The Return of the Hostages: On Contradictions, Politics, and Lies (Column 611)
Beloved is Plato, beloved is Socrates, but truth is most beloved of all
(An ancient adage, appearing in Chavot Ya’ir and in the responsa of the Rid, among others)
I apologize in advance that in this column, too, I will try to write the truth (as I see it), in a realm where everyone is lying to themselves and to others (many of them justifiably, from their perspective). This truth is painful and hurts quite a few people, but in my view truth is always the preferred option (see: just in recent days I was asked about this several times in the Q&A, for example here).
The Oxymoron
In column 607 (written toward the end of the pause for the exchange of hostages) I already noted that the three war aims constitute a system with an internal contradiction. The government set for itself and for the army three goals: destroying Hamas, creating a situation in which there is no threat to the Gaza envelope, and returning the hostages. A simple calculation shows that it is impossible to achieve all three of these goals together. Hamas holds the hostages as a winning card (see what pressure this creates here), and I see no reasonable possibility that they will be willing to return them for anything less than a cessation of fighting with effective international guarantees that it will not resume afterwards (meaning that we will not destroy them). They, too, know that after a deal we can always return to fighting. Just so they have no misunderstandings, we also declare very clearly that nothing will stop us until we destroy Hamas and kill Sinwar. So how could the hostages be returned to us? It cannot be.
Perhaps it is possible to reach the destruction of Hamas (and even about this I am very doubtful), but then we will have at most the bodies of the hostages—if at all. Maybe we will manage to free a few individuals in a successful case (like the escape of the three last Friday who, were it not for the soldiers’ tragic mistake, would have gotten out), but as a rule under such a policy we will end up only with bodies. Alternatively, one can try to make a deal and get the hostages back, but that would be without toppling Hamas. In the end, a simple calculation shows there is no way to achieve all three war aims together. Beyond that, as noted, I also very much doubt whether Hamas can truly be toppled, which all the more raises the question of whether it is right to forgo the hostages if those other aims will not be achieved. It is not reasonable to be left with none of the three; therefore at least we should consider trying to obtain the hostages (see column 607).
Just today I have already started to see such voices in the discourse. See, for example, Einav Schiff, “Time to Climb Down from the Tree” (Yedioth 18.12, p. 10), and similar points by Ofer Shelach, “Move to Phase C Now.” The question is when this will reach the official discourse and the facts will be laid on the table.
The Lies
The government and the army repeatedly declare that the return of the hostages is a central objective, and immediately add that the fighting will not stop until the destruction of Hamas and its leadership. In other words, the three goals still stand. They also keep explaining to us that the fighting creates pressure on Hamas without which the hostages will not be returned. This is nonsense, of course, since that pressure can at most lead to a prisoner exchange (without which there will be no hostages returned; they will not be liberated in a military operation), and by definition such an exchange will be conditioned on a complete halt to the fighting. That means that if we receive the hostages there will be no destruction of Hamas, and vice versa.
I assume that even our government and army understand this simple contradiction, and if they understand it then Hamas certainly does (they, unlike us, have intelligent leadership). So why is this repeated all the time? Because it is very convenient to lie in such a situation. The leadership (political and military) that failed cannot face the families of the hostages who have borne the fruits of this terrible fiasco. They are rightly seen as culpable, and the guilty cannot tell them that they have decided to sacrifice their loved ones on the altar of correcting this failure. Therefore they tell them—and all of us—a lie to placate the families, while in fact intending to continue the fighting and give up on the hostages (alternatively, to give up on toppling Hamas, and then perhaps there is a chance to get the hostages—rather slim). All the players in the arena know this is a lie: the speakers themselves, the families of the hostages, and Hamas. But it is a convenient lie, because, as noted, it is very hard to tell the families that we have given up on the hostages. There are situations in which a person lies to his friend, the friend knows he is lying and he knows that the friend knows, and nevertheless that is what is done.
None of this is meant as criticism. Bibi is indeed a consummate liar, and he surely feels like a fish in water telling these lies. It is his undisputed specialty. But in this case the lie is justified, at least under these circumstances, because one cannot forgo the other war aims and it is very hard to tell the families the truth to their faces.
“Families of the Hostages” or the families of the hostages
The spokespeople on behalf of the families of the hostages also talk about a deal at the price of a halt to the fighting, and add that we can always eliminate Hamas afterwards. Hamas, of course, knows this as well, and therefore there is no chance they will agree to a deal without a complete cessation of fighting with clear guarantees that it will not be renewed. Again, a consensual lie—this time on behalf of the families of the hostages and their PR reps. This lie is wrapped in quite a few arguments, almost all of which are unfounded. I heard, for instance, someone claim that it is very important to preserve national unity and therefore the hostages must be returned (implicitly, even at the price of stopping the fighting). That is, if we give up the other goals and bring back the hostages, there will be unity; if not, then they will not unite with us. It reminds me of the “unity of the people” of Smotrich and the Har HaMor folks. In another interview I heard the claim that the pause yielded 100 freed hostages while the fighting yielded not even one; therefore we must make a deal (and then we can return to fighting). That argument is foolish for so many reasons that I do not have the strength even to list them.
But the families are understandable. There are two ways to explain their clinging to this oxymoron. One possibility is that, due to their distress, they are biased and repress the fact that this is an oxymoron. Another possibility is that they know it full well but are also lying (justifiably, from their perspective). They are trying to sell us on making a deal and then eliminating Hamas (for it is unpleasant to say that they want their loved ones at the expense of the security of the rest of the country’s residents), but it is possible that they, too, know perfectly well that this will not happen (because such a deal would necessarily entail a complete cessation of the fighting).
It is important to note that there are also families who think otherwise (almost all of them from the religious right, of course. See the end of column 605 and columns 607–608). They argue that one must not concede and make a deal or a pause even at the price of their loved ones’ lives. These families at least honestly put the facts on the table and do not whitewash them; they are unwilling to lie or bury their heads in the sand, and even set—admirably—an appropriate and non-biased order of priorities. See, for example, the statements of the Mor and Libman families. And of course one cannot ignore the impressive final testament of the soldier Ben Zussman, of blessed memory.
Now a riddle: look at the report here about that very testament, and think: what is missing? You guessed right: the instruction not to make a prisoner exchange. It is an inseparable and very impressive part of the testament, yet it is not mentioned even by hint in an entire article devoted to this testament. The most impressive part was omitted.[1] Quite amazing, no? And this is not the only article that did so. This is a crude expression of the media agenda enveloping us. What the media calls “the families of the hostages” are only those who speak in the first register, namely those who call for a deal at any price. The others are not considered part of “the families of the hostages,” and their voices are hardly heard. The media has crowned who is entitled to be called “families of hostages” (in quotation marks) and who is not; the fact that there is a hostage in your family is only a necessary but not sufficient condition to be included in that definition. I will return to this point below and explain it.
[1] My brother Dani shlit”a pointed out to me that there is a boxed segment there in which this is indeed brought. But such boxed segments are illustrations added by the editors (like titles and subtitles). In the article itself there is no hint of it.
To be clear, I have no complaint against the families themselves. They hire PR agents to promote their cause, which is only natural and fitting. My complaint is toward the media—and in fact the entire world of entertainment—which mobilize and cooperate with this emotional brainwashing. It seems as if all these people work for the PR agents of the “families” (but not for the families). From these quarters I would expect a bit more critical sense, some awareness that there are other views, and no less an awareness that the thesis they are promoting is an oxymoronic lie. But apparently my expectations are excessive for our emotional age (see column 605).
Yair Lapid: Did It Happen or Did I Dream?
But after all the whitewashers, tilters, and liars (justifiably) I mentioned until now, there is someone who seems to be the only one who truly does not understand what I have written here: the former prime minister, Yair Lapid (may he live long and well, honorific). This morning I read his following gem (which is what prompted me to write this column):
Opposition leader Yair Lapid referred to the calls to promote an Israeli outline for a hostages deal, and said in an interview to ynet Live that “a new outline must be placed on the table, because the moment there is a paper on the table it generates action, even if it is not accepted.” According to him, “Netanyahu cannot continue to serve as prime minister. Elections can be held during war.” Lapid noted that he made clear to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu that the opposition will provide backing “even for painful prices in the hostages deal, but Israel cannot stop the fighting because Hamas will return at the first opportunity it has.”
He simultaneously speaks about freeing the hostages for painful prices, but of course this must be done without stopping the fighting until Hamas is destroyed. Wonderful. He is essentially proposing that we square the circle. He is indeed saying exactly what the government and the army say and what the “families of the hostages” (in quotation marks) say, but I already explained that all these are lying—knowingly or unknowingly—and justifiably from their perspectives. By contrast, Lapid seems like someone who does not understand that there is an oxymoron here. His words are akin to proposing to sign a peace agreement with the Palestinians and give them a state while leaving the whole Land of Israel to us. His next proposal will presumably be to solve the climate crisis without changing anything in our behavior. Admit it: these are perfect proposals, and it is unclear how we did not think of them ourselves. I must say that, assuming we are dealing with a person who proposes, as an operative suggestion, to square the circle, appointing him prime minister fills me with gloomy thoughts about our fate. It turns out the current government is not the bottom of the pit.
Another Interpretation
Well, perhaps we can judge Lapid favorably. It may be that he, too, understands the oxymoron here and is simply lying as well. But it is important to understand that for him this is not really a point in his favor. Unlike the government and the families of the hostages, whose lies are justified—each for their own reasons—his lie is not justified. He lies (assuming he is not an idiot) in order to enlist the electorate of the families of the hostages and, together with them, the protest forces against the government. That is his natural electorate, and if he is not lying then he is apparently speaking to them. These are the things they are saying and presumably what they also want to hear from a prime minister.
This brings me to the coalition that has been taking shape in recent weeks between the “families of the hostages” (in quotation marks—i.e., those among them who are oppositional to the government) and the protest forces that fell somewhat silent when the muses began to thunder here. Lately the Kaplan demonstrations are slowly returning, and again they are directed mainly against the government and in particular its head—but this time everything is done under the guise of concern for the hostages. The portrayal is that the government has it within its power to bring them back but chooses a different order of priorities. The punctilious add that it is indifferent to their fate, unintelligent, or corrupt. No wonder that Brothers in Arms and the various protest groups are gleefully riding this wave. It gives them legitimacy to return to the streets and continue the anti-government protests that had ceased in recent months due to events. It may be that Lapid’s words were aimed at the ears of this audience.
The Politicization of the Protest: the Kaplanists and the “Families of the Hostages”
These days there are many displays around the country and the world to remind people of the hostages. On the face of it there is nothing wrong with this, as it is proper to keep the issue on the public table and to identify with their suffering and that of their families. Yet it is hard to ignore the tone with which these displays are conducted. They are perceived as a protest against the government—the military arm of the “families of the hostages” (with quotation marks). It is no wonder that the protest forces (the various Kaplanists) and, of course, the media, join in. Despite the pretense that there is nothing political about this and it is only a moral and ethical matter, one cannot ignore the oppositional political context of this protest. It is perceived—and not for nothing—as a continuation of the previous protest under a different guise. Therefore the main struggle is conducted against the government, not just globally. Again and again one hears the demand to bring them back now, unconditionally and regardless of the price. The various excuses (most of them rather flimsy) come only afterwards. Somehow one gets the impression that anyone who does not aspire to their return at any price is a heartless traitor. People hardly dare to express a more measured view (see what happens to the families of the hostages—without quotation marks—who try to do so).
It is not for nothing that in public discourse the blame for the fiasco is pinned mainly on the government, and very few are willing to point an accusing finger at the army, although it is clear that it bears the chief responsibility. The army’s conceptions failed here, and in my assessment when the army has a clear position it usually succeeds in causing the government to act in its spirit. If the army had wanted to act more actively and proactively, I am sure the government would not have stopped it for long. These days warnings by the army supposedly ignored by the government are published every other day. I am sure such warnings exist all the time, there are quite a few officers and factors in the army, and one can always find, after the fact, warnings pointing in every direction. The prevailing spirit in the army was entirely in tune with Bibi’s and the government’s conception, but the public is unwilling to blame it and put it on the spot. The reason, I think, is the desire to hang the blame on the government (Bibi). In order to do that, the contribution of every other factor to the horrific outcome is blurred. This is yet another indication of the link between the protests about the hostages and the war and the protests that preceded Simchat Torah. We are told, with signs and wonders, the reasons for this in the government’s conduct, and at least to me—as someone who, as is known, is not counted among the government’s great admirers—this is not at all convincing. There is obvious tendentiousness here, and the factors stirring the pot prove it. The claims about government dysfunction, which certainly have some substance, are also greatly exaggerated, and seem to be a product of that same tendency. The impression is that the enormous contribution of “Brothers in Arms” to the functioning of the country and the army in the days after Simchat Torah is also a tool in their previous protest in order to hasten the government’s fall. The events and the hostages are merely the new tool to do so. Therefore I am unimpressed by the favorable media echo that the “families of the hostages” and protest actors receive. In my assessment, the credit they receive among the public itself (and also with me)—which their actions would have deserved on the merits—is diminishing. The politicization of ethical issues is not particularly beloved by the public. The media, as usual, does not reflect reality (especially from the right).
Precisely as someone who would very much like this government and this horrific coalition to disappear to the four winds, I view this trend with great concern. Beyond the tendentious lie involved and the usual debasement of discourse among us, this politicization and these positions are a shot to the protest’s own leg. Before the war I wrote that the demagoguery accompanying the protest against the reform (threats of democratic collapse; Hungary and Poland), which was entirely exaggerated and baseless, ultimately harmed it. It aroused camp-mindedness, and as is known the right-wing camp has a majority. This did not allow the sane right (the non-Bibi-ist) to come out against Bibi, as they felt attacked. In recent days I have begun to feel that the processes I have described here are returning us to the polarization before the war, and as then so now, Bibi supporters will back him all the more (due to the oppositional camp-mindedness). I must say that even I am already passing thoughts of voting for him just to send these harmful actors and this irritating propaganda packing.
We are told that Bibi is not acting to bring back the hostages. That is truly bizarre. He does lie, but we all know that. Moreover, I have already shown that everyone is lying, each for his reasons (most of which are justified). But why would he act against the hostages? After all, his interest—especially as someone perceived (not entirely justly, and certainly not exclusively) as responsible for the failure—is to emerge from it as well and as popular as possible. If anything, I suspect him of a bias in favor of the hostages and against the long-term interests, simply because as the one responsible for the fiasco it is surely hard for him to stand up to the families’ pressure. I fear he will forgo the long-term interests in order to look popular in the short term, by paying excessive prices for the hostages’ release. If he has a bias, in my opinion it is in their favor, not against them. But that does not stop them from going after him and suspecting him and the government, without any basis. In my eyes this is part of that same propaganda campaign whose goal is to create this harmful pressure on the government (if you are told you are not doing enough, it may push you to do more—even if that is not right and even if doing more will harm us all). That is as for the “families of the hostages” (with quotation marks). But the forces joining them—the media and the protest actors—are doing so out of the same position of continuing the previous protest and toppling the government.
Thus, for example, I do not share the criticism about Bibi’s failure to “take responsibility.” That is nonsense. I see no value in empty words with nothing behind them (“the responsibility is all mine”). The criticism about this joins all the baseless criticisms in previous periods (“the Arabs are heading to the polls in droves,” and the like) that were nothing but cheap and groundless propaganda. I certainly do fear that Bibi will not draw the conclusions he needs to draw and will not go home. That is the assumption of responsibility I would expect (at least as ministerial responsibility), and we are all hearing these days (indeed from that same enlisted media) how Bibi is preparing for the day after to prevent that from happening. The problem is that the tendentiousness and politicization of the processes I have described—whose aim is to ensure that he goes—are precisely what will allow him not to go.
The Substantive Context
Beyond the political context and the positions, these events also have a substantive-ideological context. In several columns I have noted the link between the approach to returning the hostages and the dispute between right and left. The left (liberal, not communist) regards the human being as an individual and the collective as something that exists to serve him. Therefore, for it, the fate of the individual stands at the center. The right sees, in the background, the nation—the collective—and is therefore willing to make more “cruel” considerations regarding individuals in order to benefit the collective in the long term. Hence the “families of the hostages” protest fits here very inherently with the left. It is not only because of the oppositional stance toward the government but also because of the ideology they express. Families that do not hold a left-wing worldview (and I assume that in the Gaza-envelope kibbutzim most are not, though there are also hostages from Sderot and Ofakim and from the party at Re’im), due to their personal bias adopt a left-wing narrative here. That, too, creates oppositional dynamics, for the government is made up of right-wing actors who, by virtue of being such, tend to a different course of action (the Haredim are not in the game—you do not hear them, not for nothing—and they are also not in the left-right game. They act for their own interest).
Remember, for example, Smotrich’s and Ben-Gvir’s statements at the beginning of the war that advocated an active and resolute course of action that ignores the hostages. Today they do not dare say that, although the operation proceeds in a manner that indeed ignores them (that is the lie from above). Moreover, within the declared war aims at the outset, the return of the hostages was entirely minor. After about two weeks the tune changed, and returning the hostages became the top mission (first among equals). That is the result of the pressure I have described. But, as noted, this is only at the declarative level, which is a collection of lies. Operationally, everyone understands that such an option does not exist, and at the substantive-ideological level a right-wing government, by virtue of being such, is also unwilling to forgo subduing Hamas (although, as noted, I very much doubt this is feasible) in favor of releasing the hostages.
Discussion
Since this column is political, I will allow myself to enter that (ugly) arena and say a few things:
A. There is indeed an inherent contradiction that any reasonable person understands. Still, in my humble opinion you make one consistent mistake, which causes a bias in many of your columns: you play across the entire political map as if there are equal people there. But no. There are people who know how to play in it, and one of them, whether you like it or not, is the current Prime Minister. The same is true of Bennett, Yossi Cohen, and to a certain degree, in a different way (I’m not saying whether for better or worse), also people of the type of Gantz and Eisenkot. And that is more or less it, in light of what the political table is offering us.
Yair Lapid is not part of this game. He was a failed finance minister and a prime minister who hardly missed being a failure as well (apart from the agreement with Lebanon), and basically, in your terms, he is a complete nobody. Presenting him at all as someone worth citing is embarrassing, and he really does not understand that there is an oxymoron here (he is capable of writing a nice literary article about it, but that’s all). Therefore, the attempt to present him, even implicitly, as any sort of alternative to anything is problematic in my view (of course, everything depends on the eye of the beholder). With all the hatred for Bibi, Lapid simply is not playing on the same field, not even as a beginner. He has never had an opinion on any issue, and he is only cynical (exactly like the common explanation in Hazal of “the face of the generation is like the face of a dog,” which looks backward to see what the public wants it to do), sometimes with Kaplan and sometimes with the hostages. It is a shame that the public is not smart enough to cut him out of the game decisively. So despite your criticism of him, the very fact of presenting him at all is the great sin. And on the judicial reform as well, in my humble opinion you did not reflect the dilemmas in a balanced way because of that same point (lest there be any doubt, my personal view is that Bibi should go immediately after the war ends). Socrates would have required that Yair Lapid not answer at his table.
B. As I already wrote to you in one of the last columns, you are starting from the reasonable assumption that just as Bibi strung us along for twenty years, he will continue to string us along. As for the media, your expectations are indeed excessive. But my feeling is (and perhaps this is holy innocence) that this time the public and the soldiers will not let it stop like that. Therefore, insofar as Hamas really comes under pressure, it may allow (I have no guarantee of this) the release of hostages in exchange for saving a bit of its honor, and then we will be forced to agree to the release of senior terrorists, perhaps even some of the Nukhba operatives, but we will not agree to ending the war. I don’t know, maybe exile, maybe immunity for a very few, etc. At this stage you cannot know what the cards are, and even exile is definitely a card that should be on the table (I agree that in practice they probably won’t use it, and that’s a shame). So it is not black-and-white of either hostages or war.
When I reached the end of the article I noticed the sharing option, and therefore I will allow myself to publish it.
Best regards,
Yoram Bart.
With God’s help, 7 Tevet 5784
Maybe there is a possibility of achieving a decisive outcome, meaning the elimination of Hamas rule, together with the release of all the hostages:
The moment the takeover of Gaza is completed, and only the Hamas leaders remain barricaded and holding the hostages as bargaining chips – they will be given a choice: fight “to the last drop of blood,” or release the captives and go into exile.
There is a reasonable chance that they will prefer to enjoy the pleasures of this world and the money they have hidden away in Swiss bank accounts over a “martyrs’ death,” and therefore will release the hostages in exchange for their lives and freedom in exile.
The question may be: will we have the strength and patience to fight until the Hamas leaders are completely isolated? And that question is very hard to answer.
Best regards, Fish"l
Absolutely. Everything on this site is intended for publication, and there is no need to ask permission.
There are some 15–20 mandates who think differently from you about Lapid. So to say that he is not on the field and does not constitute an alternative is ridiculous. That is regardless of your opinion of him or mine.
Hamas cannot agree to the release of hostages without ending the fighting. That cannot happen. If the fighting continues, it is going to be destroyed anyway, so why should it release prisoners halfway through?
Indeed. I answered you above that everything is intended for reading, and I would be happy for it to be distributed.
Unfortunately, I do not see that happening. I am very afraid that we will bog down there for a very long time, like in Lebanon, without any real progress.
A thought experiment: imagine that under the Bennett government, God forbid, the horrific pogrom of 7.10 had happened. Would Netanyahu have demanded squaring the circle—returning the hostages and toppling Hamas—or not? Would he have demanded that Bennett resign? Take responsibility?
To me the answer is absolutely clear.
Beyond that, isn’t Ben Gvir saying and doing things that amount to squaring the circle just to hold onto his base? For example: “We won’t let a drop of fuel into the Strip,” and at the same time he says, “We will defeat Hamas.” After all, we all know that in order to defeat Hamas (if that is indeed possible), a necessary condition is international legitimacy. And a necessary condition for international legitimacy is letting fuel into the Strip. So why is Ben Gvir trying to square the circle?
Didn’t Netanyahu also square the circle when he said there would be both normalization and judicial reform, when Biden apparently made it clear to him that this was squaring the circle (that he had to choose either reform or normalization)? Netanyahu did not dare criticize Levin even though he knew the price the state was paying, because he feared the base (without getting into his personal position, which in my estimation neither wanted nor believed in the reform to this day, certainly not in its extreme format, which contradicts many of his past statements on decentralizing power).
In short, this is just another example of the infamous phenomenon of populism, so common in our parts (and in my view the current government is the glory of populism incarnate). I do not see anything unusual in Lapid’s conduct.
Still, something has changed. This time even people from the labor-settlement movement, Gantz’s natural “base,” understand that things cannot go on like this. That one cannot return to the devastated communities without a decisive outcome and a real solution.
And therefore there is still backing, even from the “center,” for a military move that aspires to victory, and in the meantime the government is withstanding the pressure, both from the Biden administration and from the “hostage families,” and is continuing the fighting.
Best regards, Fish"l
The contradiction exists only if one assumes that all the goals have to be fully realized. If the security of the Gaza-border communities rises by 90%, Hamas is eliminated by 80% (meaning it becomes something on the scale of Islamic Jihad), and the hostages are released – then in my view the goals have been achieved. In my opinion it is clear that this is also what the government means in these declarations.
As for the next elections, it is doubtful whether there will be anyone to vote for. I have no intention whatsoever of voting for anyone who was prime minister, defense minister, or a senior officer in recent years, and I also have no intention of voting for people who do not represent my views. In the current constellation, that creates an empty set (unless Bibi is replaced by someone with no connection to the failure).
You wrote that there are three goals: destroying Hamas, bringing about a situation in which there is no threat to the Gaza-border communities, and returning the hostages—but you did not discuss the second goal, even though it is really the important one.
Destroying Hamas is a perhaps necessary stage toward that goal, because Hamas in Gaza is a threat to the Gaza-border communities and to the whole country.
Returning the hostages is important not only in itself, but because without it every Israeli will know that his life is not important enough to the politicians, and that the State of Israel will not do everything to save him. That is a tremendous fracture in Israeli society.
But if it is possible to save the hostages and protect the Gaza-border communities without destroying Hamas (at least not right now), that is a far more important goal than this war.
And afterward it will be possible to fight in other ways, for example through economic and diplomatic strangulation, to which the “moderate” Arab states will also join.
To add insult to injury, in the original source about the Second Lebanon War (part 1, minute 21), Drucker brought Prime Minister Olmert’s speech in the Knesset, which set returning the two abductees as a goal of the war. Then he interviews Olmert and asks him why. And Olmert answers – we knew, and said in the cabinet meeting, that there was no chance whatsoever that military action would cause their return, but how could we not say that we were demanding their return? Afterward Olmert also says that he knew that one of them was definitely dead (“but I’m not saying that”).
Although I very much identify with the spirit of this column, I think there is something you did not clarify in your remarks.
The goals of the war are not binary, and likewise a deal with Hamas does not have to include all the hostages. I think that if 95 percent of the hostages are released, that would definitely allow one to put a check mark next to the goal of returning the hostages.
You presumably think there is no plausibility that Hamas would agree to release even most of the hostages without a complete halt to the campaign. I tend to think so myself, but one cannot ignore the fact that the previous deal proved that at times it is indeed possible to reach arrangements with it for a partial release in exchange for a temporary pause.
Apparently this is possible only up to a certain point, but the propagandists of the “hostage families,” whom you accused of lying, argue (rightly) that everything should be done (short of a complete halt to the campaign) in order to make deals of this kind as long as they can be made.
I personally oppose any deal for other reasons. I think a deal harms the country’s long-term security and invites the next kidnappings, and that is a more important consideration. But I can certainly understand someone who argues that additional captives can be extracted from Hamas through deals, without compromising its destruction at the end of the road.
For the IDF’s combat plans in Gaza – see the article by Noam Amir, “The IDF’s combat plans – four stages that will continue until the summer,” on the Makor Rishon website.
A nice quotation. Although these things seem self-evident to me (I do not know what the Prime Minister thinks, but it is clear that even if some prime minister thinks the hostages should be abandoned, he cannot say so. In any case his statements are worth nothing and nothing can be learned from them), it is good to hear it straight from the horse’s mouth.
It seems to me that once you reach a number that allows you to see the mission of returning the hostages as if it has been achieved, that means it is a situation Hamas is not willing to reach. Therefore the contradiction remains. Partial arrangements can certainly be made, and I wrote this in my previous columns.
By the way, I am actually not opposed to such deals, and the consideration of encouraging kidnappings seems secondary to me. If only they could make a deal even at the price of stopping the fighting.
In the article about the will of Ben Zusman, of blessed memory, there does indeed appear a quotation of his opposition to a prisoner exchange deal (at least in the written part, and perhaps it was a later addition)
My brother pointed this out to me, and I already added footnote 1. See it there.
I noticed the note now. (I can’t manage to delete the comment).
“The claims about the government’s dysfunction, which of course do have substance, are also greatly exaggerated, and it seems that they too are a product of the aforesaid trend.”
Weren’t you the one who argued, in response to a question, that it is possible and appropriate to humiliate government ministers in public because of their dysfunction?!
Indeed. What is the question? There is severe dysfunction, and still the accusations were exaggerated and some of them were incorrect.
The release of all the hostages does not fit with continuing the fighting.
The release of some of them does fit—it’s a fact that it happened.
There is a goal to free all the hostages and topple Hamas. Most likely, both goals will not be achieved. Let us hope that a high percentage of both will be achieved.
Hello, Honorable Rabbi,
In my humble opinion, the rabbi’s article ignores the fact that about 100 hostages were released in the previous truce, while it was clear that the fighting would continue—and it indeed continued.
That is, they succeeded in maintaining two goals that the rabbi claims are contradictory.
And who says they will not succeed now? Even if not in releasing all the hostages, perhaps in releasing some of them.
It may be argued that the previous release involved women and children, and Hamas had an interest in releasing them even at the price of continued fighting (mainly because of image-related damage), but the previous truce proved that it is possible to advance two goals that the rabbi claims are contradictory.
In my non-professional estimation, it is quite possible that there will be additional rounds of releasing women, the elderly, the sick, and the like, and Hamas will keep the release of soldiers and young people only in exchange for a full ceasefire with guarantees (and then the goals really will be contradictory).
I would be glad to hear the rabbi’s response.
Daniel
This is completely obvious. Already in the first column I wrote that a partial release is possible. Releasing hostages, not the hostages.
Although the minority opinion among the hostages’ families is important and courageous, it seems that on the “right” there is some kind of a fortiori argument—that, look, if he thinks so then everyone ought to think so, and of course that is not the case.
As for responsibility, one evening I argued that in my opinion the army is so guilty that it is hard to see direct responsibility of the government for the failure, and my tank mates were really angry with me…
As for Lapid, he is indeed aiming at brainwashing the average person, but to his credit it should be said that he warned several weeks before the massacre that we were heading for a disaster on the Gaza border
The mistake of the security and political establishment (and perhaps of everyone) that causes this contradiction is the thought that our war is with Hamas. But that is not correct. Our war is with the Gazan people. In the same way that our war with Iraq was with the Iraqis and not with Saddam Hussein’s regime (and just as a nuclear war, had it broken out, would have been between the Americans and all the inhabitants of the USSR, and not only with members of the Communist Party). Therefore there is no need whatsoever to destroy Hamas, and that also would not help. For certainly, if we withdraw from the entire Strip now after destroying Hamas and return to the previous situation, a new regime will arise there that will be exactly like Hamas. So the problem is with the people and not with the regime.
Since that is so, in any case we need to take revenge on the Gazan people. Something like several hundred thousand dead. Not to flatten Gaza. To kill people. And preferably disproportionately. That is what will create deterrence. Because proportionality is anti-deterrence. In any event, the more we destroy, the more the people there will pressure the regime until they overthrow it, and even if not—every regime and army need civilians to work for them, supply them with food and tax money and goods and maintenance. Without civilians there will be no army and no regime. Therefore, the more the killing there increases, in the end they will beg us to take the hostages from them and stop. And that will also be the indicator that revenge has been achieved.
The fact that we do not have international credit to do this is another matter. Maybe public diplomacy will help a bit. We are constantly accused of genocide. So this is a justified genocide. But at least people here should know what the truth is. Maybe if we are united around this, God will help us as He did in the Six-Day War
With respect, I do not understand responses of this type. After all, my personal opinion is certainly not relevant and not interesting. But if I understood correctly, you are trying to do a sort of “table-clearing” and a kind of objectification of the discourse. So if there are 20 mandates that still vote for Bibi or want to vote for Lapid, they are not relevant, because we are not talking about the phenomenon as such but about its justification.
It is clear to anyone who sees the facts that the more the pressure on Hamas increases, the deal to return the hostages comes back to the table at a better price
(if the IDF had not entered the Strip, apparently not a single hostage would have returned)
As proof, 100 hostages have already returned without a ceasefire; it is possible to reach a deal that is not zero or one (destroying Hamas without hostages, or returning all the hostages with a total ceasefire). For example, the previous deal: a partial pause with a reasonable ratio of terrorists in exchange for hostages,
and thereby achieve all the goals.
Where does this certainty about an oxymoron come from??
By contrast, to argue that first we will return all the hostages in exchange for a total ceasefire (show all the cards and also want to win), and afterward we will defeat Hamas—that is a lie. As you explained.
To fight and in the meantime achieve a better deal seems to me the right path for everyone (civilian security, military security, and a better chance of freeing hostages, as Libman argues).
And regarding the saying “Plato is dear, Socrates is dear, but truth is dearest of all” – before Havot Yair and the Ri"d, Rabbi Zerahiah Halevi preceded them, quoting (in his introduction to the book HaMaor) a similar phrase in the name of the grammarian Rabbi Yonah Ibn Janah: “As the wise teacher Ibn Janah wrote in his response to the great teacher, the master grammarian Rabbi Judah Hayyuj, of blessed memory, he mentioned the words of the philosopher who replied to his teacher and said: Plato is at odds with truth, and both are our beloved, but truth is more beloved.”
Best regards, Fish"l
It may be that there are differences of opinion within the government on the question of priority in the tension between toppling Hamas and freeing the hostages.
In an article in Makor Rishon, Netanyahu is quoted declaring that the fighting will continue until Hamas is toppled and the hostages are freed.
By contrast, Gantz says in another article that he gives priority to freeing the hostages, since the struggle to eradicate Hamas will take a long time, but the hostages may not have much time left.
Best regards, Fish"l
There is an article by a Kan commentator (in the series “In Our Neighborhood”) explaining the Qataris’ haste in pushing forward the hostage deal.
According to him, the Qataris are playing a double game. On the one hand they are radical Islamists and supporters of terror, and on the other hand they are trying to maintain the image of a country allied with the West.
The massacre and kidnapping of civilians, which showed Hamas to be identical to ISIS – damages the Qataris’ “respectable image,” and therefore they are speeding up the hostage deal.
Likewise, the collapse of the Hamas regime, which would join the curbing of the Muslim Brotherhood in Arab countries – could bring Qatar back to a state of diplomatic isolation. The success of the hostage deal – may, in their view, save their loyal allies in Hamas.
Indeed, Qatar is a disgusting country 🙂
Best regards, Fish"l
At last, someone telling the truth. He must have read this column :):
https://www.ynet.co.il/news/article/yokra13728232
With God’s help, 16 Tevet 5784
For the recommendation of Maj. Gen. (res.) Yitzhak Brik, see the article: “Move to the encirclement and attrition stage – now,” on the Arutz 7 website
Best regards, Fish"l
The problem with Lapid is that you are not sure he knows there is a contradiction here. I at least prefer politicians who are cynical and sharp to those who are honest and shallow.
Someone shallow (feeble-minded) cannot be honest, because from the outset he will not know how to distinguish between straight and crooked. Lapid did corrupt things without even noticing that he had done them ׁׁ(when people spoke about opposition to the demonstrations as compared to the demonstrations against the disengagement from Gush Katif)
Not letting fuel into Hamas and defeating it is not a contradiction. On the contrary, an almost necessary condition for victory over Hamas is not to allow fuel in. The international arena is simply on Hamas’s side, and the struggle against it is part of the struggle against Hamas. You are apparently a student of Lapid
With God’s help, 20 Tevet 5784
It is worth noting that there is talk which, by being raised, actually reduces the chances of success.
The more eagerness one shows for carrying out a hostage-release deal – the more the other side raises the price.
And the more doubt one raises about the ability to eliminate Hamas – the more its staying power grows.
It is not clear that time is working against us. There is indeed concern that international pressure will continue to grow, but on the other hand it is possible that the coming elections in the U.S. will return to power an administration more sympathetic to us, and make it easier for us to increase the military pressure on Gaza.
Hello Rabbi
I would like to ask:
1. Why are you doubtful that we will succeed in toppling Hamas?
2. Don’t you think that the two are interconnected, and that once we defeat Hamas and knock it to the mat, then as a consequence of that the hostages too will return to us, because those who were holding them will have been toppled?
1. By now almost everyone already understands and admits that this is not going to happen. When I wrote this, there was still denial.
2. I explained that this is a contradiction in terms. If you kill them all, the hostages will die with them. They have no reason whatsoever to make a deal or keep them alive. Returning hostages happens only in a deal, and you do not make a deal with someone you declare you will not stop until you eliminate him. This is elementary logic, and it was explained here in the column
They keep discovering America: https://news.walla.co.il/item/3636206
But some insist on continuing to live in the same contradictory movie: https://www.srugim.co.il/886612-%d7%94%d7%a6%d7%a0%d7%97%d7%a0%d7%99%d7%9d-%d7%9c%d7%9e%d7%92%d7%93-%d7%92%d7%93%d7%95%d7%93-71-%d7%9c%d7%90-%d7%9b%d7%9a-%d7%97%d7%95%d7%a0%d7%9b%d7%a0%d7%95-%d7%91%d7%a6%d7%94%d7%9c
The continued sobering-up: https://twitter.com/attilus/status/1746545675234402766
Here it becomes clear that defining the two goals, despite the obvious contradiction between them, came to serve a political need:
https://news.walla.co.il/item/3645804
Hi Michi. You present the return of the hostages as a clear and absolute built-in contradiction to the destruction of Hamas, because Hamas will not release the hostages under any other circumstances. I do not agree that this is an oxymoron; after all, Hamas released almost half the hostages without stopping the war, and on this Bibi and his holy Torah-and-responsa rely. That is, that Hamas will understand that there is no chance it will get the war stopped, and while suffering heavy losses, will agree to return them in exchange for a temporary pause that will allow it (in its view) to rearm. Or perhaps in exchange for other agreements, such as smuggling Hamas leaders abroad and the like, as imagination sees fit. So yes, one may argue that nothing can be inferred from the previous deal because it concerned the release of women and children and not men and soldiers, and because hostages still remained, etc. etc., but these are only arguments and probabilities, and there is no oxymoron/built-in contradiction at all in the claim that one may draw an analogy from the first deal, and in the reasoning that at some point Hamas will understand that there is no possibility the war will stop, and will at least try to rebuild its strength for what comes next, or demand one or another sweetener (such as the return of prisoners), in the sense of “if you seize a little, you have seized something.” I would be glad to hear your opinion on these remarks.
I wrote my opinion. Didn’t you read it? There are always various remote possibilities of one kind or another. A contradiction in such contexts is not a logical contradiction but something unreasonable.
Hello to Rabbi Michael Abraham.
I completely agree with your description of the lie/oxymoron and with the media’s treatment of the exceptional families who speak out in favor of continuing the fighting despite the risk to their loved ones’ lives.
I have written this opinion of mine on several occasions and in several comments.
I would like to publicize your article on those sites.
Do you permit/agree to the copying of this article or parts of it and to giving publicity to these ideas on various websites?
Best regards,
Yoram Bart.