather because of the logic of the matter itself. Moreover, even if that were the spirit, Hazal’s halachic rulings bind us, but their general spirit and values do not. Again, you may call me a heretic, but if you examine yourselves honestly you’ll see you think so too (just run that thought experiment on yourself). Beyond that, this “spirit” stems not from Torah or halacha but from the understanding that this is indeed a proper way to act. I have that understanding too; I don’t need to derive it from Hazal.

Second, we are dealing with a period in which kidnapping for ransom was common practice; hence the importance of precedent. When there is a regular practice of gangs abducting people to make money, the question of how much you pay is very important. What you do now will largely determine the future in subsequent cases—whether they will have motivation to kidnap and how much they will demand. But when events are one-off, the precedential question is less important. Hamas has motivation to do this, but even so, it is not the same situation as in the past.

Third, the mishnah in Gittin speaks of a situation in which there is a market price for a captive, much like the laws of overcharging. It was one of the trades practiced in the market. Recall that in past centuries Europeans and Americans seized Black Africans and sold them like merchandise in the market. Believe it or not, in the more distant past, Ashkenazim (including Jews, and not only Jews) were also seized for similar purposes. There were companies for whom this was a fully legal business and certainly not a criminal offense. But in our day it is very hard to speak of a conventional market price for a captive—by age, sex, health, etc. So what does “their worth” mean? Presumably it means the price demanded of us is unreasonable under the circumstances and could cause harm. But that is not “more than their worth”; it is simply a deal one ought not make. If so, better to explain, with reasoning, why in your opinion it is not right to do so—and spare me the sermons and pilpul about “more than their worth.”

Fourth, in our case we are dealing with a state, not a community or individual. A state proceeds on the assumption that we have continuing relations with the kidnappers (Hamas), so we are in the territory of repeated-game theory. The outcomes—and therefore the strategies—for such a case differ entirely from those of an individual. Moreover, we are the stronger party here, unlike Jews in exile. We are able to prevent at least some of the future costs and events in various ways. Therefore, in our case, policy questions such as deterrence are more important than questions of “more than their worth,” which pertain more to individuals or communities.

The conclusion is that quoting these halachot places the discussion in an irrelevant conceptual sphere, causing us to ignore very important considerations that should be taken into account long before the price question. Therefore, these quotations are not only unnecessary and meaningless; they are even harmful.

The Law of Redeeming Captives and Its Application: Additional Halachic Provisions

We have already seen the reservations regarding a great person or a wealthy individual. These are initial examples of how inapplicable these halachot are to our situation.

But now I would be glad to hear your view on the following halacha in the same section:

5. We do not smuggle out captives, for the sake of social order—lest the enemies impose heavier burdens upon them and increase their guarding.

Is anyone proposing not to carry out military rescue operations for the hostages because the Shulchan Aruch forbids it? Seemingly, according to this halacha, we should simply pay whatever Hamas demands, and that’s it (of course, without, heaven forbid, violating “more than their worth”).

Alternatively, perhaps we should apply the Rema’s words in §6 there:

6. […] And a captive who has apostatized, even in one mitzvah—for example, eats non-kosher to provoke—he is forbidden to be redeemed.

It seems we must map the captives and see how many are halachically observant versus those who (heaven forfend) eat non-kosher. Those must not be redeemed even if offered for free. On the contrary, per this halacha, such people should be handed over to Hamas with our own hands.

And now, a real gem:

8. We redeem a woman before a man; but if [the captors] are accustomed to male same-sex relations, we redeem the man first. (And if both are likely to drown in a river, rescuing the man takes precedence). (Beit Yosef; and so it appears at the end of Horayot).

According to the sugya in Horayot, a man precedes a woman in saving his life and rescuing him from drowning. Surely that will please all our quoters. But fortunately, regarding redeeming captives, a woman precedes a man (unless the captors are accustomed to male same-sex relations). So here is a clear halachic support for the current deal, in which we plainly prefer women over men (I hope Hamas is careful to avoid such relations). But it is worth repeating the thought experiment: what would we do if halacha did not exclude redeeming captives from the other precedence rules and stated that even there the man precedes the woman? I am sure Bibi and Ronen Tzur would decide to redeem the men first—since that would be an explicit Shulchan Aruch.

Interim Summary

I write all this because it demonstrates how empty these halachic quotations are. They add nothing, since the two principles are trivial and obvious to any reasonable person. The debates around such deals concern only how to balance those two principles, and in that debate the halachic sources do not help us practically to set the balance point: what the price should be in the absence of a market price. Moreover, we have seen that these principles have no force in our circumstances, and we have also seen that the quotations are hollow—no one would change his position because of them. Especially needless to say when they are quoted by people who have nothing to do with halacha.

Before I enter the substantive discussion of such deals, there is another halachic point raised also by Rabbi Shilat: risking oneself to save another. So first let us remove that from the table as well.

Risking Oneself to Save Another

One central argument against such deals (especially after the Shalit deal) is that the price we pay now will cost us dearly in the future. We save these hostages but thereby cause the murder of future victims by those released terrorists. As noted, the Simchat Torah events themselves are one of the results of the Shalit deal.

The Kesef Mishneh on Rambam, Laws of Murder 1:14, brings in the name of the Hagahot Maimoniyot citing the Jerusalem Talmud:

He wrote in Hagahot Maimoniyot: On “Do not stand [idly by],” the Yerushalmi concludes that one is obligated even to put himself into possible danger. And it seems the reason is that the other is in certain danger, while he is in possible [danger].

A person must endanger himself (enter possible danger to life) to save his fellow’s life, since the fellow is in certain danger while the rescuer is only in possible danger. It is important to say that the Kesef Mishneh himself, in the Shulchan Aruch he authored, does not bring this halacha, from which the poskim learned that he likely does not rule so. Indeed, the overwhelming majority of poskim disagree with this principle, and in their view a person is not obligated to endanger himself in order to save his fellow (and perhaps is even forbidden to do so).

Seemingly, the question whether to save the hostages now at the price of future risk depends on this dispute, in which case the halacha would forbid it. True, Rabbi Shilat himself notes that in war the situation is different, since a soldier is required to risk his life to save civilians and his comrades. But I think that is not comparable, because, in the essential view, the soldier risks his life in order to save the entire public, including himself. The threat is to all of us, and the soldiers who risk themselves do so as part of a division of labor among the threatened themselves (each contributes his part in his turn). This is not the risking of one for the sake of others; therefore we should not compare war to the Hagahot Maimoniyot rule.

True, here too we are at war, but right now the immediate threat is not to the entire public but to specific hostages, so here there may be room to compare to the private rule of risking oneself to save another. But just as well, one might reach the opposite conclusion: the threat created by the release is to the entire public, so perhaps the hostages are the “soldiers” in this equation, and we should endanger them to prevent the threat to the public. The conclusion here of course argues against the deal.

I will add that when it is a matter of the public, the considerations may be entirely different; hence applying the Hagahot Maimoniyot to our case is problematic. In sum, even from the Hagahot Maimoniyot rule one cannot extract a clear position for or against the hostage deal, especially since most poskim do not accept it.

In the end, I hope I have persuaded you to step away from halachic quotations and pilpul, and to focus on the practical question: is it appropriate to make a deal regarding the hostages, and if so, which deal.

Considerations For and Against Hostage Deals

Before getting to the current deal, it is important to discuss such a deal in principle. In the case of Gilad Shalit I opposed the deal, and I have already mentioned here the argument I had with the Shalit family when visiting their protest tent. The reason was that one must not release many terrorists for a single soldier because of the future dangers entailed in such a release. This is not an absolute rule, and clearly the numbers involved (how many hostages versus how many released and how many future casualties) are very relevant, which seemingly connects to the question of “their worth.” Therefore, in the case of the current hostages I actually support an exchange deal. At the start of the war I wrote that it would make a lot of sense to offer Hamas all their prisoners in exchange for all our hostages (one could even present this as capitulation, which could give them a victory image and help them agree). I was unsurprised to read the angry responses I received, and not much impressed by them. In principle, had such a deal been on the table, in my eyes it would have been the right and necessary deal. Afterwards—if Hamas provided us with a pretext, which is very likely—we could and should have launched a war of annihilation against them, as is now attempted. At least we would have first brought back the hostages and would not have had to conduct the war while they are in enemy hands.

In the background of this discussion is the claim that future danger is doubtful while the present danger is certain, and the doubtful does not override the certain. Therefore, one must not compare the future casualties to present casualties (opponents of the deal ask: are the hostages preferable to future victims? Why protect these and not those?). This is why it is right to accept future risks to achieve a certain present gain—even if the future costs may be severe (since that is only a doubtful cost). But all this is true both for Gilad Shalit and for our case. So we still need to understand whether there is a difference between the cases and what it is.

In a response to a question I listed three main differences: Shalit was a soldier, whereas now among the hostages there are civilians (including infants and the elderly). Shalit bore contributory fault for what happened to him; they do not. On the contrary—the state abandoned them and failed in its duty, so its obligation toward them is greater. Most important is the number: when there are 240 hostages, that is an enormous figure, and the harm is to a large public of families and friends. Therefore, a doubtful future danger from acts of terror by released prisoners—however great—must be measured against the present harm to hundreds of people. In my view, this is decisive.

Many raise the Simchat Torah events as evidence of the terrible price we paid for the Shalit deal (1,400 killed on the first day alone, and more soldiers in the ongoing fighting). But remember that this price occurred due to our colossal failure. Had the army and government performed properly, this should not have happened. Even without the failure there would have been attacks, of course, but casualties would have been isolated—still a not-so-great doubtful risk weighed against a certain, present rescue. That is true even regarding the Shalit deal. But in the present case, the situation is already very severe (hundreds of hostages and their families). In such a situation one should accept a larger future risk—and of course ensure we do not repeat similar failures so as not to bring upon ourselves costs we should not have paid.[2]

There is a fourth difference that seems significant: the hostages are now held by an organization, not by random terrorists. That organization has a quasi-state status, being the sovereign in Gaza. Dealing with an organization allows for more deals than dealing with individuals. One can extract prices from an organization at any time in the future, and one can also expect it to keep agreements more than individuals (cf. what is happening now). An agreement with private terrorists is not a realistic option.

So much for the general stance toward an exchange of Hamas prisoners for hostages. But the question before us now concerns the specific deal being carried out these days. This deal is not about all the hostages but about women and children. The return is in batches; for each batch (about ten hostages) there is a day of pause with no fighting, and many supply trucks enter the Strip while UAV activity in the air is halted. And we have not yet spoken about the prices paid secretly as part of the deal—none of us knows them (e.g., immunity for Hamas leaders, etc.). I will now explain why, in my view, it was not right to do this.

The Current Deal

I preface by saying I have no information beyond what was published. Clearly such deals have secret components, and it is hard to form a position on them without all the information. Still, public discourse revolves around the deal as published, so it is appropriate to discuss it within those limits.

As Rabbi Shilat noted, the general impression is that there is near wall-to-wall public support for the deal, save for a few right-wing voices that are muted, as expected. The hostage families managed to enlist the media and public advocates to their cause, blurring the difference between a desire to bring the hostages home and agreement to this particular deal. They also blur the difference between joy and excitement at each hostage’s return and principled agreement to the deal. These are two entirely different things. Clearly, this ties into the question of emotion and its role in moral judgment. As I explained in Column 605, the question of the deal is very emotional, and most of the public finds it hard to approach it with the necessary coolness. The criticism of opponents assumes they are insensitive to moral questions (human life, the state’s commitment to its citizens, the suffering of families and the hostages themselves), and paints them as wicked and indifferent. Eliyahu Libman, head of the Kiryat Arba council, whose son is among the hostages, opposes this deal and a deal in general, and the media seems to treat him as an oddity—a right-wing fanatic, implicitly someone prepared to sacrifice his family on the altar of ideology. Needless to say, the hostage families boycott him and ignore what he and his like are saying—but that is understandable given their distress. All this discourse tends to ignore the intellectual aspects that raise serious question marks about the deal. As noted: morality is not emotion.

In the background, recall that the war’s goals were initially defined as dismantling Hamas’s governmental and military capacities, returning the hostages, and creating a situation in which no threat from Gaza faces the communities near the border. Returning the hostages was not the primary goal, but after about two weeks, due to emotion and protests, that changed. Today everyone understands (even if they do not admit it) that the other goals will not really be achieved, so the focus is shifting to returning the hostages. In my estimation, even now the war is not being conducted in order to dismantle Hamas (despite repeated declarations), but to create pressure to bring the hostages back. The partial success to date (nearly a hundred hostages returned) is presented as evidence of the policy’s effectiveness.

Even so, there are problems with this deal. It certainly provides Hamas a victory image and erodes deterrence—but we already had to agree to that in any deal whatsoever (I even suggested encouraging such an image). In addition, the supplies entering the Strip will likely serve Hamas in continued fighting and reduce the pressure on it going forward. Negotiations are constantly underway for more pause days in exchange for fewer hostages and more released prisoners—and that was entirely foreseeable. It has apparently already begun (today I understood they are speaking of eight released rather than the ten initially agreed). Try explaining to the families whose loved ones have not yet been returned that their dear ones are worth less than those who were, and that we are not prepared to pay any price for the hostages. Moreover, the pause days will enable Hamas to regroup and prepare more surprises. Given the glaring gap in capability and thinking between us and them (to their advantage, to avoid misunderstanding), and given that the process unfolds as if all the cards are in their hands, I am very worried about the results (recall that Hadar Goldin was killed and abducted during a pause in Protective Edge). Israel did not even succeed in ensuring that the Red Cross would visit the hostages, verify their condition, and confirm they are being treated. Beyond that, returning women, the elderly, and children, as Rabbi Shilat noted in his earlier position, significantly reduces the chances of returning the others (since international pressure applies mainly due to the women, elderly, and children). This is in contrast to a package deal for all hostages, which at least would have been a gamble that might have succeeded.

Moreover, this pause increases international pressure to stop the fighting entirely. In my assessment, it will be very hard to return to full-scale fighting after the pause (that could be as early as tomorrow), and then the pause days will prove a waste of precious global legitimacy for the fighting. True, it will be hard for the government and army to climb down from the tree of resolute declarations and act against the Israeli consensus, so they will clearly continue some form of fighting after the pause—but it will plainly not look like it did until now. The fate of the southern Strip will likely be very different from the north. It will unfold under the laundering of words—resolve, dismantling, victories, deterrence—but there will be no dismantling and no deterrence.

Already now the Americans demand that we either end the fighting entirely or at least avoid fighting in the south as we did in the north (where Hamas and its resources are still far from dismantled, despite the army commanders’, the prime minister’s, and the defense minister’s bombastic declarations. Bear in mind that during the pause they grew stronger there as well). Currently the Americans demand we stop harming civilians as we did, and that we not conquer and destroy the south. So how exactly will we dismantle Hamas without that? This international pressure will not allow us to continue such fighting for long, so I have little doubt that the goal of dismantling Hamas—governmentally or militarily—will not be achieved. Clearly we will not achieve the removal of the future threat to the border communities either. If so, what remains is the return of the hostages. But the continued talk about determination to achieve the unrealistic goals will not only be fruitless; it may prevent a deal for the remaining hostages—that is, a death sentence for them.

Note that achieving the three war aims is squaring the circle. After we announced to Hamas that they are all as good as dead and we will dismantle them after the deal, there is no chance they will agree to return the remaining hostages. That is their last card. What will we give them for the last batch? More pauses before we kill them all? To whom will we even give that if there is no one to receive it (since we are killing them all)? What incentive does Hamas have to obtain gains if it is destined to be wiped out? This does not sound serious. But none of this deters the talking heads from repeating that we insist on the three objectives and on killing all of Hamas along with returning the hostages. The public continues to swallow this oxymoron enthusiastically (“Together we will win,” did I mention?).

It is quite possible that the army commanders and the government are lying to all of us, and they already know Hamas will not be dismantled and its leaders will not be killed (there is a fair chance they have already been promised some immunity—and if not, it will likely be promised later). But in the current situation, insisting on the three war aims will also prevent us from obtaining the hostages. This deal will land us in a situation where none of the aims is achieved. I remind you that the proposal I raised—an inclusive deal instead of continued fighting—was dismissed in the comments with scorn on the grounds that Hamas must be dismantled. Here are the results (as I foresee them): in my best estimation we will ultimately achieve none of the war’s goals. Is that better? We will destroy many houses and vent our wrath on trees and stones without achieving any objective.

I am sure that as the fighting continues, there will be a laundering of words in which we will continue to hear of Hamas “senior commanders” eliminated by the thousands (like Hamas’s representative in Company D in the central Khan Yunis sector, responsible for bringing chewing gum to his men in the sector). This is part of the brainwashing carried out by the leadership on the stormy, victory-seeking Israeli public. In this context I cannot resist sharing a wonderful comedic post I saw on the subject:

I’ve noticed in the last few days that the IDF Spokesperson is already very much struggling to find respectable “shtellers” (positions) for each terrorist eliminated. Yesterday they published the elimination of “Hamas’s representative at the Conference of the National and Islamic Factions in the Gaza Strip” and the elimination of “the head of the public relations array in the Rafah Brigade.” I’m considering suggesting that the IDF Spokesperson borrow the creative mind of the Hasidim and start using Hasidic methods for coming up with titles: 1. The simplest: find another city/neighborhood connected to the terrorist. Rafah, Central Rafah \[with the stress on the first syllable, of course], Sirt-Rafah, Dzhikov-Rafah, Kosov-Rafah, Shatz-Rafah, Rafah-Kamesha, Rafah-Lakewood, Rafah-London. And so on. 2. One can also play with the spelling of the city’s name. For example: Rafah or Raafah. \[In the detailed statement they’ll write: “White Rafah,” “Black Rafah.”] 3. If the Spokesperson has a globe, he can pick random city names from Europe, with no connection to the subject of the announcement. For example: Rafah-Trebishan, Rafah-Mielan, Rafah-Nikolsburg, Rafah-Piotrkow. 4. And if they’re really busy over there, they can always make do with the names of streets or neighborhoods in Jerusalem and Bnei Brak. Like: Rafah-Donolo, Rafah-Tzefania, Rafah-Ramat Aharon, Rafah-Ganei Gad. 5. Of course, there’s always the option of using the multiplication table and attaching a random number to the city name, like Rafah45.6. One last option, a bit tacky but if there’s no choice then worth considering: simply stick to the terrorist’s sources of spiritual “nourishment,” and attach a name like: “Toldot Ziyad (Nakhaleh),” “Bnei Yasser (Arafat).” No need to be careful about organizational affiliation; you can call “Toldot Ahmed (Yassin)” even a devoted disciple of Fatah’s founder, for example… Important note, before they make critical mistakes! There are city names that cannot be “multiplied,” and that can seriously complicate matters. Such as Gur, or Satmar. \[I simply have no idea how to say “rosh yeshiva,” or “Aroinim” and “Zalonim,” in Arabic.] But there are enough options without stepping on toes…

I do not belittle the achievements and capabilities the army exhibits (the relatively low number of casualties is, in my view, very impressive), but I very much belittle the demagoguery and sleight of hand in the messaging of the Spokesperson and the politicians—and I belittle even more the public that buys it and truly thinks we are on the way to achieving the goals. It is time we stop swallowing these noodles and declarations—about the war’s goals and its achievements—and start facing reality.

The public is currently buying the noodles and is sure we are on the way to dismantling Hamas (“Together we will win,” remember). But at present it appears that this war will not attain any of its aims—sadly, likely including returning the hostages. Sooner or later, we will return to the same situation as after each previous round. There is more destruction and it will take longer to rebuild, but essentially there will be no strategic change as we were sold all along. I don’t like to say it, but I wrote this here already at the beginning of the war and took flak for it. I assume that from here on, the government will mainly engage in appeasing the public and the hostage families and in trying to persuade them with laundered words that we are fighting with vigor and determination, that we succeeded and won—and a bit less in achieving the war’s lost goals.

This means that the current deal, which ostensibly looks more resolute and less compromising, will achieve much less than the “defeatist” deal I proposed at the outset. Again, I lack information, so it is hard to state things categorically, but this is how it looks based on what is happening on the surface. May I be proven wrong.

On the margins I will add that there may be value to this war if, from here on, the government focuses on tough talk to persuade Hamas that we do, indeed, mean business (and begin with much more violent fighting in the south for however many days we can sustain it), and thus try to force them to return all the hostages in exchange for a complete cessation of fighting (which the public will find hard to accept, but that’s what there is) and the release of prisoners. That way we will at least obtain one objective (returning the hostages). The other two already seem lost to me. We must act with our heads and not our guts; instead of taking revenge and killing and destroying, better to act to optimally achieve the goals. Perhaps this is indeed what our leadership is doing now, and the talk of dismantling, victories, and fighting is a tactical lie. I very much hope that is the case, although my assessment of our leadership’s thinking ability is not sky-high.

What will happen at the end of such a war with the residents of the border areas in the south and north? I truly do not know. What I am fairly sure of is that—contrary to their expectations and demands and contrary to the promises they receive—security will not be theirs even after “Swords of Iron” is sheathed. Remember: dismantling and deterrence can be done later too—after everything—after a month, a year, or two, when we no longer have hostages there (God willing). True, the border residents will no longer believe it, and rightly so, and therefore it is doubtful they will agree to return to their communities based on such promises. In light of the protection they have received so far, I think they would have to be very naive to believe those promises.

A Note on Right and Left

In Column 605 I already noted that, as with the Shalit deal, so too these days, opposition to such deals comes almost entirely from the right. Not that the whole right opposes deals, but almost all who oppose them are on the right. At the end of that column I noted that this correlation calls for explanation. The context there hints (as broadly as the beam of an olive press) that this depends on emotion versus intellect. The left is a much more emotional stance, for whom values are there to feed emotions. The right operates more on the basis of values, principles, and ideology—even when emotion opposes them. These are generalizations, of course, but in my view they are quite true (even though many feel the opposite is the case). But there is an additional, more essential aspect.

In 5, 151, and 168, I argued that the foundation of the dispute between right and left (as defined in Israel) is an ontic-metaphysical disagreement: the right views collectives as real entities and at times subordinates the individual’s interest to that of the collective (the people). The extreme manifestation of this is fascism, which is pure right. The liberal left, by contrast, treats people as individuals and collectives as (useful) fictions. Therefore, in their view one must not subordinate individuals’ interests to a collective interest.[3] I showed there how disputes that seem to be about moral questions—such as targeted killing (i.e., fairly targeted, with harm to some uninvolved)—split along right–left lines, even though the right–left divide ostensibly has nothing to do with morality. I explained that these are not truly moral disputes but metaphysical ones, with ethical implications, while the ethical principles themselves are fully agreed by right and left.

You can now understand, in the same spirit, why opposition to these deals comes specifically from the right. That stance is prepared to sacrifice the welfare of individuals (the hostages and their families) for the broader collective interest. It is also clear why a leftist stance cannot accept such a thing. It takes very firm resolve to insist on ideology and on cold, long-term accounting when faced with powerful emotional chords like images and descriptions of children and elderly in captivity.

Up to this point this is only an explanation for the dispute without stating my own position. For my part—you may be surprised—but on this issue I am actually closer to the left. I do oppose the deal, like those on the right, but not necessarily for their reasons. As I wrote, in my view returning the hostages should be the main objective in this war. My opposition to the crystallized deal stems from my assessment that it harms that very interest—not because of long-term (“right-wing”) considerations. I explained that under current circumstances (as opposed to the Shalit deal) those considerations are less relevant. At the base of this view lies the halachic ontology that sees the individual as wearing two hats: the hat of a limb in the general organism (the collective) and a private hat—neither of which is fully subordinated to the other (see Column 530).

Good tidings to us all, and may I be proven wrong.

[1] I will not go into sources and arguments here. Factually, it is certainly true. Joseph’s actions to realize his dreams (per the well-known words of the Ramban) provide fertile ground to examine this issue. It is important to note that even regarding Joseph—who was apparently a kind of prophet—many challenge such a policy; how much more so for mere mortals like us. But this is not the place. See more in Column 585 and in my daughter’s paper here.

[2] The costs of the fighting itself should not be taken into account, since we should have fought Hamas in any case. The fact that we waited until the atrocities of Simchat Torah is part of the failure I mentioned.

[3] I think I already noted there that communism is not really “left” by this definition. Though in “Two Wagons” I explained that while it subordinates individuals to the interest of the global proletariat (individuals are “oil for the wheels of the revolution”), the proletariat’s interest ultimately aims to improve its individuals’ condition.